

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
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A TOUR
THROUGH
THE NAVAL AND MILITARY
Establishments
OF
GREAT BRITAIN,

IN THE YEARS 1816—17—18—19 AND 1820.

By CHARLES DUPIN,

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RARY ASSOCIATE OF THE ROYAL IRISH ACADEMY, AND OF THE
SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS OF GREAT BRITAIN, &c. &c.

Fidem incorruptam professis———

Tacit. Hist. lib. i.

—◆—
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

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INTRODUCTION.

IN the following work, I have endeavoured to exhibit the full extent of the Military and Naval Forces which the government of Great Britain can bring into the field, or launch upon the ocean. I have likewise described the connection of these forces with the government of the country, and also the discipline usually exercised in order to produce a hardihood in battle, invulnerable to fear and unassailable by cowardice. My observations on these subjects were derived from a residence of five years in England; during which time I was constantly employed in visiting and viewing every object and institution worthy of notice relative to the British Army and Navy.

Respecting the Army I shall say but little in this place; my observations on it will be found at large in another part of the work, to which I refer the reader: but on the subject of the Navy, and the importance of a similar *permanent* establishment in France, I beg leave to make the following remarks, to which I hope my countrymen will pay that attention which so important a subject deserves.

I regard a naval force as necessary and indispensable, not only to the opulence of the state, and the national prosperity, but to the independence, and consequently to the honour of France.

This opinion, I fear, may seem paradoxical to the greater number of Frenchmen; but, if they are desirous to elevate their minds above vulgar prejudices and errors, and sincerely to seek the simple truth, let them merely fix their thoughts on the wanderings, and the innumerable contradictions which public opinion presents, on this highly interesting subject.

The Navy is the sole force which never can endanger the liberties of a people; and yet, notwithstanding, but a little while ago, it was, even in the eyes of the defenders of liberty in France, an extremely unpopular institution.

We find, in all ranks of society in France, certain individuals who believe themselves excellent Frenchmen, because they can fight foreigners marvellously well with words. They attribute to the British government an instinct of hatred, infallible with regard to us. Every where they repeat, that by secret treaties, England compels us not to arm our ships, but to keep our Navy in an abject state, in order

that it may be annihilated by our own hands. This, say they, is the interest of England!—And immediately afterwards they proclaim, that it is not the interest of France to have a *naval force*.

Let us now turn to another set of men, who, without Lodi, Arcola, and Marengo, would be ignorant that France had immortalized her standards before the inauguration of the imperial eagles. The minds of these men are wholly occupied by the battles of Austerlitz, Wagram, Jena, Friedland, and Moscow. These were, for them, the times and the places of immortal glory. Every thing at that epoch appears to them to partake of the sublime. They have forgotten the loss of our fleets, our seamen, and our colonies; they have even forgotten the disaster of Trafalgar; and the conflagration, more recently, of the ships of the Isle-of-Aix. They speak to us in ecstasy of the imperial Army; and they overwhelm, with sovereign contempt, the *Navy of France!*

Some men of the generation which is now passing away, exclusively faithful to the ancient fame of France, would be disposed to favour, by retrospection, a Navy which now beholds the flag of past ages flying over its ships. But these generous wishes they destroy by so many absurd ideas and anti-national errors, that in public opinion they have nearly done as much injury to the Navy of France, as those on the other side have done by their pedantic animadversions.

Because that, too often, in the course of the last war, our seamen (ill-disciplined) shewed a want of ability, many individuals have hastened to conclude that they were incapable of ever becoming good seamen. They have gravely pronounced this sentence: *The French were never designed by nature for the Navy.*—As if warriors, strong, active, intelligent, and courageous, could not be trained to every branch of *naval* and *military* tactics!

I shall conclude this Introduction with hoping that from the following relation of facts, every Frenchman, by judging for himself, will acknowledge, and instil into the minds of his children, the necessity of establishing a permanent Navy for the support of the honour and glory of France, and for the protection of its hearths and its altars, from the rivalry of surrounding nations. This, and this only, will continue to France a share in the balance of power at present established in Europe.

C. DUPIN.

A TOUR THROUGH THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

Sketch of the Maritime Power of the Kings of England.—Their Dominion of the Seas.—On the Royal Authority, in its Relation with the British Naval Force.—Connexion of Parliament with the Naval Force.—Penal Laws.—Naval Inquiries.—Accusations and Judgments of Parliaments.

IN order to form a just idea of the progress, vicissitudes, and pretensions of the naval power of England, we must go back to epochs of a very remote period.

Before the ninth century, Great Britain, without any navy which she could call her own, was the prey of every sea-faring people who thought proper to invade her. This conquest of the predecessor of Augustus, and of the hero immortalised by Tacitus, was, in the end, despised and abandoned by the Cæsars. At that period the feeble Britons, debased by four centuries of slavery, were become incapable of supporting their independence. Instead of seeking to defend themselves on their own seas, and to protect their property and their liberties, they supplicated, from among the semi-barbarians of the west, a master who might protect them against the barbarians of the north. Thus, for want of knowing how to reckon upon their own forces alone, they beheld, during five centuries, their territory invaded and torn asunder by seven contemporaneous tyrannies,* which, by turns, attacked, usurped, and exhausted each other, and at last engulfed themselves in the Saxon monarchy. Here commences the history of the British naval force, the principal epochs of which we shall now briefly allude to.

England is the sole monarchy which can boast of a long succession of kings among its celebrated naval officers. From the reign of the Saxons, in less than a century, it was governed

* The Heptarchy.

by four princes, who fought and gained in person many naval engagements, viz. Alfred the Great, Edward the Elder, Athelstan the son of Edward, and Edgar.

Alfred the Great instituted the British navy; he built gallies larger than those which had been seen since the period of the splendid navy of the ancients; he triumphed over fleets, as he did over the Danish armies, broke the yoke of the foreigner which weighed upon his invaded kingdom; scoured the British coasts of the pirates that infested them; and, sovereign of the narrow seas which circumscribed his dominions, he denominated himself "*The King of the Straits.*"

In treating of the Commercial navy, we shall have occasion to admire the views of Alfred, who, from the ninth century, sent vessels towards the North-pole,* to endeavour to find a passage, of which he foresaw the importance, and which, from that epoch to the present day, has been vainly attempted to be discovered. We shall have to admire farther that admirable law of Athelstan,† by which every merchant, who made two long sea-voyages, at his own expense, obtained the rank and titles of nobility, granted every where else for the defence or the conquest of territory. To learn to reside on the ocean, was to begin the occupation of the British provinces; and to discover unknown seas, was to extend the limits of an empire, which now thought of proclaiming the dominion of the seas as its natural right.

Edgar, the successor of Athelstan, displayed forces still more formidable than those of the great Alfred: he divided them into three permanent fleets, to protect the east, west, and north, of his dominions. He embarked on-board the eastern fleet every spring, surveyed the opposite coast of France, visited the roads and the ports of the channel, as far as the extreme frontier of the south; went on-board the western fleet, made the tour of Ireland and the Hebrides; and, at last, joined the northern fleet, with which he returned to the Thames.

When Edgar held his court at Chester, he compelled the sovereigns of Scotland, Cumberland, and the Isle of Man, with five petty kings of the west and the north of England, to row in a bark, of which he himself held the rudder. In this manner he went down the river Dee, as far as the Abbey of St. John the Baptist, where these princes bound themselves, by a solemn oath, to recognize and defend his dignity as *Lord Paramount over land and sea*. Such were the pretensions of Edgar, that his edicts bore the title of "*I, Edgar, King of Albion, Sovereign of all the neighbouring Isles, and of the ocean which surrounds them, &c.†*"

* Spelman's Life of Alfred the Great, p. 151. † Hume's History of the Plantagenets, vol. i. chap. 2.

† Entick's Naval History of the British Marine, introduction, p. iv.

After this brilliant epoch, the British navy having declined by degrees, was restored by a law which appears to have been borrowed from Athens.* Ruined again by treasons, and by civil discord, the inheritance of Alfred was left defenceless against the kings of Denmark, who, as conquerors, navigators, or pirates, were equally formidable. Canute, one of those kings, usurped the throne of England, preserved by laws what he had acquired by force, and became just, as soon as he thought he could, with safety, cease being ferocious; by such conduct, in a barbarous age, he obtained and merited the title of GREAT. He ruled over the seas, but without believing, like Xerxes, that he could command that element. As a reply to those courtiers, who awarded him such an empire, he caused his chair to be placed on the sea-shore, when the tide was at its lowest ebb. Certain of seeing himself disobeyed, he ordered it to retreat still farther, when suddenly the waves advanced and covered, without distinction, both the chair of the wise king and the seats of his flatterers.

The successors of Canute, as negligent as the successors of Edgar, equally omitted to maintain the navy on a respectable footing. Thus, as soon as a state has lost its natural means of defence, there is generally a conqueror ready to invade it: during ten centuries, England has furnished an example of this truth.

During this long period we find England, on various occasions, invaded by the brigands of the north, and by conquests which gradually weakened their maritime force. They consequently grew effeminate, and became the prey of pirates, more familiar with the labours and the dangers of the sea.

On the contrary, the Normans established on the coasts of France, and compelled, in order to maintain themselves there, to fight without intermission, had retained from the nations from whom they were descended, the same activity, audacity, and thirst for invasion, which seemed the innate passion of the barbarians of the north. After having usurped the two Sicilies, braved the Lower Empire, and spread terror into the east, they turned their views against England; they proclaimed the conquest of it, before even they had attempted a landing. All the friends of rapine and pillage consented to it. Immediately armed chiefs, calling themselves knights, were seen from all the northern states, hastening to range themselves under the banners of William the Conqueror, in order to march to the predicted usurpation, and share the future spoils of the vanquished.

* The law of Ethelred prescribed to every proprietor of three hundred acres of land, to equip a vessel for the defence of the coasts. *Hume's History of the Plantagenets*, vol. i. p. 288. As to the law of Athens, see *Demosthenes on the Division of Citizens into Tributaries*; and *Isocrates, on the Replacing of the Tributaries*.

Harold, King of England, after having caused the straits of the channel to be guarded with his fleet, entered into his ports and disarmed his vessels. William, seizing the favourable opportunity, landed on the English coast, without meeting any obstacle. It was within sight of these very coasts, that Harold lost at once both his crown and his life, in a battle to which the Normans marched, singing the hymn of the heroes of France.*

The Conqueror learned, by his victory, how much a naval force was not only necessary to the preservation of his conquest, and the defence of the coasts, but to the safety of the territory. He considered the Kentish coast as the bulwark of England; he immediately established, for the defence of these shores, a maritime feudality, the traces of which still subsist in the British constitution. Of the five ports of Dover, Hastings, Hythe, Romney, and Sandwich,† he formed a political body to which he gave great privileges; at the sole charge of furnishing him for fifteen days, and, as soon as he wished, with fifty-two armed vessels, each manned by twenty-four sailors.

Richard Cœur-de-Lion, in concert with Philip-Augustus, set sail for the Holy-Land, forced Ptolemais to surrender, destroyed the fleet of the infidels, and, by his exploits, obtained the title of *Captain-general of the Christian forces in Asia*.‡ Thus did England, from this epoch, present to the Venetians that rival which, four centuries later, was to deprive them of the dominion of the sea and treasures of the east.

In the early part of the reign of Edward III. the English navy achieved great victories: this prince gained in person the battle of 1340, against the fleet of Philip of Valois. Six years afterwards, he destroyed all the French ships which he could reach, at Cherbourg, at Harfleur, and at Hague; and blockaded by sea the town of Calais, which was rendered equally celebrated both by its defence and its surrender. In short, three years later, Edward and his son, burning with revenge for an insult from the Spaniards, embarked and sailed to attack the fleet of the aggressors, which they completely destroyed.

The reign of Edward, for a long time glorious and prosperous, like that of Louis XIV. was similarly unfortunate towards the close. In 1372, the English fleet, intending to relieve Rochelle, was in its turn completely beaten by the combined French and Spanish fleets. Henry VIII. did not himself command his fleets, but he achieved more for them than any of his predecessors. Until his reign, the English navy consisted only of vessels belonging to

* The hymn of Rolland, a peer of Charlemagne.

† Winchelsea, Rye, and Seaford, were afterwards added to the Cinque Ports.

‡ Lediard, Hist. Nav. d'Anglet., liv. i. chap. 6.

private individuals; and put in requisition at the hour of necessity. Henry felt the advantage of having vessels, of which the state itself was the proprietor, and consequently directed the permanent appointment of their officers. He was, therefore, the founder of the royal navy of England. He instituted the Court of Admiralty and the Navy-office, for the service and the management of the ports; organized the fraternity of pilots, known under the name of the Trinity-house; founded the arsenals of Deptford, Woolwich, and Portsmouth; fortified Gravesend and Tilbury, to protect the mouth of the Thames, whilst, in order to defend the opposite coast of France, he built the castles of Portland, Hurt, Cowes, Camber, South-sea, Sandgate, Walmer, Deal, Sandsdown, Queenborough, Pendennis, and St. Maws.

The great Elizabeth equally protected the naval force. She built Upnor-Castle, to protect the arsenal of Chatham; augmented the number of her vessels, attended to the preservation of ship-timber, introduced into her dominions the manufactory of gunpowder caused iron and bronze cannon to be cast, increased the pay, and rendered the situation of the sailors more comfortable, prepared to repel the invasion of the powerful Philip II., personally superintended the labours and the armament of her fleet; inspired a whole people by her enthusiasm; triumphed over the Grand Armada; and received, in short, the glorious titles of the "*Restorer of the Naval Powers, and Sovereign of the Northern Seas.*"*

Under James I. and his successor, the English navy acquired no additional fame. But this epoch is remarkable for the anti-social claims reproduced at that time towards the exterior powers, and supported with the same animosity, through all the horrors of civil wars, as in the bosom of the most profound internal peace.

The English not merely give the name of the British Seas to all that part of the ocean which washes the coasts of Great Britain, Ireland, and the neighbouring isles; but, under this captious denomination, they comprise the whole of that part of the ocean which extends as far as the coasts of Spain, France, Holland, Sweden, and Denmark; and, because the English called these seas by the name of British, they pretend that they form an integral part of Great Britain; and, consequently, they declare themselves the absolute masters of it.

Let us examine what are, or at least what were, their pretensions to this sovereignty. The kings of England pretended that they alone, in the extent of the seas called British, had the right of granting or refusing fishery of all kinds, and of the precious

* See Schomberg, vol. i. p. 24.

productions, such as coral, pearls, amber, &c. ; of levying tributes on the fishermen, as well as on the merchant-seamen of all nations ; and of exercising, as lords-paramount, a jurisdiction throughout the whole extent of these seas ; of granting or refusing at pleasure the entrance and the passage of ships-of-war of all nations ; in short, of exacting homage from all foreign flags.*

It was under Charles I. that the famous discussion took place on this subject between England and the United Provinces. In 1629, Grotius wrote his *Mare liberum*, to show how much the pretensions of England, in this respect, were contrary to the law of nations ; Selden replied to it by the book entitled *Mare clausum*. Charles I. ordered that a copy of the latter work should be deposited in the Court of Admiralty, as a testimony of the sovereignty of the English over the sea. But we must go a little farther back for the history of the pretensions of England to this sovereignty.

From the reign of King John, the commanders of English fleets were allowed, and indeed enjoined to compel every foreign flag to strike before that of Great Britain ; to attack and capture refractory vessels ; the mere fact of their disobedience sufficed for their being declared lawful captures, even in time of peace.†

In 1554, a Spanish fleet, of 160 sail, bringing Philip II. who came to marry Queen Mary, encountered the English fleet in the channel, commanded by the lord-high-admiral. Philip wished to pass on without striking his royal flag ; but the proud admiral firing a shot over the ship which bore the son of an emperor, who was engaged in marriage with his own queen, compelled Philip to be the first to lower his flag and to strike his top-gallant sails.‡ “ *An action, highly meritorious and worthy of imitation !* ” said Captain Schomberg, in relating this trait of barbarous pride, in his naval chronology of England, vol. i. p. 23.

Under James I., the United Provinces refused to pay to the British flag that homage exacted from all foreign nations : it was accordingly thought proper, at all hazard, to chastise such an act of independence. Shortly after, an English fleet encountered six Dutch vessels, the admiral of the fleet compelled the

* “ And all these prerogatives,” says Entick, “ belong *incontestably* to the kings and queens of Great Britain. *Naval Hist. Introduction. The Sovereignty of the Seas asserted and vindicated.* ”

† Schomberg, vol. i. p. 9.

‡ Under Elizabeth, a Spanish fleet, having Anne of Austria on-board, landed at Plymouth and neglected to strike its flag ; a ball shot over the ship which carried the princess, gave notice to the admiral to render the accustomed homage to the English flag.

commander of the squadron to strike his national colours three times; and, not satisfied with such an act of submission, he obliged Holland to lower her flag, so long as she cruised in the neighbourhood of the coasts of Great Britain.

The Republic or Commonwealth of England, even in the period of its greatest distress, never abated any of the pretensions of those kings whom it had displaced. Vainly, in 1652, did Van Tromp, after having beaten the English fleet, cruise along their coast, with a broom suspended from the top of his gallant mast, as a signal that he was come to sweep the seas from the tyrants which ruled over them. The English Republic, as persevering as Rome was after the disaster of Cannes, dictated laws to its rivals, in the midst of its defeats, as well as in the heart of its triumphs; redoubled its efforts, and again seized upon the dominion of the seas. In less than two years, the Dutch, conquered and blockaded in all their ports, were forced, for the first time, to consent, by a solemn treaty, that their ships should lower their flags before those of England.

Under Henry IV., the Duke de Sully, prime-minister, repaired in solemn embassy to the court of James I. The English, ere they received the Protestant hero, dispatched a vessel to meet him, with an order to compel him to lower his French flag: he refused, attesting his double character as an ambassador and an ally; but three discharges of artillery forced him to obey. Henry IV. obtained only vague and vain excuses, as a reparation for such an infringement on the laws of nations.*

Under Louis XIII., a French squadron degraded itself so far as to render a similar homage to the English, at a distance from those seas called British, in the bosom of the Mediterranean, and almost within sight of the French coast. But Louis XIV. would sooner have devoted his whole navy to certain destruction, than have humbled his royal standards to such a point. Fortune favoured his noble pride. For, the last time, the Stuarts were replaced on the throne of England, Charles II. in gratitude for the benefits of the potentate who formerly supported, and still warned him against his own subjects, commanded his captains not to demand from French ships, either the salute by salvos, or the lowering of the flag, and top-gallant sails.

What a contrast! Louis XIV., who judged it unworthy of the high rank of a king, to render a similar homage to England,

* "It was necessary," says Richelieu, in addressing Louis XIII., "That the king, your father, should have used dissimulation on this occasion; but with this resolution, another time, to support the rights of his crown, by that force which time would give him the means of acquiring by sea."—*Testament Politique*, ch. 1. s. 5.

strove to enforce it himself from other kings. This is proved by the declaration of 1680, directing that the flags of all Spanish vessels should be lowered to the French ships of war.*

At the recital of these discussions, engagements, and treaties, the moderns might imagine themselves transported back to those ages of barbarism, in which insolent knights, infesting, by their pride and their arms, the high roads and public places, obliged peaceable travellers to humble themselves before them; or if they refused, plundered them without mercy, in order to obtain from them some flattering marks of deference and vassalage.

It was but a paltry honour, however, to cause the sails and colours to be lowered before the smallest vessel of the English navy. Thus, when the British power had acquired more lustre, it sought other advantages from its maritime superiority. Not content with being recognised as lords-paramount of the seas, the English declared themselves the proprietors of them, and arrogated the monopoly of commerce. To this was owing the famous Navigation Act, for which England was less indebted to the genius, than to the passions of Cromwell.† Charles II., on ascending the throne, took care not to annul the act of the Protector: he contented himself with simply placing his name to it, as to the most part of the great institutions of the Republic and the Protectorate.

The Navigation Act prohibited the importation into Great Britain of the productions of Africa, America, Asia, Russia, and Turkey in Europe, in any other vessels than those of England. This act reduced every nation on the continent to load only its own vessels with the particular productions of its soil and industry, in order to obtain entrance into the British ports: whilst the English reserved for themselves, sword in hand, to carry their own productions, and those of the whole world, into all the ports of the universe.

Had the nations of Europe, from that time, been as enlightened as the English people, they would, by simple reprisals, have immediately put an end to this prohibitory law; but, in

* *Consid. sur la Marine Franc.* 1818, p. 27. *Essais sur la Marine, La Serre*, p. 31.

† Cromwell, in order to punish the isle of Barbadoes for its attachment to the Stuarts, conceived the idea of subjecting it to employ only English vessels in the export of its productions, which could no longer be sold but in the markets of the mother-country. Thus it is to a feeling of vengeance, and as it were to a penal law, that England is indebted for the origin of that colonial system, which has so well turned to the profit of the metropolis. However this may be, scarcely had England perceived the advantages which it might derive from restrictions imposed on navigation by one of its colonies, than it hastened to extend all its possessions beyond the seas.

the origin, it appeared only directed against Holland: it caused no alarm to the other nations. The Dutch were then the factors or agents of nearly all the nations of the continent, and those nations could not foresee all the injury which they would ultimately receive from a measure which did not directly affect them.

After a sanguinary war, England triumphed over the United Provinces. Spain and France next began to recognise the danger of the system established by ambitious islanders. Those two powers attempted by turns, and sometimes together, to resist the maritime usurpations of Great Britain. They might have been able to rally all the other powers to their cause, by instructing them as to their true interests, by shewing them every thing which was unjust, humiliating, and pernicious, in monopolizing the commerce of the seas; but guided by a foolish pride, or restrained by a narrow-minded egotism, those nations, after having treated without generosity, fought without prudence, and sunk under the struggle.

Those continental states which, at first, considered themselves strangers to this conflict between Great Britain and the maritime nations, have cruelly felt the attacks of a ruling dominion over the seas. For, this power gave to all its possessors the commerce of the whole globe, and the riches accruing from that commerce. The treasures acquired by this monopoly soon served to sow discord among the continental nations, and to stir up the people against their kings, and kings against their people; and, what is worse, citizens against citizens! In short, when the several states, exhausted by these horrors, treated for peace, in order to heal their wounds, the ruling power of the seas, protected from the evils of which it had been the cause, suddenly found herself the legitimate mistress of sixty millions of conquered subjects, besides possessing the keys of all the seas, and of a territory more extensive than all Europe together.

It is doubtful whether England has even at this day abandoned its pretensions to the sovereignty of the seas. However, content with the real empire, she no longer exacts from foreign nations humiliating homage; she arrogates to herself when necessary, more positive and useful rights. We shall shortly find the English juris-consults endeavouring to prove that the constitution authorises the kings of England to commit privateering hostilities before a declaration of war has broken the treaties of peace.

With allies, and neutral powers, these kings declared, when it pleased them, that such, or such a part of the coast of one of the seas of the world was, until further orders, interdicted to nations, whether friends or enemies. It is not necessary, that

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an English cruiser should perform the blockade; the signature of a minister of his Britannic Majesty is sufficient to place ideal barriers, at such a distance from the shore, across the plains of the ocean. It is sufficient when the Cabinet of St. James's indicates to the universe, under what degrees of latitude and longitude the liberty of the seas ceases to exist! Every neutral vessel becomes seizable, if it oversteps this barrier, in order to continue its commercial relations with those nations with whom it is in amity. And, because the word blockade is derived from the war vocabulary, the British power looks upon this suspension of the general right of nations as a sacred law, which all the nations of the earth ought humbly to obey.

What an abuse of power! The sea is at once the public place, the public mart, and the public thoroughfare of nations. That nations should be the exclusive masters, on their own coasts, rivers, and lakes, formed by nature, in the heart of their territory, is nothing more than just. They command on these seas with the same title as on the land of their ancestors. But that a state should arrogate to itself the dominion of a sea, which bathes the frontiers of many other empires;—that it should pretend, at its pleasure, to interdict nations in the passage of a vast ocean;—that it should close, by an edict, those routes which it cannot even descry from the top of the most elevated heights of its inhospitable coast; is attacking the liberty of nations, placing shackles on their natural and legitimate intercourse, aiming a blow at the progress and the benefits of civilization, and declaring itself in permanent hostility against the whole human race.

Sometimes oppressed nations have united their means to repel these invasions and oppressions by force. Such was the armed neutrality of the northern powers at the commencement of the present century. But the death of Paul I. deprived this great example afforded to nations of any useful result.

France might, and ought to have been in the first rank in the coalitions formed for obtaining the liberty of the seas. Napoleon was aware of this great truth. But his ambition destroyed all the advantages which might have been derived from similar associations. Was it not absurd, indeed, to talk continually to the people of their liberty on the seas, when, by stratagem or violence, their liberty was destroyed in their own dwellings? This was the reason why Napoleon never had a sincere ally among the maritime powers.

We have seen, at a recent period, a people, confident in its own courage, and in the justice of its cause, brave all hazards and suffer all evils, rather than bow its head under a humiliating yoke. It was thus that the United States of America, irritated

against the prohibitions, the exactions, made on-board their vessels by the English, have, within these few years, commenced the first war in which Great Britain has been compelled to acknowledge that it was necessary to put some limit to her maritime pretensions.

On the Royal Authority, in its Relations with the British Naval Force.

After having considered the maritime power of England acting against other nations, let us examine the rights which the British constitution possesses, and the obligations which it imposes on the executive power, relative to the naval force.

The supreme command of this force is placed, by the constitution, in the hands of the king. To him alone it belongs to furnish the armaments, and direct the expeditions, during war and peace. The nomination to all the appointments, the promotion to all the ranks, elevation to all the honours, are, in the service of the navy, as in that of the army, ranked among the prerogatives of the crown.

To the king belongs the power of making peace and declaring war. He not only authorizes the vessels of the state to attack those of the enemy, but he can grant to captains of privateers the right of attacking and capturing ships which are the property of the subjects of that enemy. He can do more, he can authorize national privateers to attack the ships of a foreign nation, many days before war has been declared. Let us hear on this subject the celebrated Blackstone, considered by the English as the oracle of their jurisprudence.*

"As a delay in the operations of war may sometimes cause prejudice to individuals who have suffered by depredations, on the part of foreign potentates, our laws have, in some respects, invested the subjects with the power of constraining the royal prerogative, since it directs the ministers of the crown to deliver letters of marque and reprisals, after a request duly made. The prerogative of granting these letters is much the same with that of making war: it is evidently derived from it; it is only, in fact, a state of *incomplete* hostility, which generally ends by a formal declaration of war. *These letters may be granted conformably to the law of nations*,† every time that the subjects of a state are oppressed or injured by those of another, and that justice is refused by the government to whom the oppressor belongs. In this case, the letters of marque and reprisals (words synonymous

* *English Commentaries*, Book 1. *Right of Persons*, ch. 7. *King's Prerog.* § 4.

† Is it not painful to see the learned Blackstone, in order to justify the customs of his government, assimilate to the law of nations an arbitrary act the most opposed to the universal principles of common law?

in themselves and signifying a retaliation,) may be obtained; in order to seize the persons or the property of the subjects of the offending state wherever they are to be found, till such time as satisfaction shall be made.

"Indeed, this usage of reprisals seems dictated by nature itself; it is on that account that we find very remarkable examples of it, in the most remote periods. But there is an evident necessity for having recourse to the sovereign power, in order to determine in what case reprisals ought to be used, otherwise each individual aggrieved would be the judge in his own cause. In consequence of this principle, it is declared, among us, by the stat. 4, Henry V. c. 7, that if any subject of the kingdom is oppressed, in time of peace, by foreigners, whoever they may be, the king will grant letters of marque, in due form, to all those who feel themselves aggrieved. The formalities to be used are as follows: the party aggrieved must first address himself to the lord-high-chancellor, who will deliver letters of requisition under his private seal; if, after this demand, the party aggressing does not, within a convenient time, make satisfaction or restitution to the party wronged, then the chancellor delivers to the petitioner letters of marque under the great seal. By virtue of these letters, the complaining party may attack and seize the property of the aggressing state, without risk of being condemned as a robber or pirate."

What is almost incredible is, that here the lawyer supports himself on the example of depredations committed by the Greeks, in an age even in which their wisest historian* considered that they were nothing more than pirates. "Behold," says Blackstone, "*how Nestor carried away cattle from the Epeian nation, in order to indemnify his subjects and obtain satisfaction.*"† It is then by the legislation of the age of Ulysses, that Blackstone wished to model the laws of maritime captures. Nevertheless, if the example cited be of authority in the eyes of the oracles of British law, it ought evidently to be still more so in warfare by land than by sea; since it was on the land of the Epeians that the king of Pylos attempted an irruption, in order to make, in time of peace, the same captures which, during hostilities, the privateers commit by sea. I purposely rely on this connexion, because it shews that it is not more barbarous to go to war, and especially to precede it by the devastation of fields, than it is to go to it and to precede it by pillage on the seas: and this is why the example of Nestor appeared praiseworthy in the eyes of Blackstone.

* See Thucydides, liv. ii.

† Note of p. 259, vol. i. ch. 7, already cited. 7th edit. Oxford.

Let us now examine what sense the English government puts upon this pretended right of commencing the captures of war, before having declared it. We shall leave the facts to speak for themselves. A single example will suffice; we shall not look for it in barbarous ages, nor even in the last century, nor shall we speak of the 300 trading vessels taken from France in the commencement of 1756, in full peace, and during the time that the English minister exhausted himself in vain protestations in order to quiet the weak ministry of Louis XV.—Let us refer to the last war.

On the 16th May, 1803, the king of England, deliberating in council, granted to his ministers the right of delivering *letters of marque* to all privateers who wished to attack French vessels, and laid a general embargo on all Dutch and French vessels in the British ports. On the 17th the order in council was published in the official gazette. On the 18th the cabinet of St. James's issued a manifesto, which, far from declaring war, presented, on the contrary, ostensible wishes for preserving peace. At length, on the 23d, Fox again addressed parliament, urging the ministry not to break the treaties; and that very day, some English frigates, cruising along the French coasts, captured their merchant-vessels, and manifested to them the commencement of a war, by continuing against them these lucrative hostilities.

We now beg leave to ask all honest men, whether *letters of marque*, in the name of the king of England, had been delivered (before any declaration of war) only to privateers, having experienced on the part of the French, either some personal injury, or some individual wrong? And if it was in default of all legal method that such means of reparation were employed, for imaginary wrongs?*

Certainly, even in the age of ignorance, when the Barons of England obtained from King John the guarantee of Magna Charta, those noble defenders of their national liberties estimated the rights of nations better than our contemporaries; they made the solemn recognition of them, by laying down, as an article of their fundamental law: *that all merchants (except those already prohibited) should have a safe conduct to enter England, there travel, traffick, and depart freely, EXCEPT DURING WAR.* It was, then, by a violation of the great charter, that in 1803, without *previous* declaration of war, a general embargo was put upon French vessels and crews in all the ports of the British empire. Now, certainly, this was preventing

* To retaliate these measures, adopted in 1803 by the king of England, (without any declaration of war,) the first consul not only ordered the seizure of all English vessels which might be in the ports of the French republic, but he declared to be prisoners all British subjects travelling or resident on the French territory.

French merchants from trading in England, and departing *freely*.

This generous disposition towards foreigners could not escape the author of the "Spirit of Laws." "The great charter of the English," says he, "prohibits the seizing and confiscating, in case of war, the merchandize of foreigners, unless it be by way of reprisals. *It is gratifying to think that the English nation should make this one of the articles of its liberty.*"

The English, who were accused by the first consul of making war as pirates, accused the French in their turn with waging war as barbarians. Without either approving or blaming these injuries, let us consider the offence and the reprisals. Let us be just: if it is lawful to capture merchant-vessels, and to make prisoners of the crews, why should it be less lawful to declare every other class of citizens prisoners, and seize upon their property? Why should travellers by sea be placed out of the law of nations, while travellers by land are not exposed to the same treatment?

Vainly will it be replied that the English, after having taken vessels, retain only the ship, cargo, and crew, but send off the passengers. What would have been said of Buonaparte, if he had deprived English travellers of their horses and guides, their equipages, and the property which they carried with them, by taking them several days before the commencement of war, in order to send away the unfortunate masters whom he had plundered! and yet this is what the English did to the French travellers found on-board merchant-vessels, navigating in the security of peace, and on the faith of treaties.

In recalling this melancholy commencement of a struggle, which during twelve years deluged the two nations with blood, far be from us the culpable desire of re-kindling passions but yet too recently extinguished. But let us profit by the return of peace, to implore, in favour of the common law of nations, as much fidelity as is found among men of honour, even when they become irreconcilable enemies.

Relation of Parliament with the Naval Force.—Penal Laws.

Every thing hereafter stated with respect to the *Military force*, and regarding the national rewards voted by parliament, applies, without exception, to the rewards decreed by this supreme power to those naval officers who have signalized themselves by great actions.

In the course of this work, it will be seen that the authority and vigilance of parliament enlightens, directs, and stimulates the agents of the naval force. It will be seen to what details the legislator has thought it his duty to descend in fixing the

basis of the maritime institution, and what parts of the authority he has thought fit to leave to the discretion of the executive power. The spirit and motives of the acts of parliament and of the king will easily be understood, in proportion as we shall explain the institutions or operations to which they belong. On the contrary, if we were here to unite all these acts, in order to give a precise idea of the limits which the legislator imposes to his own authority, we should be no longer intelligible, except with the very few men who know at once both the operations of the navy, and the complicated forms of the British government.

Let us confine ourselves, now, to making known the spirit of those laws, which, being applicable to all kinds of maritime service, require special knowledge in none.

The first act of parliament which served as a criminal code to the navy of Great Britain, appeared under Charles II.;* this act and some others were ameliorated and united into one, which dates from 1749,† and which has only undergone, since then, some secondary modifications: the latter defines with precision the nature of crimes and the maximum of punishments; whilst, for the land force, the punishments and crimes which are not capital, are defined by a simple law, which the king may change every year.

Temporary tribunals, called courts-martial, pronounce without appeal, on the crimes and punishments provided for by the penal law which regulates the navy.

This law distinguishes four species of crimes or offences. The first, punishable by death without commutation; the second, by death or a lesser punishment, at the discretion of the tribunal; the third, by a punishment not capital, at the discretion of the tribunal; and the fourth by the degradation of the condemned.

Many of the great English lawyers have exclaimed against the power possessed by courts-martial of condemning a soldier to death, during peace as well as during war. "If a lieutenant or any other, having commission from the martial law," says Sir Edward Coke, "puts a man to death, by alleging this law, he commits a murder; for he violates the great charter, 3 *Inst.* 52." Hale, a celebrated lawyer, was of the same opinion. However, it must be remarked, that at the epoch when these two eminent lawyers wrote, what was called martial law rested only on the orders of the king, whilst it is at present transformed into a regular act of parliament. But the observation of these great men does not the less preserve all its force against the inconvenience and danger of judging soldiers (in time of peace,) after any other laws than those which suffice for the chastisement of crimes committed by simple citizens.

* 13th Statute, ch. 9.

† 2 Geo. II. ch. 33.

Formerly, the king could not mitigate the sentence of a naval court-martial, even to commute the punishment of death, unless a recommendation to that effect was expressed in the sentence. But, within these few years, the parliament has placed in the rank of the royal prerogatives, the right of remitting in whole, or in part, the punishments pronounced by virtue of the martial law.* The king can even (if he judges a sentence too lenient or too severe,) prescribe to the court which has rendered it, to sit again and revise its judgment: "Certainly," says Blackstone, with much truth, "one of the great advantages of a monarchy, over every other form of government, is to be governed by a supreme magistrate, who enjoys the power of extending his mercy wherever he believes it to be merited; by a magistrate *who holds in his heart a court of equity*, to soften the rigour of the common law, in cases which merit exemption from punishment."†

No offence can be prosecuted by the court of admiralty, more than a year after the return into the ports of Great Britain of the vessel which carries the delinquent, nor longer than three years after the time of the crime being committed.

Wherever the naval law does not specify the punishment of death, confiscation, or degradation, it leaves the punishment to the discretion of the court-martial; provided that this punishment, if it is imprisonment, does not exceed two years.‡

The naval law confides to the admiralty the immediate convocation of naval courts-martial, and the delegation of powers necessary to assemble these courts; it fixes the number of members of which these tribunals ought to be composed.

When a process is to be instituted, the judge-advocate transmits to the accused, not only the act of accusation, but the list of witnesses which it is intended to produce against him, whilst he receives in exchange the list of witnesses which the accused wishes to call in his defence. This measure does honour to British jurisprudence.

As soon as a court-martial is instituted, the president names a provost-marshal, charged with the custody of the accused during the time of the process, and until the execution of the sentence.

Except in urgent cases of rebellion, no sentence of death is executed before having been transmitted to the lords of the admiralty, and returned, by them, with an *exequatur*.

It is of great importance to be thoroughly acquainted with the jurisdiction exercised, by the civil tribunals, over the mili-

* Stat. 37, Geo. III. ch. 14.

† *Commentaries*, Book iv. ch. 31, § 2.

‡ In treating of discipline, we shall make known the various punishments in use in the English navy.

tary tribunals of the navy. In a free country, the first are always the most powerful: a single fact will suffice, in order to shew their preponderance in England.

In 1743, a naval lieutenant refused to bring a prisoner on-board his vessel, unless he received a written order from his captain. Having been tried under a false pretext of disobedience, the lieutenant was condemned to fifteen years imprisonment and to degradation: the king pardoned him. Soon after, the accused indicted, before the civil judges, the president of the court-martial who had condemned him: he obtained one thousand pounds damages, and the tribunal declared to him that he might equally indict each of the members of that court. Accordingly, he prosecuted them individually. Two of the members were arrested, on their returning from another court-martial, held at Deptford; this court appealed to the admiralty, and the admiralty to the king. The lord-chief-justice being informed of it, instantly ordered all the members of the court-martial at Deptford into custody, and caused this act of the civil power to be solemnly registered in the *Remembrancer's office*: "*to intimate to the present and to future ages,*" said this bold magistrate, "*that whoever should place himself in opposition to the laws, or should believe himself above the law, should be undeceived in his culpable expectation.*"*

We will now consider the naval courts-martial in the limitation and extension of their powers, relative to the various classes of persons. *Exceptions.* A very remarkable exception, and which seems directly contrary to the principles of the British constitution, is, that an English peer can be tried by a naval court-martial. Thus, the bill which gave this extraordinary power to the admiralty, passed through the upper house by a majority of only two votes; and in spite of the formal protestation of seventeen peers.† The vessels of the transport-service not being vessels of war, the crimes which are committed on-board these are not cognizable by the military penal law. Every seaman on half-pay, officer or not, being no longer in effective service, is out of the jurisdiction of courts-martial.

Assimilations.—Every year the parliament, by a special act, declares the *Mutiny Act* and the *Articles of War*, for the regulation of the army, shall equally regulate the troops of the navy, when these troops shall be on land.

Violent discussions have arisen on the custom of trying the land-troops embarked on-board the fleets of the navy. The soldiers pretended that they could only be tried by military courts-martial, whilst the sailors insisted that they should sub-

* Macarthur, on Naval and Military Courts-Martial, &c. Vol. I. p. 270.

† *Journal of the House of Lords*, p. 1690.

mit to the judgment of naval courts. In 1795, the Duke of York, commander-in-chief of the British forces, issued a regulation to remove the trials of these troops from the naval courts. The officers of the navy remonstrated with energy, and protested against such a regulation, which, said they, emanating from the commander of the land-forces, could have no authority over the fleet, neither could it violate an act of parliament: in order to obviate these difficulties, the admiralty ordered the land-troops to disembark, and replaced them by troops of marines. However, in order to make a concession to the navy, which the interest of the state required, the following measure was inserted in the Articles of War for 1812: "All land-troops embarked on-board a vessel in commission, must conform themselves strictly to the laws and regulations established for the government and the discipline of vessels; and must, as to the rules necessary for the service, on-board, consider themselves as being under the command of the oldest naval officer, and of the officer commanding the fleet of which that vessel forms a part."

Such was, for a long time, the independence and supremacy of the officers of the navy on-board their vessels, that we find the house of lords, in 1699, censuring an admiral for having admitted officers of the army into the council-of-war in which the question was agitated, to know whether or not a naval battle ought to be risked.*

About twenty years ago, similar discussions arose between the ordnance department and the admiralty, on the subject of artillery-men embarked on-board bomb-vessels.† To put an end to these disputes, the admiralty have created four companies of

* *Journal of the House of Lords*, year 1699, vol. xvi. p. 420.

† On this subject I ought to cite as a model, the remonstrances addressed by Nelson to one of the lords of the admiralty: "It is again meant to violate the act of parliament on the discipline of vessels; but I hope the authors of this attempt will never succeed in their object: if they do succeed, adieu to our naval superiority. But if the army, it is said, must not command the navy, the navy also ought not to command the army on-board their vessels. Once allow the land-officers to gain this first point, of being independent on-board our vessels, and they will soon gain another—that of giving orders on-board. When soldiers conduct themselves badly, it is said again, they will be tried on land by a court-martial.—And when that should be the case, of what members would that court be composed? For the most part of sub-alterns, who, notwithstanding all the impropriety of the delinquents' conduct, would pronounce, that they had very properly conducted themselves towards us brutes of the sea. But, thank God, dear admiral, the king himself cannot annul an act of parliament. Although my career is nearly run, were I to hear that our navy was sacrificed to the land-forces, it would embitter my future days, and the moments of my death. I can easily conceive the attempt of the army, at this moment, when it thinks itself of great importance (1804)." *The admiralty might mislead those who know not that an act of parliament alone can annul an act of parliament.*

marine-artillery, in order to replace the land-artillery which were formerly embarked on-board bomb and fire-ships.

Naval Inquiries :—Impeachments and Decisions of Parliament.

When parliament has reason to suppose that one of the branches of administration, confided to the executive power, harbours abuses, frauds, and malversations, it creates, by a special motion, temporary commissions charged to inquire into these vices or faults of administration, and provide a remedy. On the report rendered by such commissions, the parliament resolves on the means necessary to repair or to prevent the excesses committed, or about to be so. It examines, at the same time, if there is ground to prefer accusation against the delinquent, and to pursue them before the ordinary tribunals, or before the parliament itself, constituted into a high-court of justice: this last mode of accusation is what is called an *impeachment*.

It was thus, in 1802, an Act of Parliament created a commission of five members, charged with presenting to the king and the chambers a special report on each office of the navy, signed by at least three of them, and to make known—1st. The irregularities, frauds, and abuses which they might discover and substantiate; 2d. Their observations, views, and plans, to abolish, or correct, and ameliorate the various offices.

For this purpose the commissioners may assemble as often, at such times and place of the three kingdoms, as they may think fit. They can require of private individuals, as of the government, registers, and documents of every kind, relative to transactions and contracts passed between the navy and private individuals. In short, every inhabitant of the British empire is amenable before the commission, on receiving an indemnity fixed by it.* He must reply on oath to all interrogatories. A false evidence is punished as in cases of wilful and corrupt perjury.

If any one refuses to appear, or to take an oath,† or to furnish documents, papers, and necessary explanations to the commission, he is thrown into prison, without the power of being discharged, even on bail, until such time as he satisfies the legal demands of the commissioners. However, by a reserve very honourable to English legislation, no one can be forced to reply to questions, nor to produce any account, or document in

* The Act of 1802 assigned to the commission 2000*l.* for the salary of clerks, and the indemnities necessary to grant, in order to continue the inquiries.

† Except the Quakers, who are believed in courts of justice on their simple affirmation.

his possession, when the reply or the production of the papers tends to criminate himself, and expose him to some severe punishment.

The commissioners take an oath, before the chancellor of the exchequer and the master of the rolls, to use *faithfully, impartially, and sincerely*, the powers with which they are invested. If a place happens to become vacant in the commission of inquiry, the king can fill it, but it must be by a person who is not a member of the House of Commons.

The duration of the powers of the commission alluded to, was fixed at two years. Nevertheless the parliament reserved to itself the power of modifying the act of which we shall indicate the principal dispositions, and to prolong or diminish the duration of it should it think fit.

We will now follow this act in its execution, and shew the happy results which it has produced on the English navy. The commissioners of naval inquiry proceeded with the greatest zeal to the accomplishment of the painful duties which were imposed upon them. In less than three years, they presented twelve very important reports. The nine first did not appear to excite any extraordinary sensation in the public mind, but the tenth roused the indignation of all classes of citizens; this report unveiled great abuses committed in the offices of the treasurer of the navy.

On the 13th of February, 1806, the tenth report of the Naval Inquiry was presented by the commissioners to the House of Commons. The 8th of April Mr. Whitbread proposed to try Lord Melville, and the principal agents of the treasury of the navy. On the 10th, after much debate, this question was put to the vote, and the result was an equal number on both sides.

The Speaker of the House of Commons, then considering that the public interest required an examination into the conduct of ministers, in all cases in which there is even only a simple doubt as to their prevarications, declared himself in favour of the motion, and gave his casting vote.

On the 25th of April, the House of Commons proceeded to the choice of a committee of twenty-one members, in order to examine the tenth report of the Naval Inquiry, and the measures necessary to be adopted to begin and follow up the accusation. At length, on the 25th of June, the House resolved to prosecute Lord Melville criminally, (*by way of impeachment*) and that Mr. Whitbread, the principal accuser, should go to the House of Lords to declare the accusation against him.

Mr. Whitbread accordingly proceeded to the bar of the House of Lords and spoke as follows: "My lords, in the name of the House of Commons of Great Britain and Ireland, I accuse

Lord Viscount Melville of high crimes and misdemeanors; and I inform your lordships that, in proper time and place, the House of Commons will produce its charges against him, in order to prove their validity."

The preparations being finished, the witnesses designated and cited, the process at last commenced with all the solemnity consecrated to these grave circumstances. Westminster-hall, reserved for the inauguration of kings, was alone large enough to contain the judges, witnesses, and spectators. A vacant throne was the emblem of majesty, who was supposed to preside invisible in this law process of the people against the ministers of the crown. The members of the Commons came in due order, according to the rank of the counties which they represented; they ranged themselves on the right of the throne. Under the bar a vast space was filled by the chosen part of the citizens. The peeresses by hereditary right, the widows, wives, and daughters of peers, occupied special tribunes. At last, preceded by their eldest and youngest sons, and by the twelve great judges of the kingdom, the peers, clothed in their senatorial robes, arrived and placed themselves according to the ranks of their hierarchy.

After a trial, which lasted for fifteen days, Lord Melville was acquitted by the peers. It appeared that his lordship, like the most part of the English ministers, was *personally pure from all peculation*; but he was certainly guilty of a negligence pernicious to the public interests, and of a reprehensible facility, in leaving his clerks to derive a source of profit from the public money, which was prohibited by law. Nevertheless, he was fully acquitted, because the lords forming an aristocratical tribunal, incline always for mildness and indulgence towards the guilty whom they reckon in their own ranks, or whom they must one day receive into their body. It is the same indulgence which the Patricians of Rome shewed for all crimes and offences of a magistrate who did not attack the patriciate itself.

However, let it not be supposed that Lord Melville, in the case here taken for example, entirely escaped his just punishment. The abuses of his administration exposed to the observations of a whole people, the loss of the important office of first lord of the admiralty, the disgrace of undergoing a trial at which all the citizens of the first rank sat in silence with the peers, and secretly pronounced even more severely on the accused, the irrevocable sentence of public opinion: in short, for a great functionary who finds no suitable reward of his labours and his ambition, but in the universal esteem of the people, that national indignation excited against him by the publicity of the accusation, was a very severe punishment, inflicted for

offences which certainly seem light, if we compare them with the abuses committed by the ministers of despotic governments. Lord Melville was deprived of all his employments, and dragged forth as a criminal, before the supreme tribunal of the nation, for having allowed his clerks to enjoy the *interest* of some thousands of pounds; whereas Cardinal Mazarin, under Louis XIV., after a long existence passed in fraud and speculation, died in peace, leaving property amounting to upwards of a million sterling!

CHAPTER II.

Navy Pay-office.—Treatment of Prisoners of War.

IN a country where all sums above a pound sterling are paid in Bank Notes; and where there are, as it were, no money in the coffers; nothing ought to be more simple, more expeditious, and less expensive, than a navy pay-office. But political reasons have rendered this administration much more burdensome than the extreme facility of its operations seem to require.

The Pay-Office is under the direction of the Treasurer of the Navy. Before 1782, he accumulated considerable appointments, with such an abundance of fees and interests in the funds, that the state, in suppressing the indirect part of such revenues, gave him, *for the sake of economy*, four thousand pounds a-year! The offices of the treasurer are established on a footing which perfectly corresponds with the extravagance of his appointments. The reader may judge by the budget of 1820, of which we here present a summary:—

1 Treasurer, salary now reduced to	-	-	-	3000/.
1 Chief clerk	-	-	-	1000
8 Clerks, 1st class	-	-	-	6000
10 Ditto, 2d class	-	-	-	4775
24 Ditto, 3d class	-	-	-	8400
22 Ditto, 4th class	-	-	-	4400
4 Ditto, 5th class	-	-	-	715
27 Servants	-	-	-	2150
Expences of the office, &c.	-	-	-	6875

Total £37,315

If we add to this enormous expenditure, that of the Pay-office of the royal-marines, which is placed in the offices of the admiralty, and costs alone 2,765*l.*; the whole amounts then to 40,080*l.*, which immense sum is devoured by seventy-four clerks!

It is with pain, I confess, that I here bring forward this

shameful extravagance. I fear that, in future, as soon as a reform and reductions are spoken of in the treasury departments of the French navy, the partisans of profusion will compare with emphasis their expenses of every kind with those of the treasurer of the British navy; and shout forth an exclamation of triumph, in showing that they are still behind the English in the waste and dissipation of the public money. But I dare hope, that then the friends of the public good will raise a courageous voice. They might say, in their turn, that it was for having allowed the greater part of the administrations to fall into such unmeasurable extravagance, that the most industrious, the most commercial, and the richest country in Europe, saw itself literally ruined by its government, in the short period of twenty-five years! and this ruin is at present the cause of the profound discontent which menaces Great Britain with a terrible revolution.

We cannot but admire the punctuality of the payments of the English Navy Pay-office.* As soon as a contractor has made some delivery, and the certificate of the receipt is produced, not only is a bill for the amount of this delivery paid over to him, but the bill bears interest from the date of the receipt. The promissory note which he receives takes a preference in the market, over the bills of the first merchants of the city.

In England, a contract legally passed between a private individual and the Commissioners of the Navy, is irrevocable; whatever be the benefits, even unforeseen, which the contractor may realize; he is never subjected to the arbitrary conduct of administrators, or of ministers. If any agent of Government neglects or refuses to fulfil certain parts of engagements agreed upon, such agent is prosecuted by means of the civil court, before the ordinary tribunals; and the actions brought against him have never any occasion to be authorized by a ministerial council: that is to say, in England, actions are not prejudged by authorities at once judges and parties.

Of all the consumers in Europe, the administration of the English navy is the richest, the most certain, and the most equi-

* I may relate the following fact, as an instance of the fidelity shown by the English government in fulfilling its engagements. When I arrived at Dordrecht, in 1805, I had to receive from Messrs. Bonn a supply of timber for the French navy, and these respectable merchants communicated to me, that they had furnished great quantities of ship-building timber for the English navy, and that the English government owed them upwards of half-a-million at the time of the declaration of war in 1803. Notwithstanding the state of war, Messrs. Bonn received a safe-conduct from the admiralty. One of the partners came to London, and without any difficulty, he immediately received the amount of his claim. Honour to this spirit of equity!

table. A preference is therefore usually given to it; and for which the most perfect naval supplies are reserved. I have seen in many countries supplies of this nature, remarkable for their excellent quality; I have enquired for whom they were intended. "For the English navy," was the emphatic reply. These words meant, as a matter of course, that the merchandize was excellent. Not only is this navy perfectly well supplied, but that at a lower price than any other, because it purchases in greater quantities; and, above all, as it inspires more confidence.

Treatment of Prisoners of War.

There exist, in Europe, two nations rivalling each other in love for military glory; equally captivated with the dangers which produce, and the triumphs which embellish it; but, very differently celebrated for the purposes to which they have appropriated their triumphs! The treatment of the vanquished, conducted as prisoners to one or the other power, presents a contrast, the political effects of which unveil to us one of the most profound lessons of history: they shew to us that nations, from the example of individuals, can never be unmerciful without punishment, nor beneficial without reward.

Of the two nations whose characters and conduct we here place in opposition, in the bosom of prosperity, the one has made no captives whose hearts it has not disarmed of enmity, as well as their hands of the instruments of war, because the prisoners have experienced from that nation a generous and mild sympathy, which her esteem for virtue, her respect for valour, and her kindness towards the unfortunate, poured forth. The prisoner, welcomed by the inhabitant, as a pardoned enemy, admitted to domestic labour, and participating in the cares and affections of his family, has found the honest and just reward of his zeal and industry, under the roof or in the fields of the hospitable conqueror. In short, while governments oppressed with a heavy hand their prisoners of war, the citizen detested severities which were foreign to his habits. Far from endeavouring to justify them by example, and by the law of reprisals, he declared them openly to be anti-national; and his prompt assistance poured consolation, hope, and friendship, into the heart of the vanquished.

The other nation, on the contrary, has never made captives, without having by outrages or ill-usage kindled in their hearts an inextinguishable hatred. Neither the liberty restored to these captives, nor the peace and harmony rendered to nations, have had the power of appeasing, or even moderating their implacable resentments, indestructible as the remembrance of a shameful and barbarous treatment.

From these remarks, those who have been prisoners in France, and in England, will have recognised the two nations here intended to be characterized. All raise their voices, in declaring which is the power that merits and preserves either their contempt or respect.

The prisoners made by the arms of France, on quitting a land which is the friend of humanity, in order to return to their native soil, have every where celebrated the beneficence and generosity of the nation who conquered them. They have pleaded the cause of the French character in the presence of their countrymen; and, more than once, have extinguished those resentments which our ambition had justly excited among the two nations.

But the prisoners which the English made, quitted the gaols and hulks, only to fill the two hemispheres with their cries of vengeance and execration. The recital of their miseries and humiliations has stirred up a spirit of enmity, which has not even been counterbalanced by the eminent services rendered to some nations, during the European struggle, which has for some years been suspended. The British government has preserved its friendship with those governments which it still has the power of intimidating; but a deserter, since the peace, from the cause of the nations who contributed to its triumph during the war, each succeeding year must reveal to it, that it has to reckon fewer friends among those nations.*

In the midst of these open or disguised aversions, without the least exaggeration, the impartial observer ought to hear only with reserve and suspicion the complaints and recitals of those soldiers whom Great Britain has detained in her prisons. He ought, chiefly, to be on his guard against the declarations of those vile writers who heap up this dishonour to their country, in the hope of rendering themselves popular by testifying a profound hatred against foreign nations, their neighbours and rivals. As if by being foreigners, neighbours, or even rivals, such nations ceased to be subject to that common law which, under the name of humanity, without regard to race or tribe, governs the whole of human nature.

Among the numerous recitals of sufferings which soldiers of all nations have endured in the prisons of England, there are some imputations which ought not to be taken in their full ex-

* If we are called upon to justify this observation by examples, it will be sufficient to point out what is, in comparison with the present English government, the spirit manifested or kept secret, since 1814, by the Russians, the Spaniards, Portuguese, and the English Americans; by the Belgians, the Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, Saxons, Neapolitans, Genoese, the Septinsular Greeks, and the Venetians.

tent; there are others which virtuous hearts can hardly conceive to have any foundation. Thus, although it has been asserted, and so frequently repeated, they cannot believe that the English government could have ever designedly formed the horrible project of undermining and destroying the strength and health of prisoners of war, even Frenchmen, by subjecting them to privations and treatment calculated to disgust and overwhelm human nature.

Nevertheless, even in repelling these imputations, prompted by profound resentment, there remain but too many facts to convince the English ministry, that by crowding the disarmed captives into hulks, or strong fortresses, and barrack-prisons, (whether they had, or had not, been solely actuated by exaggerations) they shewed themselves as deaf to the voice of pity, as to the counsels of philanthropy.

In order to palliate appearances, the simple truth of which alone would be too severe, let us recal to our recollection above all, at the present period, the noble reception which, since the peace, we have experienced in the three kingdoms, among men the most worthy of the esteem and friendship of all foreigners.

A declared admirer of the great and glorious institutions which, in the British empire, form the sacred link between the citizen and the government, I shall not be charged, I hope, with disparaging the worth of a people whom I revere for the wisdom of their laws, and the energy of their civil institutions; but, without being blinded either as to the errors of their ambition, or the wanderings of their patriotism.

In order to remove even the shadow of partiality from this work, we shall make a point of not accepting, as authority, the testimony of any foreigner. We shall describe, as faithful narrators, what we have seen with our own eyes; what the English themselves have seen; what their own writers have confessed; and what their magistrates have authentically recorded. We shall afterwards leave to calm and just minds to pronounce, in their wisdom, on the cause which we have undertaken to defend; the cause of warriors made captive in battle, whoever may be the conquerors and the conquered.

At the time when the illustrious Howard, after having witnessed, as sheriff of a county, how far the sufferings of civil prisoners might be extended, undertook to visit all the places of confinement in the three British kingdoms; at this time, I say, he found prisoners of war detained, *in England*, at Plymouth, Bristol, Winchester, Forton, Deal, Carlisle, Pembroke, Chester, Liverpool, Hull, Lincoln, Shrewsbury, Yarmouth, and Falmouth;

in Scotland, in the castle of Edinburgh; in Ireland, at Dublin, Belfast, and Kilkenny.

At that time Howard urged, that inspectors should be appointed over the prisoners of war, and that they should consist of gentlemen, independent by their fortune, and chosen in the neighbourhood of the prisons. "These prisons," says he,* "are habitually guarded by a militia, whose sentinels have shewn themselves, on many occasions, too eager to fire upon the prisoners. They are encouraged to do so by inexperienced officers. Several prisoners of war have, in this manner, been killed on the spot: although, perhaps, there existed no serious design of making their escape. This is what the governors of prisons dare not prevent, but what independent gentlemen, as inspectors, might *probably* endeavour to prevent."

Prisoners of war had equally affirmed, that on-board the hulks, when there arose any tumult or quarrel, the guard frequently fired upon his captives, without seeking to restore order by milder means. We refused to believe these assertions, before having read the above passage from Howard.

Since 1796, in order to facilitate the inspection, as well as the detention of prisoners of war, and render it more economical, the number of places of confinement has been greatly diminished. On the coast, the government has preserved floating, and barrack-prisons at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham; and at Greenock and Yarmouth, floating-prisons only. In the interior of the country, they have preserved the prisons of Greenlaw, Stapleton, and Norman Cross, near the marshes of Ely. At a later period, they have built the vast prison of Dartmoor, at the foot of the mountains of Devonshire, in the heart of a cold, marshy, desert, and wild country; in order to confine there a multitude of French soldiers and sailors.

The majority of officers, prisoners of war, were on their parole in certain parts of Great Britain. But, too often, they were seen exposed to the outrages of a vulgar multitude, whose passions had been studiously inflamed; so as to transform, in this manner, the wars of the cabinet into popular wars, and political madness into national fury.

It is here we must render homage to the benevolence and kindness of the Scots. Even at the most terrible epochs of the war against the French Republic; at a time when the English ministry strove to stun the reason of the populace, and change the hatred of the people, for the abuses of its own government, into a hatred of nation against nation; at that very time, the Scottish people did not practice these outrages, nor did they

* *The State of the Prisons in England and Wales.*—4th edition, 1792, p. 189.

take advantage of victory and power, to insult, outrage, or fire upon the prisoners confided to their care. The far-famed hospitality of the sons of Caledonia did not even suspend its benefits in the midst of a most sanguinary war.*

We have nothing to say on the subject of Ireland, as to its conduct with respect to military captives. Never did England dare, during the last wars, to confide a depôt to the Irish: this would have been to unite, in the same hearth, the enemies from within, and the enemies from without.

We have seen at times officers, prisoners on parole, unjustifiably, no doubt, but not unpardonably, reduced to despair, from the bad treatment which they had to support, and from the humiliations, the outrages, which were heaped upon them, endeavouring to escape from them by flight:† if they were taken, they were confined in hulks, promiscuously with sailors and soldiers.

When these soldiers or sailors, who were not detained on parole, made some unsuccessful attempt to escape, they were either shut up in dungeons on land, or on-board the hulks, thrown into the bottom of the hold, and there reduced to famine, in order to take from their absolutely necessary allowance sufficient to reward those who detected them. Let Howard himself speak on this subject: "Forty days of imprisonment, on half-allowance, in order to pay, on the price of provisions, ten shillings each to the persons who have captured the prisoners, seems to be too severe a punishment! On such occurrences, the remark of the worthy magistrates of Berne always presents itself to my mind: "*Every one ought to be actuated by the desire of regaining his liberty.*"‡

In my work, "*On the Navy, and the Roads and Bridges of France and England,*" I have given a description of a floating-hulk, reserved for convicts, and the floating-prisons for prisoners of war. In a literary journal, called *The Quarterly Review*, a work set afloat by the friends of the English ministry, to de-

* The immortal Howard has also eulogised the treatment of prisoners detained in the castle of Edinburgh.

† From an official document in my possession, comprising every year of the war, from 1803 to 1814, by dividing the total number of prisoners by the number of those who escaped, there appears to be, out of 10,000 prisoners of all classes,

Escaped, although detained on parole	{	French, in England 32
		English, in France 110
Escaped, without being on parole	{	French, in England 20
		English, in France 442

We wish to make no observations on these figures; they sufficiently speak for themselves.

‡ The State of the Prisons, &c. p. 186.

fend the doctrines of arbitrary power, and when an opportunity presents itself, to heap upon France calumny and outrage, an under-secretary of the Admiralty takes upon himself to give an account of the above work. The following is the manner in which he expresses himself on the subject of my description of floating-prisons:

"After visiting the *Bellerophon*, a ship of the line, transformed into a hulk for the convicts employed in the excavations of Sheerness, Mr. Dupin records a fact which we *instantly* recommend to the attention of Mr. Bennett,* as proceeding from a person who cannot be suspected of *any* strong predilection for England; and who, on this point *at least*, is free from prejudice. 'In the fitting up and interior management of this hulk,' says he, 'every thing which humanity could invent as most ingenious is put in practice, in order to render a floating-prison supportable and comfortable.'

"The eulogy recorded in this manner may, however, be regarded as a method of presenting, under a more striking point of view, the *philippic*, which immediately follows, against the inhumanity of the British government, and the difference of treatment experienced by a convict and by a disarmed enemy; an inhumanity demonstrated,' says he, 'by placing from 8 to 1200 prisoners of war on-board a hulk of the same rank as the one which receives no more than 400 convicts.' We ought to observe, first, that this assertion is not founded in fact; secondly, that a remonstrance on the subject of the treatment of prisoners of war, and an affectation of humanity for prisoners, (an affectation of humanity for prisoners!) comes with a singular bad grace from the part of the creature of a tyrant, who, in the most cruel and aggravating circumstances, has captured and detained military, and non-military, women, and even children; of a tyrant who refused to open the gates of his prison, and to hear any proposition for an exchange; and who forced hundreds of unfortunate Spanish and Italian captives to the gallies on the muddy banks of the Escant, and the basins of Cherbourg."—*Quarterly Review*, No. 43, 1819. Art. 2.

These, then, are the justifications which they have the hardihood to present to us! Injuries to repel reasons; outrages to reply to supplications, to invitations given in the name of humanity; in short, cruelties exercised, say they, by tyranny itself, against hundreds of captives, alleged to justify cruelties exercised upon

* A member of the opposition, and a friend of the Author, a man celebrated for his generous philanthropy, and who, like Howard, considers the confinement of prisoners of war on-board hulks to be barbarous.

thousands of prisoners, by a ministry who boasted of appearing the friends of mankind.

And even should it be true, that a tyrant had shewn barbarity towards his prisoners, would you by that be justified in imitating his example? If you call him a *tyrant*, because you say he is cruel, and if you call him cruel, because he has confined in a cheerful town,* under a beautiful sky, in the heart of a generous and humane people, families who could there enjoy all their opulence and the pleasures of society; how then would you wish to be called, you who confined, indiscriminately, prisoners made on-board ships of war or trading-vessels, in the heart of strong fortresses, in barrack and floating-prisons.

We have already shewn, that Napoleon was justifiable in regard to the English, whom he detained in 1803, as so many hostages, to retaliate for the violation of good faith and illicit captures openly made by England. If Napoleon sullied his power, by ill-treatment towards prisoners of war, far be it from us ever to be the apologists of a similar baseness. Let his historian, should he be an Englishman, give a severe account of it; and let him add this account to the dreadful lessons presented to the universe, by the overthrow of a force which, for having respected neither men, nor climates, was annihilated in the very heart of conquest and of triumph.—But for the honour of human nature, never let a writer dare to allege turpitude attributed to despotism, as an excuse for atrocities which are the dishonour of a constitutional government.

Do these reviewers imagine, besides, that they can lessen the value of our remonstrances, when defending the cause of humanity itself, by calling, *the creature of a tyrant*, him who has never written, acted, nor spoken, but to aid, according to his too feeble means, the independence, the honour, and the liberty of his country? But let us pity the poor obsequious satellite, who, in order to please the masters who employ him, circulates injury and calumny in their favour, and under their auspices: to be offended with him, and to be revenged otherwise than by silence and forgiveness, would be to forget the lessons of prudence and humanity.

The English government, in order to wipe away the reproach of having treated their military captives with inhumanity, have published the number of prisoners who have died on-board the hulks, as well as the numbers of those transferred to the hospital. We confess, with satisfaction, that their number is considerably less than we might be induced to believe, on the recital of the

* At Verdun.

treatment which they actually experience. However, we must rather observe, that the effects of imprisonment ought not to be sudden and violent disorders which speedily terminate existence, or which require an immediate treatment in an hospital.

The English Government employed a remarkable method in order to diminish the number of deaths among its prisoners of war. In proportion as men of weak constitutions were ready to sink under the regimen of the prisons, it hastened to send them away in a dying condition to their own country; those who did not expire on their passage were received into our hospitals; *and more than nine-tenths died there*: such is the result of the official reports from which I have taken extracts. From these reports, it appears that from 1803 until the peace of 1814, the losses of the naval force of France resulting from the treatment of prisoners of war in England, are—

<i>Died in prisons</i>	- - - - -	12,845 men
In a dying state, without exchange during	} 12,787*	
the war		
TOTAL	- - - - -	25,632

Returned to France since 1814, in a state } 70,041+
of health more or less impaired - - }

At this moment, I make bold to ask, of what consequence is it to nations that their seamen are frequently or rarely sent from hulks to hospitals, and from hospitals to the prisons of England, if the greater part of these seamen, restored to their country, enter it with their constitution irrecoverably ruined! Of what import is it whether the insalubrity of the ship, or the want of provisions, or the effects of imprisonment, or the horror and despair of confinement, have destroyed the strength of these unfortunate prisoners? The irritated nations have not the less ground for demanding of the British Government, by what right it has introduced, among civilized people, a treatment which is only made use of among unenlightened and ferocious nations?

The rations of prisoners-of-war in health was as follows: ‡
 $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. of bread, $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. of meat, $\frac{1}{4}$ of a pint of pease, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. of salt.

* The French navy, during the same war, was not obliged to send away more than 190 impotent or incurable, although it had nearly half as many prisoners as England!!—

‡ We must add nearly 30,000 prisoners belonging to nations allied to the French empire. Of these prisoners, overwhelmed by the *regimen* of the prisons, many entered into the English service, in order to escape slavery and death: they formed whole regiments. The rest returned to their homes in proportion as our allies turned their arms against us.

† 13th Report of the Commissioners on the Civil Affairs of the Navy. App. No. 3.

Although the English pound is lighter than the ancient French pound, if this ration was faithfully delivered to the prisoners, they would have barely sufficient to support existence. But they no longer had even that, when they were punished by the deprivation of the half or merely the third of their provisions. Now, is it unnecessary to admit that, sometimes, inhuman governors and responsible knaves may have combined their power and artifice in order to deprive the unfortunate prisoner of a part of his provisions, and give him some of an inferior quality. *

CHAPTER III.

Popularity of the Navy in Great Britain.—Honours and Rewards.—Discipline.—Punishments.

IN free states, military force cannot repose on a solid foundation, unless it be popular: it can no longer continue to be so, unless the enlightened classes who, sooner or later, command general opinion, have themselves recognised the real advantages of a similar force. This popularity, sanctioned by the suffrages of superior minds, must then be placed in the first rank among the moral causes which concur, with physical causes, to render the navy of England so powerful. Let us examine the mutual influence of these causes.

The metropolis of the British empire contains, within its circumference, the most frequented parts of the universe. It is the commerce of the sea which, alone, has rendered London the most populous and the most opulent of the capitals of Europe. The vessels of a hundred various countries display their colours on the Thames, even in the heart of this immense city. Nevertheless, in the same place, the British colours alone surpass in number those of so many other nations!

The citizens of London are justly proud on viewing the merchant fleets, which daily arrive from sea, or sail down the river;—the latter to export the productions of the national industry; the former to import the productions or treasures from

* Howard, in visiting the houses of confinement for prisoners of war, records at every page, that in one the bread was deficient, either in weight or quality, in another meat, and in many both.

The prisoners complained to me, "says Howard," that their bread was deficient in weight, and that their meat was bad. "Why," observed this philanthropist to them, after having remonstrated with the responsible agent of the prison, "do you not afterwards complain to the commissioners?"—"How can we do so," pertinently replied one of the prisoners, "when all our letters are examined by the agent himself?"—*State of the Prisons, &c.*, p. 187.

foreign lands :—They cannot contemplate so interesting a scene without recognising that commerce and the empire of the sea have produced the wealth and the grandeur of this great city.

This spectacle, as well as the ideas and reflections to which it gives rise, not only characterises the sole capital of the British empire, but the capital of all the kingdoms and the greater part of the provinces of which this empire is composed. Edinburgh, on the shores of the finest gulph of Scotland; Dublin, in front of England, and on the most advantageous part of the coast for rapid communications between London and Ireland; Quebec, on the banks of the river St. Lawrence, the Thames of Canada; Calcutta, on the banks of the Ganges; Halifax, on the northern coast of America; and Cape Town, on the equinoctial coast of Africa,—at that point which it is necessary to double, in order to communicate from India with Europe;—in a word, in all parts of the world, the central points of British power participate in the benefits of the commerce of the sea; and, by these benefits, contribute to the splendour, the riches, and the strength of the people and their government.

In England, Scotland, and Ireland, not only the capitals, but a multitude of cities of the first order, are also built on the seashore, or on the banks of great rivers navigable for vessels: Bristol, Hull, and Liverpool; Dundee, Aberdeen, and Glasgow; Belfast, Cork, and Waterford, are united by commerce with all the cities, and all the manufactures of the interior; and the interests of maritime towns are at the same time the interest of the whole territory.

In the eyes of the English people, the Sea is the natural element of British power, and ships are the moveable ramparts of the territory of England. It is not merely in the figurative language of poetry, but in the most familiar language of conversation, that the English, in speaking of their ships, emphatically denominate them "*our bulwarks, our wooden walls.*"

In treating of the military force, we shall have occasion often to observe the effects and causes of the aversion manifested by the English people against standing armies, which it has always regarded as the scourge of the liberty of nations. But the naval force, solely created for the defence of the exterior, can do nothing against the citizens, but much for the fortune even of seamen. This sole difference produces a multitude of others in the moral influence exercised by the navy over the minds of the British nation.

Promotion in this service being gratuitous for all ranks, the man pushed forward by his talent and valour meets with few

obstacles to stop him in his career. He is not condemned to languish eternally among the under officers or subalterns, like the soldier of fortune, who has no other pecuniary means but his miserable pay. Besides, captures present the naval officer with hope of acquiring an independent fortune; the share of prize-money being very considerable for superior officers. From this circumstance, these ranks are the object of general emulation, not only for the honours and power which they confer, but also for the opulence which they undoubtedly insure.

Preferment and Rewards.

There is no preferment or reward granted to the army, which is not equally bestowed upon the navy, for the brilliant services rendered to the country. Pecuniary rewards, decorations of military orders, and the various ranks of the peerage, are the rewards given by the king to those naval officers who have achieved any illustrious actions. One of the most ancient and honourable rewards was that granted after the battle of the 31st July, 1653, against the Dutch. Van-Tromp was then defeated by Admirals Blake and Monk, who gave orders neither to grant nor receive any quarter. Thus, in that battle, there were five thousand Dutch killed or drowned, and twenty-seven of their ships sunk, no quarter being given. The parliament, in gratitude for this memorable service, voted gold chains to the admirals and medals to the captains.

In the late wars of Great Britain against France, Spain, and Holland, the admirals and captains obtained similar badges of distinction from the king, after the victories gained by Admirals Howe, St. Vincent, Duncan, and Nelson. It is remarkable that, in all these battles, the king granted medals to admirals and captains only, whilst, after the battle of Waterloo, he has bestowed the right of wearing a similar decoration to all ranks of the army, from the officers of the first rank down to the private.

Parliament decrees to the navy, as well as to the army, votes of thanks, not merely to the admirals and captains, but also to the subaltern officers, royal marines, and common sailors. These testimonies of national gratitude, granted by the representatives of the English people, are considered by the navy in the most gratifying point of view.

When an admiral or even a captain dies in the midst of a cruise, or in the arms of victory, the parliament grants to his mortal remains the honour of a national monument in Westminster Abbey, or St. Paul's Cathedral.

Thus, when Blake, the most illustrious seaman of the seven-

teenth century, was killed in the midst of his exploits, the commonwealth ordered that his obsequies should be celebrated with the greatest solemnity, at the expence of the public treasury, and that the remains of that renowned warrior should be interred in the king's chapel, at Westminster.

But when the government of the Stuarts succeeded the usurpation of Cromwell, without respect for the memory of a warrior, a stranger to the actions of the government which had then been overthrown, culpable only of having rendered his country renowned during the absence of Charles II., and of having spread the terror of the English name among all the nations of Europe, the bones of the hero were dug up and thrown with ignominy into some obscure corner of the earth. Monk, on the contrary, who often, in conjunction with Blake, had fought under the standards of the republic and the protector, but who dishonoured them by dreadful cruelties,* after his death had the honour of being placed in the sepulchre of the kings whom he had restored to the throne !

Nelson, who, at once possessing stern patriotism and an unbounded but magnanimous ambition, obtained only two rewards for all his victories, viz. an hereditary peerage, to found and perpetuate the celebrity of his house; and a national monument, to honour his mortal remains, and to recal unceasingly to the recollection of his countrymen the memory of his heroic actions.

At the battle of Cape St. Vincent, this hero sustained alone, with his two-decked vessel, the fire of three vessels with three decks. Scarcely had he received assistance when he boarded one of these large vessels, and made himself master of her. At the same moment, he saw his prize attacked by another vessel of the first rate; then rushing with his crew upon the new enemy, Nelson, as a war cry and signal for boarding, uttered these few words: "Westminster Abbey or Victory!" The same heroic sentiment seemed to animate this hero in all the battles in which he was engaged.—It was thus that arriving within sight of the French squadron, anchored in the bay of Aboukir, he exclaimed to his captains, *To-day, I shall either gain a place in the House of Peers, or a tomb at Westminster.* He accordingly attained the desired peerage, with the title of *Baron of the Nile*; and in the greatest victory which he subsequently

* See, in the History of Cromwell, an account of the massacre of the royalists, in Scotland, executed by order of Monk: this is what the historian calls, *being faithful to excess* ***.

gained, he obtained the immortal asylum which he had so often desired for his remains.*

Before the battle of Trafalgar, England was in a state of danger, which seemed to increase, and which in truth was momentarily increasing. Vainly had the cabinet of St James's, by an able policy, prevailed upon Austria and Russia to declare war against us. The flotilla, abandoned merely in order to fly to the victories of Ulm and Austerlitz, remained untouched, and always ready to receive the conquerors, impatient to attempt an invasion which had been so long meditated. The allied fleets of Spain and France, and of France and Holland, might have peaceably waited at the two extremities of the European ocean, so as to act at the moment, when the French troops, returning from a successful campaign, would have again menaced the coasts of England. But an incredible blindness, and the most absurd impatience, induced our fleet to risk a naval battle which became the ruin of the French navy. Had such a victory been gained by the English, on the banks of the Thames, even within sight of the metropolis, the people could not have been more transported with enthusiasm. The heroes who had saved their country were extolled to the skies. The monarch bestowed upon them titles, honours, and decorations. The parliament voted rewards and thanks. Corporations and voluntary associations strove which should contribute the most to relieve the widows and orphans of those who were killed in battle, and to support those whose wounds interrupted their career in the service.

But amidst the general joy, an irreparable loss shadowed with a funereal crape those laurels so dear to the citizens. The most enterprising and the most fortunate of admirals, after having been so many times pre-eminently successful, fell in the midst of his most glorious triumph—a triumph which placed him in the rank of the great deliverers of his country. Nelson died while fighting on-board the *Victory* * * * *. It was the *Victory* herself which brought to England, and deposited at Greenwich, the remains of the hero. The lords and commons, the laity and clergy, the army and navy, all united in celebrating the funeral of the son of a country curate, of a man who began his career as midshipman on-board a small vessel, but who raised him-

* In the *Life of Nelson*, written by Southey, a stipendiary panegyrist of the court of England, under the name of Poet Laureat, it is stated that at the Battle of Trafalgar, Nelson was killed by one of the Tyrolean fusileers, hired to fire upon him. This is a gross mis-statement: there was not a single Tyrolean on-board our fleet; neither were there any rifle-guns.

self, sword in hand, to the rank of admiral and peer of Great Britain. His mortal remains, surrounded by all the appurtenances of victory, were brought from the palace of Greenwich Hospital, as far as Westminster, on-board a vessel surrounded by a thousand small craft decorated with crape and laurel.

At Westminster, the parliament, princes, ministers, and a select number of the citizens, received the immortal tribute which the navy now presented to the country. In the midst of this national assembly, the remains of Nelson, honoured by the eulogiums, and the tears of a whole people, were carried in triumph on a majestic car into the magnificent cathedral of St. Paul, where a splendid monument has since been erected by the national gratitude, amidst the standards which recal the battles and the victories of the illustrious hero.

I have travelled through the greater part of the principal cities of Great Britain, and every where, even in the remotest places, in the wildest confines of the north of Caledonia, I have seen magnificent monuments, raised by the gratitude of the citizens, to the memory of Nelson. These are the noble testimonies by which a country proves to us that she is worthy of such triumphs.

Let us compare these innumerable monuments with those produced by the most important victory which the British arms ever achieved by land. Trafalgar did not decide the fall of the French empire, but Waterloo crushed that imperial power, which had been recently raised from its ruins as if by enchantment. Waterloo delivered England, and indeed all Europe, from the terrors which they had so long experienced at the sight of the French eagles! Waterloo placed (at least for a few years) the British power in the first rank of the coalition of continental forces. Nevertheless, if we traverse the three kingdoms, we shall look in vain for numerous monuments which consecrate this memorable triumph. The names of a certain number of streets and places; some inscriptions; a few statues; the name of a bridge built by private subscription, before the commencement of the campaign of the hundred days, these are all that remain in England to perpetuate the remembrance of a victory obtained by sacrifices, the burden of which weighs at this day with its whole force on a people now brought to their right senses, as to the policy of interfering with the internal affairs of foreign states.

Discipline.

It is discipline alone which has until now contributed, and which will always contribute, to the success of the British navy. The want of discipline has indeed caused the ruin of the French navy. Let us examine with attention the secret spring

which, alone, can give a great energy to the moral force of armies both by sea and land. There are many seamen who, in order to justify their habitual spirit of insubordination, pretend that those rules of deference, submission, punctual and respectful obedience, which constitute a severe discipline, have no influence on the fate of battles. Such persons would induce us to suppose that men who, far from the enemy, never obey any one, but follow their own caprice, may, nevertheless, in presence of that enemy, follow the rigid precepts of duty. But, what discredits these assertions, subversive of all military order, is the circumstance that we have seen the most noisy advocates of this untenable doctrine be the first to fly from the midst of battle, and so dishonour their national flag.

In a navy, accustomed to the severest discipline, the admiral, at the moment of commencing a battle, which was to destroy at once two other navies, full of confidence in a spirit of devotion and obedience, long before inspired among all the seamen whom he commanded, contented himself with giving to his ships that ever-memorable signal,

"To-day, England expects every man to do his duty."

This idea, so simple and so grand, of the country which reckons upon the accomplishment of the duties of each of its defenders, animated all hearts with fresh enthusiasm; and victory remained faithful to the standards of severe discipline.

We have cited, as a model, the administration of the *materiel* of English vessels. Let us add, that a perfect regularity in the renovation and supply of this *materiel* is the surest index of the discipline observed on-board the British fleet.

What exquisite cleanliness, what order in the whole, and in the detail of the fitting up, the armament, and the manning of vessels; in the disposition and preparation of all the machinery necessary for working a ship, or performing the manœuvres of battle!

At the same time, what strict discipline among the officers, what submission, silence, and good order on the part of the seamen; and that too in a place so confined, for the number of men who are on-board, and who have to execute so many movements, obey and answer so many various orders! This is the calmness of force, the result of experience and good management. In the midst of the most complicated operations, and even in the heat and rage of battle, the voice of command alone is heard, pronounced and repeated from rank to rank with due measure and presence of mind. No wrangling or jarring, no murmurs, clamour, or tumult. The officers execute their duty in silence; and the subordinates act, while, at the same time, they suppress all inclination to utter their sentiments.

No doubt the phlegmatic disposition, and the natural taciturnity of the English, render it less difficult to establish this perfect order on-board their vessels. But it would be wrong to suppose that it is impossible to obtain similar results, even with crews composed of our seamen of the south, and especially of the provinces. I saw, several years ago, this prodigy performed by Captain Charles Baudin, of the *Dryade* frigate: never have the English had a vessel in better order, under all the points of cleanliness, discipline, silence, and instruction.

On-board the British fleet, in battle as well as out of it, the most absolute subordination marks the distance between the inferior and the superior officer. The subordinate is not only denied the privilege of reasoning upon an order which he receives from his commander, neither to delay it for a moment, nor to modify the execution of it; but subordinates, of whatever rank they may be, are forbidden to render the conduct, talents, or operations of their superior officers the object of their satire and animadversion. Owing to these prudent measures, a captain is never ridiculed by his officers, in the eyes of subalterns, nor by the latter in the eyes of the crew. Instead of employing slander and calumny, an invariable respect preserves among all ranks that confidence, deference, and valour, which, in battle, can alone unite all minds and all efforts, in order to obtain great and ultimate success.

I have been the more struck with the advantages of such a system, as I have been enabled to judge, with my own eyes, of the fatal consequences of a contrary line of conduct. Under the *regime*, so much boasted of at present, of the late imperial navy, I have seen renewed those scandalous scenes, and that spirit of insubordination which, under Louis XV. and XVI., at different times ruined the French navy. I have seen naval captains openly manifesting their contempt for the greater part of the admirals under whom they served, or might serve; captains of frigates shewing the same feelings of contempt to the captains of first-rate ships of war, which the latter testified for their admirals; in short, from rank to rank, unto the simple midshipmen, even to the sailors themselves, I have observed a spirit of detraction, a wish to cast odium on the commanding-officers, infect the mind of every subordinate officer, destroy the confidence of crews in their commanders, and, by the loss of that confidence, annihilate the energy and efficiency of the naval force!

At Toulon, for instance, in the last war, it was customary among the subaltern officers to designate the captains of ships, when they spoke of them among themselves, and in public, by the three denominations of *Monsieur*, *Sieur*, and *Mr. Such-a-*

one; according as they had a good, an indifferent, or a bad opinion of their probity, talent, and bravery! Now, what can be thought of a squadron where such practices are tolerated? I leave this single fact to those men who seek, in the composition and spirit of armies, the causes of their success and their defeats. Besides, has it not happened, more than once, that the most estimable officers have become the victims of this general system of defamation? And that such men who, had they been well seconded, would have performed prodigies before the enemy, have fought only disgraceful battles, because their principal officers defamed them in the eyes of the inferior ones, and the latter again in the eyes of the whole crew! * * * * *

I once witnessed, in the Ionian Isles, a captain of the navy, on arriving with a frigate, in order to relieve the station of another frigate, commanded by an older captain, at first strike his flag; but his predecessor, after having put to sea, being forced to return on account of contrary winds, the newly-appointed captain refused, contrary to all rule, to pull down the flag of command; he affected every where to brave his superior, whose reputation he thus injured. However, some time afterwards, the two captains found themselves engaged in separate battles; the braggart, without making the least effort, disgracefully lost his frigate; and the captain, whose reputation had been unjustly branded in public opinion, sustained, with great fury, an honourable engagement, in which he lost an arm and a leg.

By a natural consequence of the spirit of insubordination, of which we can never give a picture sufficiently hideous, each individual, regarding himself as much superior to his chiefs, either in merit or in experience, we have frequently seen admirals and captains, in the midst of the most important affairs, suffer themselves to disobey the instructions and signals of the commander-in-chief, and in such a manner as to become the cause of our greatest disasters. So long as the punishment of death, without chance of pardon, is not the inevitable consequence of a culpable disobedience; so long as degradation of the severest kind, inflicted in the most public manner, is not the punishment of that odium, which every subordinate may seek to cast upon his superiors; let us say it boldly, it is in vain for us ever to hope to obtain any success in a maritime war. If the English government requires from inferiors an entire obedience, and a blind respect for their superiors; it requires also, from the latter, an example of all the military virtues. The English, like the Carthaginians, punish with death the admiral who, fighting with a force almost equal, does not obtain the victory. Thus, Admiral Byng, although the court-martial had acknowledged that he was neither deficient in good-will nor

bravery, was nevertheless condemned to death and shot. *He appeared culpable of not having perfectly directed the battle!*

Let us offer a more recent example; Admiral Calder, with an inferior force, encountered the combined Spanish and French fleets; he engaged, while pursuing them, in an action with their van-guard, and took two of their ships. He was afterwards tried by a court-martial and censured, because the court supposed that, by renewing the engagement, he might have obtained a more decisive success. What would have been done with Calder, in England, had he commanded the fleet which was so much superior to his own, and lost two vessels, by avoiding an action which presented so fine a chance for skill and valour? What would have been done with the captains? * Shall that man be looked upon as sanguinary who hesitates not in defending the severity of inexorable discipline? No! this would be doing injustice to the sentiments of his heart. * * * * * Humanity must be placed in the safety of the greater number; it must, above all, be placed in the safety and glory of the country. In sparing the life of a commander who betrays his duty, if you abandon your squadron to certain defeats, and thus occasion the death or captivity of a multitude of brave men, certainly it is you, who are not merely pusillanimous, but barbarous and sanguinary. Persuaded by false notions of pity for commanders covered with dishonour and infamy, you sacrifice to them the whole navy, and the welfare of the state. * * * * * Napoleon, notwithstanding the immaturity of his views on the navy, had too accurate ideas on the nature and effects of strict discipline, not to endeavour to put these ideas into practice in the constitution of his navy. But as he was ill-seconded, or rather, as he was generally thwarted in the execution of this design, his will, which was every where else so powerful, failed before the obstacles over which it was necessary to triumph. Captains, evidently culpable, were ordered by him to be tried before maritime courts; they were acquitted by judges, delighted to establish, in naval jurisprudence, that officers might be incapable or pusillanimous in battle, without incurring that punishment merited by the incapacity which compromised the public safety, or the cowardice which dishonoured the national flag. Sometimes Napoleon dismissed the members of these courts, and wished to try a second time what the law permitted only to be

* We take delight in looking back to the time of the republic of England, when Admiral Blake deprived his own son of the command of a ship, for having failed in action. No naval officer durst then flatter himself to fail in action, and escape with impunity.

tried once. This was acting the part of a despot,* and not remedying the evil. He would have done better to have consulted public opinion; to have endeavoured to gain a previous knowledge of those men, who were so easy respecting faults against honour; never to have confided a command to them, and to have placed them, as soon as possible, on half-pay. He ought to have called to the superior ranks, an active and valourous body of young men, who were languishing in subordinate stations; they certainly would have performed great actions, had they been withdrawn from the protection of that revolutionary junta, placed for our disgrace at the head of our navy. These young men, guided by a few aged admirals and superior officers, gifted with experience and acknowledged heroism, would have restored the glory of the French flag. Then, had any pusillanimous commander escaped the touchstone of honour, it would not have been difficult to have found him inexorable judges; because, all would have judged life to be incompatible with disgrace, and command with defeat.

CHAPTER IV.

*Tactics of the Navy.—Effective Power of the Naval Force.
—Single Engagements.*

THE tactics of armies and navies present general principles of marching, attack, and defence which are common to both species of service. But the means of execution, although guided by the same principles, being essentially different, there also result from them very striking differences among those parts of the art of military or naval warfare.

When the art was in its infancy, ships were small and light, the machinery simple and clumsy. Generally speaking, human force readily applied, was the most powerful and the surest regulator. This is the reason why, in the battles of ancient times; the fleets made much more use of their oars than their sails, to approach or to withdraw, to shun or to board each other:

* If we wish to know the spirit of the accusations of a reign entirely military, let us read the following (*Moniteur*, 23d Nov. 1841): "The minister of the navy will cause the laws of the empire to be executed. The commander of the *Clorinda* shall be brought before the tribunals, for having taken so small a share in the battle,***** for having preferred life to honour.*****" Thus the emperor pronounced, from authority, the infamy of the officer whom he was about to put in judgment. If fear, honour, and virtue are the vehicles of despotic, monarchical, and democratic states, I leave it to be imagined to what form of government such a decision belongs.

They then fought obstinately, and, in the end, the most courageous warriors always obtained the victory. This is the reason why, as soon as the Romans found the means of joining their adversaries, they triumphed by sea, with the same arms, the same discipline, and the same valour which had contributed to their triumph by land.

When the moderns found out the means of accumulating on-board a ship, a sufficient quantity of cannon to present a force superior to that of a whole crew supplied with ancient arms, it was necessary, on both sides, to employ artillery, as the principal instrument of attack and defence. This artillery, on sea as on land, augmented the space which generally separated the combatants before coming to close action. It was necessary, therefore, to adopt an order of advance proper for battle, at great distances from the enemy; in order that, in the most sudden attacks, time may be had to attain the best disposition for defence. Thus naval armies felt the want, in their navigation, of keeping a certain order, out of sight, as in the presence of the enemy; and naval tactics thus became a science much more extended and complicated.

Some men of genius have, in the age of Louis XIV., discovered fine combinations for certain particular cases. But it may be said that, until the wars of the French Revolution, the art of disposing and conducting naval forces, in order to produce the most prompt and complete effect, had not been reduced to regular practice.

A professor of Edinburgh had the honour of restoring the true principles which ought to serve as a guide in the employment of the naval force. The object of Clerk was to destroy the false system of attack, introduced into the English fleet, after the fall of James II. He goes back into the engagements of Mathews and Byng, against the Spaniards and the French, in 1744 and 1756, in order to explain the insignificant reverses, and the delusive successes of adverse naval forces.

According to Clerk, from this epoch to the end of the American war, we find the English admirals generally taking the advantage of the wind, to run against the French squadrons, by attacking them either at the boom, the centre, or (when they were able) at the stern.* In these various actions, the French pursuing their course on the nearest line, by getting more and more a-head of the enemy, overpowered it with the fire of the

* In support of these assertions Clerk brings forward the battles already cited of Matthews and Byng beat by the *Galissoniere*; those of Admiral Keppel, near Ouessant (27th July, 1779); of Byron, near the Isle of Grenada (6th July, 1779); and Barrington at St. Lucy.

batteries of their van-guard and their centre; afterwards, the first division and some vessels retreating more in advance, formed under the wind a line parallel to the original order; after which the rest of the fleet, retreating likewise, and coming to form themselves under the protection of the second line, the whole fleet again presented itself for battle in the same order as before. The English, regarding themselves as conquerors, because they remained masters of the scene of action, endeavoured again to pursue our fleet and recommence the battle. But their van-guard being in a great measure dispersed by the first engagement, found itself out of condition to continue the pursuit. On the contrary, the French fleet still remained entire, and was at liberty either to relinquish or to continue the contest.

Most certainly, the advantage here entirely remains with the French. But it was necessary then, instead of leaving the English in the impossibility of renewing the battle, immediately to press their sails, in order to attack the wing which was put in disorder, by cutting it out from the rest of the enemy. But if the rest of their fleet had placed itself in advance of this wing to protect it, then the French fleet, having no longer but a part of the adverse fleet to oppose, would have destroyed it by its numerical superiority.

From 1744 to 1782, owing to their not having displayed this energy in their conduct, the French admirals, although they had really obtained advantages over the enemy, on various occasions, have nearly always lost the honour of the victory.* They have permitted this degraded opinion to gain credit among our rivals, and other nations, viz. that a French squadron can no long hold before an English one of equal force. Our seamen themselves, have finished by believing it, and this error has produced the most fatal consequences on the destinies of our navy.†

* If we except the commander Suffrein, who, in India, carried on an offensive warfare with so much success; too happy to fight at a sufficient distance from France, so as never to have occasion to take counsel but from his own enterprising and valourous character.

† It is equally an error to believe that the greater part of our admirals have followed, from taste and disposition, the defensive and timorous system, which, during one hundred and forty years, has predominated in our naval tactics. Throughout this long period, the French government, finding the sacrifices required by the maintenance of a navy to be always excessive, has too often prescribed to our admirals to keep at sea as long as possible without coming to an engagement, which might end in the loss of ships too expensive to be replaced. They were often enjoined, when they should be forced to give battle, to avoid with great care the compromising the fate of their fleet, by too decisive an action. They in consequence believed themselves obliged to retreat the moment an engagement took too serious a turn; they thus acquired the fatal habit of voluntarily conceding the field of battle, as soon as an enemy, even inferior, disputed it with them courageously.

In this manner, therefore, to maintain a navy at a great expense; to

In developing, with true patriotism and rare sagacity, the real success of the apparent victories of his countrymen, Clerk has inquired what ought to be the orders of battle the most conducive to produce decisive results.* Such orders are here, as in the army, those in which the greatest forces are opposed to the least forces of the enemy. Thus, whilst the orders of battle, where the engagement became general from vessel to vessel, produced scarcely any success which was not purchased by losses nearly equal on both sides; Clerk has shewn that every time a part of the enemy's navy can be attacked, by depriving the other part of the possibility of taking a share in the action, the chances of victory will be the more certain, as the part thus put in the impossibility of acting, will be more considerable. By cutting out only one of the wings of the enemy in order to destroy it, the rest rendering and preventing any assistance, we have then the greatest chance of success. But by breaking the centre of the enemy, although victory must be more dearly purchased, it will be more decisive and will cause more ships to fall into our power. These principles are become the guide of the English admirals, and have procured them those brilliant successes which have thrown so much discredit on the French navy.

cripple its effective power; to send it in pursuit of the enemy, only to retreat shamefully; to receive battle instead of giving it, and finish by vain representations of defeats; to lose their moral force, in order to spare their physical strength; this is the spirit which, since the death of Louis XIV., until the errors of Napoleon (save in some brief and rare exceptions) has guided the administration of the French navy. The results of this system are well known.

The English, by not pushing their attacks against our fleets with all the vigour which they have shewn in these latter times, attained with more delay, but not less surely, the object of their efforts. They were almost sure of seeing our ships-of-war respect their merchant fleets, even although escorted by an inferior force. The English, on the contrary, eager to pursue our merchant vessels, divided or united, escorted or otherwise enriched themselves at the expense of our commerce, which was annihilated by degrees. Their growing opulence permitted them to produce by sea, forces more and more considerable, while the French navy soon fell into a state of exhaustion which would not even permit of our repairing the feeble losses it had undergone. Our navy thus found itself conquered almost without having fought a single battle. This is the way in which the maritime wars which we have commenced against England, with the greatest éclat and prosperity, have finished by disasters which have compelled us the most humiliating treaties. Such was the war of 1756, commenced by the defeat of Admiral Byng, and which ended by the demolition of the Port of Dunkirk, and by the irreparable loss of a great part of Louisiana, of the whole of Canada, and the Isles of Grenada, St. Vincent, Domingo, &c. What lessons for futurity!

* No doubt Clerk was mistaken in many explanations and means of execution; because he was deficient in practical knowledge. But, I repeat, that he clearly perceived and ably defended general truths.

In 1782, in the battle fought by Rodney against De Grasse, the first having cut by the centre the line of the second, and our rear-division having yielded to the effort of the whole of the enemy's fleet, the English fell back on that part of the centre which our rear-guard abandoned. Then the French admiral, and those of his fleet which remained around him, being driven by superior forces, and caught between two fires, were compelled to surrender; this was the most decisive battle since that of La Hogue.

The battle of Trafalgar presents the best application of the true principles of the art of naval tactics; an application such as might have been expected from the admiral whom nature endowed with a naval genius, and the most comprehensive and rapid judgment. The French navy presented itself in a line under the wind at the nearest point, and not having sufficient wind to be able to assume a proper position, before being attacked by the enemy, Nelson hastened to form two columns of attack, which he directed on two points of the centre of our fleet. In this order, in proportion as the two columns approached our line, the attacking vessels pressed their sails, and covered the whole of our centre in order to overwhelm it. During this rapid manœuvre, the two French wings remained inactive, the van-guard, instead of turning round in front, in order to take the attacking columns in flank and rear; the rear-guard, instead of forcing sail in order to arrive at the scene of action, awaited, therefore, until the centre was destroyed, which was at length accomplished. Then forgetting their pious respect for the sacred order of the line, they began to contrive how they should escape.

Ought we not to be surprised on finding the admiral commanding the rear-guard of Aboukir, cause by his inactivity the loss of that navy; and, commanding an entire fleet at Trafalgar, be himself defeated, because his two wings imitated that inactivity of which he had formerly given an example.

Hitherto our fleets have formed their order of battle on a single line, either for attacking or acting on the defensive. It is surprising that the example of the army, who, in order to force a centre, or a wing, form thick columns, instead of advancing in order parallel in lines of immense extent, should not have taught us to form in a similar manner thick masses, in order to overthrow the feeble point of the enemy's navy. A line of thirty vessels occupies a space of three miles. Why should they wish that this immense cordon should receive rapid impulses from a single point occupied by the admiral, and that, too, often invisible? How can a wing, in a pressing danger, run in time

to the assistance of another wing, especially if it is necessary to go before the wind?

We must, relative to all these objects, confine ourselves to recalling the attention of our seamen to the most important difficulties: they alone can solve them. Their glory and ours depend on it. Let them reflect on the disasters of the last war; they will find there, we believe, the secret of victory for future wars.* Always recollect, whatever may be our theoretical discoveries, or our acquisitions of this nature, that we shall never be able to accomplish any thing without discipline, and especially without any other discipline than that hitherto adopted on-board our fleets.

In the midst of battle, a single individual may direct at once the movements of all the ships of a great fleet. In a multitude of occasions, surrounded with enemies, enveloped in the smoke of their cannon, or our own, he does not perceive the position and movements of the extreme parts of his fleet, and often cannot even distinguish his nearest vessels. If, therefore, on all points, the officers next in command await from him detailed orders, either for commencing or ceasing to act, or merely for changing the mode of action, never shall we seize upon the favourable moment; and we shall always lose the battle.

In order to remedy this serious danger, a French ordonance, of the year 1765, prescribed a rule the most ridiculous and fatal, which the evil genius of our navy had ever conceived. According to this ordonance, our vessels must form a line, to be in order of battle. No ship, under any pretext, must quit this line, unless by a formal signal made by the admiral of the fleet. Therefore, every time that this admiral (engaged) ceases to be within sight, however evident may be his want of assistance, or the distress of any other part of the *sacred* line, the ordonance is inviolable; the line must be guarded. And the vessels which the manœuvres of the enemy leave out of the action, can take no part in it. They must wait until the rest of the fleet, annihilated under their own eyes, permits the adverse fleet to come in a body, and give battle to the scrupulous preservers of an ill-drawn line!

In this respect we must take the English for our models. In each of their fleets, the vice-admirals of squadrons, and rear-admirals of divisions are responsible for the movements of their

* We invite our readers to peruse in the *Victoires & Conquetes des Français*, &c., an account of the principal naval actions, compiled by M. Parizot, a naval officer, disbanded in the prime of life: they will there find a number of very sound views. The descriptions of this able writer, and the reflections accompanying them, interest and excite us to reflection: a double advantage derived from few works.

respective bodies. They are bound to take upon themselves to execute all the movements which may concur with the execution of the projects of the commander-in-chief. Should they not perceive the signals, they manœuvre of themselves, and change (when there is absolute occasion) the dispositions previously ordered by the admiral, every time the situation of the battle which had been prescribed to them required a change.*

Such is the power of the vice-admirals and rear-admirals over their squadrons and respective divisions, that if any captain refuses, or merely hesitates to do his duty, in the middle of an action, the nearest admiral (if the one immediately under his command does not perceive it) has a right to send instantly an order to suspend him from his command, and to replace him by another officer. It is thus at every moment the captains are under the necessity of conducting themselves as heroes, or to become dishonoured in the midst of battle, in the presence of both fleets.

On the contrary, the organization of the French navy has foreseen nothing to ensure the various parts of a great fleet in concurring efficaciously in battle. This has caused the loss of the most important battles, and the dishonour of the French admirals and captains, who, had they been accustomed to manœuvre with the aid of their own understandings, would perhaps have covered themselves with glory, by turning the chances of battle in their favour.

In the British navy, when the admiral, or any other superior officer, is forced by a wound to quit the command in the middle of a battle, or even if he be killed, his flag remains flying on-board his vessel. The fleet is ignorant of his death. Private signals announce to the admiral the loss of his captains. A secret signal communicates to the senior officer the loss of the admiral, in order that the former may come, if he can, on-board the vessel, which bears the flag of command. As for the rest, the battle continues without the possibility of perceiving whether

* Nelson ought to be cited as the model of naval commanders, by the extreme care he took to inspire all his admirals and captains with the spirit of the attacks which he proposed to make. He developed to them his general plan of operations, the modifications which time, or the manœuvres of the enemy might force him to add to his original determination. As soon as he had once fully explained his system to the commanders and superior officers of his fleet, he confided to them the care of acting according to circumstances, in order to carry to the most favourable point the execution of the enterprise thus concerted. Thus, Nelson, who could choose the companions of his glory, had the talent and the happiness of finding men worthy of his lessons and of his confidence; they learned to supply, in the action, what his foresight had omitted, and, in the result, surpassed even his most sanguine hopes.

the fleet had lost one of its commanders. The captain of the fleet, the depository of the manœuvres and plans of the admiral, pursues the execution of them, as if the author were still living.

This is the reason why, in the battle of Aboukir, although Nelson was reduced to such a state that he could fight no longer; and in the battle of Trafalgar, although he was killed, the action and the victory continued their successful courses.

Effective Power of the Naval Force.

In considering the comparatively small number of killed and wounded, which the most recent naval victories have cost, some have thought proper to conclude, that the present French navy is without real power; that the services which it renders are in no ways proportionate to the expences which it occasions; in short, that its numerous defects call, not merely for some rectification of a system radically weak, but an absolute change in its mode of attack and defence.

If we compare the naval battles of the ancients and the people of the middle ages, with those of modern times, we shall be struck with astonishment at the great difference which they present, as to the quantity of blood shed either by the conquered or the conquerors. It is sufficient, in order to be convinced of this, to consider the losses experienced on one part and on the other, in the battles of Salamis, Drepana, and Actium; Palermo, Minorca, and Trafalgar.

From this it must be confessed, that the naval force of the ancients was much superior to that of the moderns; since, in the former, it required that there should be infinitely more combatants killed or wounded, in order to gain a victory. However, such an opinion will not bear a serious examination. The best organized Athenian, Roman, or Carthaginian fleet, which might offer us battle, would be thrown in disorder by five or six ships of the line, or by the same number of frigates or even gun-boats. Modern vessels, by the superiority of their construction and manœuvring, would never suffer themselves to be boarded, except when becalmed; and their fire being well supported, cutting the masts, rigging, and sails, dismounting the helm and breaking the oars of the galleys, would render them unfit for action, and cover them with killed, before having received the least damage from their enemy.

In battles where our corporeal action is the principal agent of destruction, it is almost individually that the conflict takes place; consequently, man chiefly must be destroyed, or rendered unfit for action. But if machinery and instruments are employed to aid us by other very powerful physical forces, then the

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action becomes complicated. Our efforts are divided, one part acts against the *personel*, and the other against the *materiel* of the enemy, the first cause of diminution in the loss of men. At the same time necessity makes us seek defensive arms to guarantee us from offensive weapons. It is, therefore, seldom that the discovery of a new agent of attack does not create new means of defence and preservation. We must, before reaching our man, destroy the preservative means by which he is surrounded; this demands so much greater efforts, but which are less efficacious as the defensive art is rendered more perfect.

It will now be conceived how, in the battles of the moderns, although the total quantity of action* be incomparably greater than in the battles of the ancients, the total losses in men are, however, less considerable, every time we do not arrive at the means themselves employed by the ancients, that is to say, in single combat.

On seeing the number of killed and wounded thus diminishing in the battles by sea, by means of the progress of art, it would be better, it appears to me, to applaud such a progress, than to be discontented with it, as though the art had declined.

It is, also, worthy of remark, that when gun-powder was first applied in the art of war, the friends of humanity were alarmed to find that we had acquired so powerful a mode of destruction. Man had, by that, increased the distance ten-fold to which he might send a fatal shot to his fellow-creatures: every thing seemed to presage that, by the aid of so fatal an invention, wars would, in future, become only a blind butchery, which no longer leaving any thing either to genius or to valour, would soon re-plunge nations into barbarism.

The most opposite effects have, however, dissipated these chimerical fears. From the circumstance of our means of destruction being able to extend further, there merely results from it, in battles by sea, as in those by land, that the scenes of action have acquired more extent in breadth and depth. The lines of the combatants, instead of attacking each other hand to hand, attack each other at a distance. Combinations founded on the nature of localities, and the diversity of arms, have acquired a still greater importance. The entire surface of the largest country is become as a field of simultaneous operations; generals have been obliged to seize upon it entire and by detail, in order to distribute their new means of attack and defence. Military

*I mean here by the quantity of action, the number of shots levelled at the enemy, estimated after the product of the weight, by the swiftness of the striking body.

combinations, and the extent of the theatre of war, are increased in the same way in the operations of the navy. Thus, since that time we have seen much more rarely those conflicts by land and sea, in which, of old, innumerable barbarians, rushing on the lines of regular armies, who not being able to repel them from a distance, rendered useless the superiority of art, and decided, by the effusion of blood, the destiny of battles.

From the above opinion, praise-worthy in itself, but erroneous in its consequences, those weapons which are the fittest for destruction are the most fatal to men: when we have seen sovereigns refuse to be made acquainted with, or demand the secret of certain inventions which appeared to them of too murderous a nature, they were in the wrong.

When governments have recourse to the terrible means of war, it is because they prefer the deaths of men to the continuance of an order of things which appears to them insupportable. Whatever be the means which they employ, they will not cease until one of the parties be injured in proportion to the rage of their passions. But when the destruction is tedious and gradual, intermixed with reverses and successes, the triumphs of the moment cause the disasters of the preceding day to be forgotten. As there is never any great catastrophe, none of the two parties are actuated by any sudden wish to sue for peace. Time habituates nations to a state of warfare, and consequently their quarrels become interminable. It is thus that they cost much greater sacrifices to humanity, than a small number of general and vigorous actions, which, in a few months, would have decided the fate of the belligerent powers. Let us never repel, as being of too destructive a nature, new methods of making war; for the use of them will diminish the total quantity of blood spilt in the quarrels of nations.

Nevertheless, on the opposite side, we must not think that men, on being alarmed, will renounce battle rather than attack each other with too formidable weapons. Such is the fury or the folly of nations who call themselves civilized; that for a mere word, a gesture, or a look, we find duellists taking loaded pistols which they discharge at each other, with the certainty that one of the two must fall; and sometimes, even with the certainty that both must perish.

There is only one effectual mode for preventing men from destroying each other. It is by shewing them that the true interest of nations consists in maintaining peace and harmony among themselves; to effect an exchange of their productions, learning, and services. It is by shewing them that all the efforts of wars are so many forces lost for the prosperity of the globe, and the progress of the human species. It is, in short, to pluck the false

title of glory from usurpation, invasion, and destruction, in order to preserve well-earned laurels and just renown for the defence of the country, its liberties, and legitimate rights; to decree also this immortal recompense, to the labours of superior minds, who consecrate their efforts to render men more enlightened, and consequently more friendly towards each other.

Let us return to the examination of the present French navy. If we wish to appreciate the real force of a ship-of-war, it must not be said, a ship is a floating fortress, with which we can scarcely, in a battle, kill or wound more than a fourth or fifth, or even a tenth of the seamen of a ship of equal power. We must say, a modern ship is a floating fortress, which now can only be forced to surrender to fortresses of the same order. It is a fortress which can resist the sea, in all seasons, amidst every kind of tempest. It is a fortress which transports itself with a rapidity much superior to that of the most expeditious troops, so as to traverse the fourth of a large circle of the globe, in less time than a continental army can pass from Spain to Poland, or from France to Russia. Therefore, when these long voyages are undertaken, a naval force experiences neither fatigue, nor privations, nor wants, nor epidemical diseases, which destroy so many land armies. Without accident to the crew, a ship may pass the winter in the midst of polar ices, with cold more intent than that which destroys the finest army on land, which has been seen in modern times. In short, a naval force does not merely transport itself, exempt from sufferings and fatigue; it transports a land army and gives it its motion. By these means, powers which have only a small number of soldiers, multiply them by disembarking them unexpectedly on all the vulnerable points of the enemy's coasts.

We ought not, therefore, to consider the present naval force as offering but slender means of attack and defence; every thing, on the contrary, clearly proves that it is a very formidable force. But let us not conclude from this that it has attained the highest pitch of perfection. From the present time, we can augment it by a much better mode of construction, and of fitting out the vessels. The mechanical and chemical arts can, and certainly will, make important and numerous improvements. These improvements will lead to the discovery of new belligerent means, more powerful than those which we now make use of: we must hasten, therefore, to put them in practice. Certain departments of the art will then, I fear, make quite a different aspect. But there will always remain those immutable and general principles which are applicable to all the means of conducting maritime warfare, because they in no way depend on the movements of the engineer.

Single Naval Engagements.

In single actions, as in battles fought between divisions and squadrons, the French have sustained numerous defeats, during the two last wars. Several of their disasters have been degrading to their navy; but the greater part have been owing to bad armament and a want of discipline. We shall enter into some details on this subject: they will afford us the most important lessons.

We know what disorder reigned in every branch of the naval administration during the first years of the French republic. On one part, anarchy, insubordination, and pillage; on the other, presumption, prejudice, and ignorance, destroyed all the good which had been endeavoured to be produced by a small number of officers who, alone, had an idea of the true principles of a well-organized navy.

Order appeared to be restored under the consulate and the imperial sway, but it was of that kind which did more for the preservation of the *materiel*, than for the amelioration of the condition of the seamen. Besides, the epidemical disease which raged in our fleet at St. Domingo, and the sanguinary defeat at Trafalgar, cut off the flower of the officers. From that time the energy of the French fleet was destroyed by a blow which rendered the dreadful effects of a despotic government fatal.

If the press, and the discussions in the senate, had been free in France, such misfortunes would have been prevented, or at least repaired. After each of our reverses, cries of indignation,—the salutary warnings of a power which slumbers over its own dangers, would have re-echoed from all parts. Reflecting minds called to meditate on the subject of these just clamours, would have sought out and discovered the true causes of our defeats. They would have pursued, even to its last intrenchments, that self-sufficient ministry, who, concealing in the shade and in silence, its prejudices, errors, and faults, reserved to itself the fatal right of dishonouring with impunity the standard of France. But the tribune was dumb, and rigorous orders were given to all periodical writers, to publish nothing respecting the navy, unless the minister himself had formally approved of it! * * * *

In proportion as a fresh defeat added to our disgrace, an official article drawn up by an audacious hand,* in order to con-

* I shall only cite one example, but it is a striking one:—the matter in question was to prove to the French how much the loss of their colonies was **ADVANTAGEOUS** to their navy. We find it in the *Moniteur* of the 26th of February, 1811: *Address of the Prince Regent to the British Parliament*.—"The conquests of the Isles of Bourbon and Amboyna have diminished still more the number of the enemy's colonies." *Commentary of the French Government*, on the above: "In the present circumstances, Martinique, Guada-

ceal the extent of the evil, and, above all, to disguise the real causes of it, served to deceive the people only for a time. For the extent of the losses could not always be kept secret. The nation recognized the artifices of which it was at every moment the dupe. Naval successes announced by an authority, destitute of sincerity, no longer excited any thing but a settled distrust, and that bitter dislike with which public opinion, once undeceived, receives the pretended secrets of a fallacious administration. Thus, credulous in adversity, incredulous in prosperity, public opinion ended by seeing in the announcement even of real triumphs, nothing but a lure offered to the good faith of all, in order to appease the indignation and diminish the contempt against a species of force which cost the state immense sums, and in the end brought on more frequently nothing but opprobrium and defeats.

Without aspiring to the charlatanism of a factitious power, it would have been better to have confined ourselves to keeping in our ports, or at sea, a number of ships rather under than above our means; but perfectly constructed, completely equipped, and judiciously manned, in order that we might never fear an enemy of equal force. On the contrary, in order to dazzle the vulgar by a display of numbers, we seemed to reckon the forces of our navy from the number of our masts and sails. We pompously announced to Europe the rapid increase of the *materiel* of our fleet. But in what a state was this fleet found? Constructed, in a great part, with materials of the worst quality, it was manned by crews composed of recruits; the most part strangers to the sea-service; and, above all, strangers to our national interests. With the French seamen were mixed Germans, Italians, Illyrians, and Greeks. These foreign subjects of the empire, ill-paid, ill-fed, and ill-treated, served France with rage and hatred at the bottom of their hearts; full of artifice and determination to desert an abhorred service; heartless in defending the honour of a flag which was the symbol of their slavery: these were the supporters and the companions which were given to our inexperienced seamen.

Physical strength was not less wanting than moral energy to this multitude of undisciplined seamen. The finest men and the

Isle, the Isle of Reunion, and the Isle of France, produce nothing to the French nation, and cost it more than twenty millions every year. With twenty millions we can construct ten ships annually; therefore, during the five or six years which the present war is likely to last, we shall have fifty sail of the line. The colonies now occupied by the English will be restored to us, either in time of peace, or when the empire shall have one hundred and twenty ships, two hundred frigates, and small vessels. This epoch, which is foreseen and calculated, is not very remote."

best sailors were called to serve in the troops of the line, or rather in the imperial guard; and the very refuse of the belligerent force were reserved for the sea-service. In order to fill up the numbers which were daily diminishing, the government enrolled, without choice or distinction, the feeble of every description; they kept on-board the wounded, the sick, and the incurable, to present to the emperor, to the empire, and to Europe, the state of a navy, imposing by its numerical force, but contemptible on account of its real weakness. Nevertheless, when our vessels have been commanded by captains whose activity, merit, zeal, and courage, taught them to surmount all difficulties, these officers have triumphed over the evil genius which hovered over our navy. They have shewn to the enemy, so proud of his superiority, that with equal talents, and even with less experience, French valour could triumph over British bravery.

In 1811, the brig *Abeille*, under the temporary command of a provisional lieutenant,* conveyed a quantity of gunpowder to Corsica; while on her voyage she encountered the English brig *Alacrity*, attacked her, and in less than an hour compelled her to surrender. On-board the English vessel there were fifteen men killed and twenty wounded, while in that of the French brig there were only seven men killed and twelve wounded.

The *Renard*,† of the same force as the *Abeille*, escorting a convoy in the Gulf of Genoa, encountered the *Swallow*, of the same force as the *Alacrity*. An English frigate and a ship of war were in sight. A sanguinary engagement took place between the two brigs, and the *Swallow* escaped inevitable destruction only by taking refuge, at full sail, near the large ships of war, which pressed also their sails in order to save her.

Let us proceed to other examples. In 1811, Captain Duperré (now promoted to the rank of admiral,) was sent out to India with the *Bellona* frigate. While on her voyage she first took the *Minerva*, a Portuguese frigate, superior to her own, in size, in the number of men, and guns. He arrived at the Isle of France, put a crew on-board his prize, stood again to sea, and compelled three of the British East India Company's ships to surrender. He returned to the Isle of France and proceeded up the straits, notwithstanding the fires of Fort de la Passe, occupied by the English, and by a frigate at anchor, protected by that fort. Soon after, three other English frigates joined the first in order to capture our two frigates, a small French corvette

* M. Mackaw, now a captain in the French navy.

† Commanded by the young and valorous Capt. Charles Baudin, now disabled.

and a prize, in the straits where they had taken refuge. An engagement took place, which lasted from five in the morning until two in the afternoon. The heroic Duperré, grievously wounded, was carried off the deck, and was immediately replaced by Captain Bouvet, who nobly performed his duty on that perilous occasion. The next day the action re-commenced with the same fury. The French frigates, and three of the English frigates, ran a-ground at low water, and fought in the position caused by this emergency. The number of killed and wounded was greater on the side of the French; but the steadiness was not so great on the part of the enemy. The English could no longer sustain the fire of our vessels. One of their frigates surrendered; a second took fire the second day of the battle. The third also took fire on the third day of the battle; and, in short, the fourth, having taken refuge under Fort de la Passe, surrendered on the appearance of the Hamelin division, who came to enjoy this splendid triumph of our naval force.

Thus, by a succession of brilliant actions, the frigate *Bellona* caused the enemy the loss of the frigates *Minerva*, *Nereide*, *Magicienne*, *Syrius*, and *Iphigenia*. Some days after, this same frigate, the *Iphigenia*, commanded by Captain Bouvet, took another frigate, the *African*.

It was necessary, at this time, to send from our great ports twenty frigates into the Indian seas, to join the heroes who had acted with so much valour. But the most insignificant aid was sent out; the consequence was, the greater part failed in their destination. It was thus that France lost for ever an island which supported with glory the name of our country, and menaced the eastern commerce of the British empire.

I should enter into too long details were I to mention here all the glorious battles fought, in the Indian seas, by the ships commanded, at various epochs, by Bouvet, Duperré, Hamelin, Lhermitte, Linois, Sercey, Willaumez, &c. It is sufficient for me to have proved this fact: in those very times in which the English every where repeated with a loud voice that our naval force was degenerated, and no longer dared to sustain a battle against them of equal force, we could oppose to them illustrious successes, and shew all that our navy (if wisdom had ruled its destinies) was capable of undertaking and executing.

Official reports, drily inserted in an official journal, were all the public voice raised to celebrate these great actions, and the people, who saw only the recital of them in the *Moniteur Universel*, considered as so many exaggerations, or falsehoods, the narration of these prodigies performed in another hemisphere; more particularly, as on every opportunity the government displayed our naval force under such disgraceful colours.

At the recital of these exploits, had the government and the navy been popular;—had the wishes and sentiments of the people been freely manifested;—had the cities and departments, and the great bodies of the state been able to vote thanks, and civic distinctions, and crowns of triumph, to the heroes who had acquired so much real glory,—soon, a burst of gratitude and enthusiasm would have transported all hearts, restored all hopes, and rendered our naval force invincible.

Notwithstanding the brilliant exploits which we have just cited, England deceived the whole world, on the nature of its successes and our reverses; and that was natural. Of the two antagonist governments, that of a free people will always gain the opinion of other nations in its favour. For, in order to conquer this opinion, there will be on one side writers whom nothing can fetter; and on the other, writers whom a suspicious and jealous power compels to struggle in chains.

Accordingly, when England had to dispute the maritime pre-eminence with the United States of America, being no longer able to carry on, to the benefit of her reputation, her usual controul over the press, she, in her turn, became degraded in the opinion of nations. It was not until several years after the peace, that she was able to recover, in part, from the loss of this powerful engine.

While fighting against us, the English, every time they captured one of our vessels, affected to compare the small number of the guns of the victor, with the great number of those of the conquered. They intended by that to shew, that, even with inferior forces, they were sure of victory. They went still further; the French, (to believe them,) *when they encountered the English, thought of nothing else but escaping; they defended themselves only by flying, and surrendered as soon as there was any danger.* (Naval Gunnery, p. 268.)

In order to throw some light on the greater part of the single engagements which have signalized the two wars of our revolution, we must shew according to what principles our enemies drew a parallel between their vessels and ours. I shall take my authorities from their own writings, in a work published with a demi-official character, on the last naval war of England against the United States of America, by a gentleman belonging to the navy-office, Mr. James, a writer who often displays the most laudable candour.

It was announced in England, that the *Furieuse*, a French frigate of fifty guns, was taken by the *Bonne-Citoyenne*, an English sloop of eighteen; that the *Traave*, a French frigate of forty-four guns, was taken by an English frigate of thirty-eight; and a multitude of statements of the same kind were proclaim-

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ed with the same éclat. Thus, the French navy was dishonoured in the eyes of nations.

In the mean time, what was the real state of the case?—The *Furieuse*, an old frigate, armed as a schooner, carried only twenty guns, instead of fifty; whilst the *Bonne-Citoyenne*, instead of eighteen, carried twenty. The *Traave* of forty-four, instead of being taken by a frigate of thirty-eight, was taken by one of forty-six.* But when the *Traave* belonged to England, it was rated in the navy-list as a frigate of thirty-six! and that was natural. For, if the admiralty of England had decided that the frigates of forty-six guns should be rated only at thirty-eight as soon as they became British, it was of course necessary, that the frigates of forty-four guns should be called thirty-six.

The *Guerriere* and the *Renommée*, French frigates of forty-four guns each, taken by the English, received three guns more than their original complement, and owing to this augmentation they became in the British navy frigates of thirty-eight!

In order to prevent, all observation, the name of the latter frigate was changed to that of *Java*. So that if ever the *Renommé*, called *Java*, had taken one of our frigates of forty-four guns, England would have had the double glory, first, of taking the *Renommée* of forty-four, with a frigate said to be thirty-eight, (although, in reality, forty-seven :) secondly, of taking a French frigate of forty-four with the *Java*, said to be thirty-eight, (although, in reality, forty-seven.) This is the manner in which the English again proved, by this double example, that even with a very superior physical force, the French could not hold out against the English!

But these combinations, which so well succeeded in throwing disgrace over the French navy, were, by a just punishment, turned to the disgrace of England, who, in order to justify her defeats in the struggle with America, was obliged, of her own accord, to reveal to us her deceptions.

“Foreigners,” adds Mr. James, (after having confessed the facts which we have cited,) “often speak, and with an acrimony almost pardonable, of that *habitude* which we have of contrasting the rank of our vessels with the effective number of their own guns. And what can an Englishman say on this subject? With what face can we blame the Americans for having acted in the same manner against us?† “Let us shew in what in-

* In general, English frigates carry forty-nine guns, and sometimes more.

† The Americans of the United States, educated in the school of the English, have followed the same practice: in 1799, the *Constellation*, an American frigate, of fifty guns, having taken the *Insurgent*, a French frigate, of forty guns: the Americans celebrated the glorious victory of their frigate of thirty-six over our frigate of forty!

stance this system of deception was turned to the detriment of its authors: it is a lesson of which it behoves us to present an example to all nations.

War burst forth between England and the United States. By a singular fatality, it was precisely the *Guerriere* and the *Java* which the Americans captured. They boldly declared that these pretended frigates of thirty-six or thirty-eight guns were frigates of fifty-four; and they asserted that they captured them with frigates of forty-four guns!*. Official reports, addresses of felicitation from the various states of the union, votes of thanks decreed by the Congress itself, the suffrages of government; every thing, in short, confirmed these assertions. Every one was persuaded, in the Old as well as in the New World, that the English were, in fact, beaten by American forces materially inferior.

Vainly, after the taking of the *President* and *Chesapeake* frigates, did the English prove that the Americans had, (from their example,) concealed the real force of their ships of war. The effect had been already produced; the Americans, far from trembling before the British flag, looked upon themselves as superior to their rivals, and this confidence sufficed to augment their courage.

The republic of the United States has gained a decided advantage in the struggle which she has lately sustained; since it has caused those conditions to be ratified, in concluding peace, which Great Britain refused to concede before commencing the war.

Nevertheless, (if we must believe the English,)+ the Americans have suffered still more than their enemies, as we may judge from the following comparative statement by Mr. James, of the ships of war taken and conducted safe into port:—

By the English	22 ships, carrying 330	† guns:	2,430 men.
By the Americans	9 ditto, ditto 171	ditto:	919 ditto.
Merchant-vessels taken and conducted			By the English 1,699.
safe into port - - - - - }			Americans 1,200.

* The Constitution, which took the *Guerriere* and the *Java*, carried, on the contrary, fifty-six guns.

† The Americans assert, that they have taken 2,500 English ships, from 1812 to 1815; and that 1,750 of these vessels, which have not been re-captured, have consequently been lost to the British power.—*Seybert's Statistical Annals*, 4to. Philadelphia, 1818.

‡ In the first war of the United States against England, the total number of guns taken on-board the ships of war, or merchantmen, was 1,755 in favour of England,—and 470 in favour of America. We see from that, how much the last naval war was less disadvantageous to America: the progress is immense in its favour.

And, notwithstanding, the English have been compelled to conclude a peace; because, for the public prosperity, 1699 captures, divided between the owners and crews of privateers, are very far from being able to compensate for the losses, bankruptcies, and disorders caused to society, by the loss of twelve hundred merchant-ships, laden with the riches of national industry.

The last struggle, sustained with so much honour by the United States against England, is very remarkable, with respect to the art of sea-fighting. At the period in which the war commenced between these two powers, the English were satiated with success against our navy. Some admirable battles might have proved to them every thing that French ships, well armed, and well commanded, were capable of performing; but it was all in vain. They knew that, in every circumstance, Napoleon sacrificed his navy for his army, that he made his shipwrights serve as sappers, the gunners of the navy and the crews of large ships as foot-soldiers. Certain of never having to fight any ships but those manned by recruits and novices, the English gave themselves up to security. They relaxed more and more from that activity, and that frequency of military exercises which had rendered them so formidable. They thought themselves rather on a footing of peace than of war. In fact, seven hundred English vessels, cruising on every sea, scarcely fought, in the course of a twelvemonth, a dozen of single battles, which merit the name of a naval action: thus ninety-eight out of every hundredth of the British navy, were on a footing of war, without having once in a year an opportunity of coming in contact with their enemy.

At the same time, this vast developement of a naval force, destined to blockade every continent, compelled them to mix many foreigners with English sailors, and to add a multitude of novices to experienced seamen.

The Americans, on the contrary, having only a small number of ships of war, were enabled to exercise the greatest liberality in the composition of their crews. Besides paying their sailors very high wages, they offered a bounty for the desertion of the best English sailors, circumstances which doubly diminished the strength of the British crews: besides this, the Americans, English in their origin, patient, energetic, and cool-blooded, were inured to the sea, and familiarized with the working of vessels, from having performed long and perilous voyages. Under these numerous points of view, they were enabled, without disparagement, to sustain a comparison with the seamen of the British dominions.

The Americans having long previously prepared to struggle against their natural rivals, acted like men who mistrusted their own forces, and dreaded the great reputation of their antagonists. They took advantage of every circumstance which prudence could suggest. They had to create a navy entirely new. Free from prejudices and fetters, which are opposed to the reform of abuses, and the perfection of ancient institutions, they set out from the most advanced point, into all the branches of the art. If they constructed vessels, they were after the best principles, and upon the most advantageous dimensions. To each rank of vessels they afforded a physical superiority, viz. in size, in the number and force of the guns, and in the number and choice of the sailors. They afterwards paid the greatest attention to the exercise of the seamen embarked on-board these vessels. These seamen, naturally good workmen, became excellent gunners, and were taught to fire from a distance with much precision.

Let us add to all these elements of success, the enthusiasm of the defenders of a free country, and the patriotic feeling of a mercantile people, fighting for their own interests, and the safety of their commerce. Then we shall find that all the physical and moral causes were united, to give to the late war between the United States of America and Great Britain, that remarkable termination which astonished all Europe.

The single engagements which took place in this war, are of great interest. They shew how well the Americans know to profit from their real advantages, by beginning the engagement from a distance, in order to derive advantage from the superiority of their guns. Their gunners pointed to the lowest place in which the projectiles could reach their antagonists, in order that the chances, which are so numerous, might never be unfavourable. They profited by the disorder of the enemy, in order to take him, nearer and nearer, in certain positions, and finished by destroying him at a little distance, when disabled by a well-supported, rapid, and ably-directed fire.

The English, compelled to their costs to acknowledge the superiority of American vessels, hastened to construct some of the same size, and carrying the same number of guns. In 1816, I inspected these new ships, with the greatest care; I have made known their dimensions and their armament, and have endeavoured to shew the necessity for our having ships of the same force: and, since that period, the French have constructed some frigates, which will be able to sustain a battle against the English and American vessels of the same class.

A TOUR
THROUGH
THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS
OF
GREAT BRITAIN.

PART II.

CONSTITUTION OF THE ARMY.

CHAPTER I.

*On the Royal Authority, in Relation with the Military Force.
—The Connexion of Parliament with the Army.—Military
Penal Code.—National Rewards ordained by Parliament
and the Sovereign.*

BY the constitution of Great Britain, the sovereign is vested with the supreme military authority. His orders alone are to be obeyed, as long as they are in unison with the fundamental laws of the empire. Beyond this, obedience itself would be deemed treason to the state: whatever were the rank or station of the offender, he would be dragged before the tribunals of his country, and might in vain plead the commands of superiors to arrest the judgment of the law. The punishment of the immediate instrument of violence or oppression is the first care of justice; but her vengeance is afterwards made to pursue in succession the authors of the guilt, until it reach the most elevated. It is thus that the British have at once been a conquering and a free people.

The restraints upon the royal authority do not extend to the foreign relations of Great Britain; to other powers the sovereign is known only as the representative of the nation. He has the sole province of declaring war, or of concluding peace; and of determining the conditions of both. But a treaty, in order to be binding upon the people of England, must be signed by a minister, who, in giving his name to the act, becomes responsible to the country for the preservation of the national honour and the public interest. The king, by his acknowledged rights, can grant subsidies to his allies or indemnities to his enemies. But he cannot order the payment of these indemnities, nor of

these subsidies, unless the parliament has voted the taxes by which they are to be defrayed. Although he is at liberty to commence hostilities, or to retard the conclusion of peace, he can never long continue a war which is disapproved of by the nation. The sovereign, since the settlement of the British constitution at the memorable epoch of 1688, has entirely lost the power of augmenting, at will, the number of his troops, and arbitrarily taxing the citizens for their support; but he has the supreme command of the army, and its organization is dependent on his will. All employments, promotions, and military honours, emanate from his power; every thing proceeds from him, but directly by him nothing is done. It is thus that his person is inviolable: "the king can do no wrong," because he can do nothing of himself. The orders of the sovereign, whatever they may be, become efficient only when countersigned by a responsible minister, who is the accountable medium of communication between the sovereign and the public force. All the measures, and all the acts of this authority, are at first decided upon in the cabinet. *The secretary of state for war and colonies*, who is also a member of the cabinet, is charged with issuing general instructions for the levying and disbanding of troops, and for the formation and direction of military expeditions. *The commander-in-chief* of the land-forces of the British empire, is charged with the execution of these instructions, for all operations confined to Great Britain he is specially entrusted with the organization and discipline of the army. The foreign possessions of England are divided into provinces, in the manner of the pro-consulates of old Rome. Their defence is confided to civil and military governors, who, in the latter capacity, under the title of *commanders of the forces*, receive the orders of the commander-in-chief with respect to the discipline and organization of the troops.

The secretary of state for the home department, who is a member of the cabinet, has the superintendence of the training and service of the local militia, or national guards. A minister, who is not of the cabinet is charged with the administration of war, and takes the title of *secretary of war*; and, lastly, the master-general of the ordnance, who is a cabinet-minister, directs the *personel* and *materiel* of the artillery and engineer service.

The connection of parliament with the army.—The sovereign power of the British nation is exercised in plenitude by the parliament of the United Kingdom, and without its authority no military force can be levied or maintained. The same wise principle, which leads the parliament to vote the supplies, for the exigencies of government, for only one year at a time, has induced the legislature to set similar bounds to the power with

which they entrust the executive, of maintaining an army on foot. The act itself, which yearly invests the government with this authority, opens with an express recognition of the rights of parliament over the military force: fixes the number of men whom the sovereign may retain or summon under his standards; and, finally, establishes the principles of criminal jurisprudence to which it is necessary to subject the soldier. This law, which is known under the denomination of the Mutiny Act, and which we may designate as the military-law, is worthy in every respect of the deep attention of the citizens and representatives of every state regulated under constitutional forms.

In the first place, it determines the nature and extent of the punishments which can be inflicted upon the military subject. In certain cases it is left to the discretion of the judges to mitigate the penalties, according to the circumstances of extenuation in the guilt of offenders. It grants to the king, for the period of one year, the power, first, to convoke courts-martial,* according to the forms which it establishes; secondly, to compile the regulations known under the name of "The Articles of War," for the maintenance of discipline in the army; and to ordain by these rules, with regard to crimes not specified by the military law, every penalty not reaching to sentence of death or chastisement. This unbounded authority would be utterly incompatible with the government of a free people, did not the general liberty, and the moderation of the sovereign and his ministry, combine to restrain in practice the latitude of an arbitrary power, which is the more formidable, as it has the sanction of the law.

The mutiny bill fixes the number and form of military musters, and specifies the penalties to be incurred for offences on this subject, against either the soldier or the state. It forbids, under heavy penalties, any deduction from the pay of the troops, by paymasters, agents, or officers, except what is prescribed by the regulations.

It secures to every citizen who may be surprised into enlistment, a ready method of recovering his liberty; but it also

* There are general courts-martial for Great Britain, Ireland, and the trans-marine possessions: their judgment is without appeal, and without any other relief than the pardon of the sovereign. The king very frequently commutes the sentence of death for transportation.

There are, besides, regimental courts-martial for the discipline of every corps; these can neither condemn to loss of life, nor limb, and there is an appeal from their sentence to a general court-martial. A royal officer, under the name of judge-advocate, fills the office of reporter to every court-martial. A judge-advocate-general, resident in London, is the keeper of the records of all the trials. The law-officer who holds this important station, is usually a member of the House of Commons.

exacts from such as consent to bear arms for their country, an oath of allegiance, the form of which is specified.

It regulates the reward for the apprehension of deserters; and determines the mode of quartering the military, who are only chargeable upon publicans, in conformity to the celebrated "Petition of Right," regarded by the English as one of the foundations of their liberty.

The law descends to minute particularity, to secure the soldier on his march a lodging on the publican, and diet at once economical, abundant, and wholesome; it also provides the requisite means for ensuring the immediate payment of the remuneration due to the officer and soldier. It further determines the mode in which the citizen is to proceed for the recovery of debts incurred by the military.

The manner of requisition and payment of carriages for the conveyance of military-baggage are fixed with an exactitude and equity no less scrupulous. Among these important guarantees, we ought not to forget that admirable article which forbids every military officer, under a penalty of twenty pounds sterling, from forcibly entering any house without the warrant of a justice of peace, who cannot himself grant such an order unless under circumstances expressly pointed out. Such are the measures by which the legislator has reduced into practice the axiom of British liberty, that "the house of an Englishman is his castle."

There are, doubtless, some articles of the military law which might be more favourable to the dignity of the soldier, to liberty, and, above all, to humanity. There might be less latitude to certain arbitrary power which is left to the crown, of proportioning punishment to crime. But the fundamental bases of the legislative authority are placed with the greatest wisdom. The martial-law determines with equity, in innumerable cases of importance, the rights and reciprocal duties of the prince and the army, the soldier and the citizen, the officer and the sentinel.

How rejoiced I should be to see a military code, established in the same spirit of prudence and liberality, for the annual government of the French army; a code to remind the officer and the soldier that they carry the sword and the musket only at the command of their country, and to protect the life, the property, and the liberty of the citizen!

After any great military exploit, the parliament and the sovereign hasten to bestow upon the generals, officers, and soldiers, their testimony of the admiration and gratitude of the nation.

Monuments to the heroes who have gloriously fallen on the field of battle; honours and provision for their families; votes of thanks by the parliament addressed to the victorious army; titles

and decorations granted by the sovereign to the skill and valour of the surviving generals, — these are the brilliant offerings of a free people.

We shall now instance a memorable occasion of the manner in which the legislative and executive powers concur in dispensing these glorious tributes: On the 21st of March, 1801, General Abercrombie was killed, while fighting at the head of his troops on the shores of the bay of Aboukir; and, on the 18th of May following, the House of Commons voted an unanimous address to the king, praying him to command the erection of a monument in St. Paul's Cathedral, to the memory of the Right Hon. Sir Ralph Abercrombie, Lieutenant-general, Commanding-in-Chief his Majesty's forces in the expedition to the coast of Egypt; to the memory of that general, "who, on the 21st of March, 1801, received a mortal wound, and who remained upon the field of battle, directing by his order, inspiring by his presence, the brave troops under his command, up to the moment of their gaining the important and brilliant victory of that memorable day." The address concluded by assuring his majesty that the House would hasten to provide the funds for the erection of the monument. The House further resolved, that they highly approved of the regularity, discipline, coolness, and valour, so conspicuously displayed by the non-commissioned officers and soldiers serving under the orders of the late General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, in the memorable and brilliant operations of the army in Egypt. The House decreed that this resolution should be signified to the troops, by the commanding-officers of the corps, who were requested to thank them, in the names of the Commons of Great Britain, for their exemplary and distinguished conduct.

Finally, the House directed that the speaker should communicate these resolutions to the Hon. Major-general Hutchinson, the second in command, to be by him transmitted to the generals and officers to whom they related.

On the 20th of May, the king caused his reply to be made to the House of Commons, that he would give orders for the erection of the monument to General Abercrombie; on the same day he sent a message to the House, inviting them to concur in a provision for the family of that hero. His majesty proposed to bestow the title of baroness upon the widow of the general, and that she should enjoy a pension of £2000 per annum, to descend to the two next heirs in the male line. On the following day the House of Commons, having gone into a committee of supply, voted that they would provide for the charges of the proposed pension to the family of General Abercrombie. We may observe, in these different testimonies of the public gratitude, with what

wisdom they are exercised in the acts of the sovereign, and those of the representatives of the people.

Parliament declares, in the name of the British people, that the generals, officers, and soldiers have deserved the thanks of their country. The speaker himself of the House of Commons transmits to the general-in-chief the vote of thanks which the legislative body addresses to the army. A monument is to be erected to the memory of a hero; the parliament expresses a wish for it; communicates that wish to the monarch; the supreme head of the executive power determines that he will comply with the desire of the people.

The sovereign, as the bestower of all honours, conferred a peerage upon the descendants of General Abercrombie; but being desirous of accompanying the dignity with an annual stipend, he applied to the House of Commons, which alone had the power of imposing new expences on the country; and the House acceded to the wishes of the king.

We here view the parliament of England as dignified, and as generous as the Roman senate, granting to the warriors who had merited the applause of their country, honours worthy of a great people. But impartiality obliges us to add, that the British parliament has, more than once, sullied the lustre of its praise, by lavishing rewards that should be reserved for deeds of immortal splendour, upon occasions the most trivial, and sometimes the most disreputable. Upon the embodying of the volunteers of Great Britain and Ireland, to repel the meditated invasion of the French consular government, the parliament voted its thanks to men who had merely enrolled themselves for the common defence; and who thus, without a single exploit, without encountering a single danger, were permitted to usurp an honour which up to that moment, had been regarded as the peculiar reward of the most glorious achievements. And, after the unsuccessful and disgraceful result of the Walcheren expedition, the parliament decreed that the fleet and the army *deserved the thanks of their country*, when they ought to have condemned to the severest punishment the general who dared not advance from his landing-place to the walls of Antwerp, and the admiral who had neglected his opportunity of ascending the Scheldt. Whatever might have been the courage and constancy of the troops, if the honours of victory were to follow their repulse, how was it reserved to welcome them on future occasions of triumph?

CHAPTER II.

Secretary-of-State for War and Colonies.—Commander-in-Chief.—General Staff, and Regimental Officers.

THE secretary-of-state for war and colonies is one of the principal members of administration. The institution of this office is not of earlier date than the year 1768, at the epoch when the disputes between the mother-country and her American colonies began to assume that character of blind oppression and exasperated resistance, which led to the revolt, the confederation, and, ultimately, to the entire independence of the United States.

Great Britain, since this period of her disasters, has applied herself to the government of her colonies with more justice, prudence, and liberality. In this respect, she at present offers an example worthy the imitation of enlightened nations.

It is rather remarkable, that in England, where the navy is by far more powerful than the army, the government of her colonies is associated with the superintendence and direction of military operation; while, in France, where maritime authority has much less influence in the government, it is, nevertheless, entrusted with the command of the colonies. But a sufficient explanation, can, I conceive, be given of this apparent political paradox. From the very circumstance that the dominion of the seas is possessed by the British navy, the transport of troops and stores from the mother-country to the colonies becomes merely a secondary object, gained without danger or difficulty. There are not more obstacles to communication between Great Britain and America, than between England and Ireland; and the minister of war can dispatch assistance across the Atlantic and the Irish channel with equal facility. It is natural, therefore, that the executive power of the army, and the defence of the colonies, should be united in the same hands. But in France, on the contrary, the greatest obstacle to the defence and preservation of the colonies arises from the contingencies of the ocean. If the ministry of the French colonies has not within its command all the means of re-victualling our transmarine possessions at the proper moment, they must inevitably sink under the power of the enemy, whatever may be the number of the troops by which they are garrisoned.

During the imperial government we lost the greater part of our colonies, because the emperor, himself a military commander, chose to direct the defence of our foreign possessions by the principles of his own profession: they were wrested from us by the want of timely succour.

But there is one reason to determine the English to unite the

administration of war and colonies under the same authority, which does not apply to France; the British government is too enlightened to regard its foreign dependencies merely as plantation farms, or commercial depôts. The advantages claimed by the mother-country from the productions of her colonies, and by the direct interchange of merchandize with them are, doubtless, sufficiently understood; but in this respect, as in many others, all that is requisite is to suffer affairs to take their own course. The avarice, enterprize, and industry of the agriculturists, merchants, and seamen in England, can be safely depended upon: all these classes ask but a single right and a single favour—liberty at home, and defence abroad. The British government views the greater part of its foreign possessions, whose political dominion it has retained, as advanced posts in preparation, to supplant, during peace, the commerce of rivals; to destroy at need the navies of other nations; and, lastly, to facilitate the invasion of the territories of every nation who may become an enemy.

Thus, such possessions as the Antilles, from their murderous climate, ungrateful soil, and small extent, are far from offering productions which can compensate for the enormous expence of their government and military defence. But these possessions are the bulwark of an extended and profitable navigation; they afford impenetrable resources to smugglers for carrying on a contraband trade with the neighbouring establishments of other powers; and that is sufficient to justify their occupation. Thus again, the rock of Heligoland, at the entrance of the Baltic; the rock of Gibraltar, and that of Malta, the one at the mouth, and the other in the centre of the Mediterranean, are establishments in every way burthensome; but they lie in the heart, or in the channels of European navigation, and no expence can be too great, which enables the sovereign of the seas to display his flag on these spots.

The Cape of Good Hope was, to the Dutch, what the Isle of France was to us,—a military station of the greatest importance. These two stations formed, as it were, the military chain of the great Indian navigation. Both these positions have been seized by England; and I doubt whether, if, by a fortunate vengeance, the fleets of their former possessors could carry their victorious flags into the Thames and the Medway, the cabinet of St. James's could be induced to consent to their restoration.

The colonies of England are, therefore, for these reasons, under the direction of the minister of war and colonies, who proposes to the sovereign, for his nomination, the governors and all other officers for the foreign possessions, if not chosen as a right by the colonists themselves. The latter, in almost all the

Anglo-American provinces, have the happiness to enjoy a representative government, the right of appeal from their governors, the institution of justices of the peace, trial by jury, &c. &c.

Under this system, the government, without losing the influence necessary for the guidance of affairs, is enabled to discharge duties equally laborious and difficult, when the governors and the governed are separated by a half or a fourth of the extent of the globe.

From the secretary-of-state for war and colonies, we pass to the commander-in-chief of the British forces.—It is frequently a mere general officer who is vested with this dignity, and as it is not bestowed for life, and may even be kept vacant altogether, of which history affords several examples, it is accompanied by an authority too precarious to entail danger either upon the sovereign or the constitution. Nevertheless, in the spirit of the English monarchy, this high dignity must not be confided to the heir-apparent to the crown. It appears, indeed, to enter into the system of government, to give no military command to the hereditary successor to the throne. When, on the renewal of hostilities in 1803, the French threatened England with invasion, the Prince of Wales eagerly solicited the honour of commanding the army of defence which was hastily assembled on the shores of the channels; the ministry replied to him, in the name of the king, that his royal highness would have the power, in case of danger, to signalize, at the head of his regiment, his love for his country, and devotion to the person of its monarch, but that it would be contrary to the constitution to give him a general command.

Let us pause for a moment upon this wise measure. When, in the anarchy of feudal times, the English constitution was feeble, there was no security for the monarchy but in the valour and military talent of the sovereign, who by force alone could maintain himself as the ruler of his turbulent barons. It became then highly expedient, for the preservation of the reigning dynasty, to train the presumptive heir to the crown to an early acquaintance with military tactics, and the duties of command. This was the Black Prince, distinguished by his martial qualities above the most warlike barons, and who, on the field-of-battle could rival his father in courage, and his king in talents. But, as civilization advanced, it was perceived that the duties of a monarch were rather to watch, in the centre of his kingdom, over peace, good order, and justice, than to seek danger and carnage in the tumult of camps. When kings were made prisoners while fighting with arms in their hands, and detained for years in foreign captivity, their states were left in fatal disorder. Their liberty was seldom procured without ransoms ruinous to their people,

and conditions dishonourable to their kingdoms. At other times the fall of a king in battle was sufficient for the overthrow of a dynasty, and the usurpation of a throne; such was the conquest of England by William, after the death of Harold on the field of Hastings.

The results of such experience have, fortunately for mankind, in modern times, been the removal of the hereditary prince of the monarchy from the active command of armies. The warlike habits acquired in youth become the passion of maturer years, and the greatest curse, therefore, which can be inflicted on a free people, is to be governed by a military king; under his standard it must inevitably follow, either that liberty will be crushed, or that the sovereign himself will perish amidst the destruction of a sanguinary revolution.

To these general reasons, a more particular one may be applied to the case of England, such as she is at present constituted. The hereditary prince no sooner comes of age than he is immediately released from all dependance; he takes his seat as a matter of right in the House of Peers, and needs not the pleasure of the sovereign to entitle him to that dignity. He may frequently chance to be found in the ranks of opposition, and it will, therefore, be readily conceived that the union of military command with political power might in such case be attended with dangerous consequences. It is not, however, considered, that the same obstacles exist, as to command, in other princes of the blood, as in the instance of the eldest son of the reigning sovereign. The second prince of the blood at present holds the office of commander-in-chief. The Duke of York has filled this office almost without interruption for the last twenty-five years, and has done much to entitle the English army to claim that rank, to which it seems called, by the personal courage, constancy, and energy of the national character. Before this prince entered into office, there was no uniformity in the system of exercise of the different regiments: every colonel instructed and manœuvred his corps after his own ideas. When elements of such an incoherent nature were assembled for the formation of an army, it will readily be judged to what a degree they were deficient in the power of martial conformity, so necessary to the success of great operations.

In rendering the situation of commander-in-chief independent of a change of ministry, it appears to me that the British government have wisely followed the spirit of the constitution, and the dictates of prudence. Owing to this distinction, if by a sudden transfer of administration, the general plan of military operations is altered; the organization of the army, and all the details

which influence the efficiency of regiments, cannot be overthrown by the caprice and variety of the new ministers. It is the master-piece of the institution of England, that stability in the system of public service is combined with the power of changing the directors of the executive authority.

There are in the British service four ranks of general officers: 1. Field-m Marshals, who correspond to the marshals of France;—2. Generals, who answer to our lieut.-generals commanding in chief;—3. Lieut.-generals;—4. Major-generals, who correspond to our *marechaux-de-camp*. The following is a table of the numbers of each rank of general officers, at three different periods:—

	June 1, 1815	June 1, 1819	August 12, 1819.
Field-M Marshals	6	7	7
Generals	112	83	106
Lieut.-Generals	250	188	197
Major-Generals	306	284	315
TOTAL	674	562	625

This division of the superior military ranks appears to be one of the worst that could possibly have been adopted. In the first place, with only two exceptions, the rank of field-marshal is given to princes who never commanded an army:—the highest military office of dignity must thus be regarded as a mere honorary rank or sinecure.

In the next place, the number of generals has always been too great, even during a period of war. Of the hundred and twelve generals supported on the war-establishment in 1815, there were, at most, ten in employment; at present not half that number are on active service;—it may, indeed, be supposed that it is almost impossible to employ, in the same line, generals and lieutenant-generals in the subordinate commands of the divisions of an army or colonial government.

Modern nations no longer exhibit, in the high military ranks, that noble disinterestedness which shone with such lustre among the people of antiquity, and which induced the greatest warriors to serve alternately as generals, and as lieutenants, or simple volunteers. In our times, a general who has commanded an army in chief, would think it derogatory to him to serve in another army as a subordinate officer;—that system must therefore be bad, which comprises too many officers, who cannot be employed in the secondary ranks; and it deprives the service of the talents and exertions of many among the most distinguished of the general officers.

To demonstrate how much the staff of general officers of the British army is out of all proportion to the wants of Great

Britain, we shall content ourselves with giving the following table, extracted from the report which the finance committee of 1817 submitted to parliament.

EMPLOYED IN THE THREE KINGDOMS	1815.	1816.	1817.
Commanders of the forces or generals } in-chief	2	2	2
Lieutenant-generals	11	1	1
Major-generals	30	18	15
EMPLOYED IN FOREIGN SERVICE			
Commanders of the forces	7	3	3
Generals	1	0	0
Lieutenant-generals	6	2	2
Major-generals	53	14	12
TOTAL	110	40	35

To these numbers should be added the general-officers on the staff of the army of occupation, consisting, on the 25th of December, 1817, of a field-marshal, in command of the forces, four lieutenant-generals, and sixteen major-generals.

The British government thus employed, during the most active part of the war, only *one hundred and fifty general officers*, while they retained upon the strength *SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOUR* !

We have now to speak of one of the most important services of the staff of general-officers in the British armies.—The territory of the three kingdoms is allotted into districts, which are entrusted, with regard to military affairs, to general-officers, in the same manner as our military divisions. During the war, these districts were ten in number for England and the isles in the channel, two for Scotland, and seven for Ireland.—Since the peace, the districts of South Britain have been reduced to six.

The general-officers of districts are desired to obtain, with the most scrupulous care, a thorough knowledge of the actual state of the military corps under their orders; to inquire into the nature and duration of service of the men of those corps; and lastly, to be accurately informed of the numerical force which the different regiments can produce in case of need.

The details of the service of a district are confided to assistants-adjutant, and quarter-master-general. The assistant-adjutant-general is responsible for the correctness of the reports on the military state of the district, and his rank is superior to that of the majors of brigade;—on this account he is always selected from the field-officers. The orders of the commanders of districts are transmitted through him for immediate execution. The assistant-quarter-master-general is charged with the quartering, encampment, and marching of troops throughout the district;—he gives account of his operations to the quarter-master-general of the forces, and transmits to him every month a

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report upon the whole of the troops in the district.—He is (under the orders of the general commanding) entrusted with the receipt into the magazines, and issue to the forces, of all camp-equipage. He keeps the account of expences incurred in the construction and preservation of field-works, as well as the maintenance of posts for alarm-signals in time of war. In the maritime districts, the assistant-quarter-master-general is instructed to acquire a thorough knowledge of the points where a landing is practicable, of the best positions for defence near those points, and of the particular winds and periods of tides which would afford an enemy a favourable opportunity of approaching the coast. In all the districts, he must be entirely master of the state of the roads, and such accidents of the ground as are applicable to defence, as well as of the course of the ruins, and the means of inundating the country;—he must sketch all the important positions with their several points of access, and draw up a memoir upon the attack of these positions.—Finally, he must give his attention to the embarkation and landing of troops, and, in short, perform for his district all the detail of duties which we have described as belonging to the department of quarter-master-general.

Like the forces of most of the European powers, the army of Great Britain is divided into regiments; but, in interior organization, these regiments differ widely from the troops of other nations; and, in order to understand the difference thoroughly, it will be necessary to examine, in succession, whatever is most remarkable in their system, with regard to officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers. We shall conclude this chapter with a notice of the regimental officers of the British army.

Every regiment of infantry or cavalry is commanded by a colonel, who has the property of his corps; and this property is so lucrative, that a lieutenant-general, or even a general with a staff appointment, is not so rich as a colonel enjoying the profits of his regiment. It is on this account that the greater number of commissions of colonel are held by major-generals, lieutenant-generals, generals, and even field-marschals, who receive the pay of simple colonels. Not only, however, do general-officers of all ranks hold the situation of colonel, but a great number of the same order are merely lieutenant-colonels, majors, and some even simple captains, in the different regiments of the army. It is a natural consequence of this system, that the titular colonels scarcely ever serve with their regiments. Called to the command of brigades, divisions, and armies, the general-officers are obliged to abandon to their lieutenant-colonels the conduct of corps of which they are only the honorary commanders; hence it may be conceived, what a surprising difference

must exist between regiments submitted to the ideal government of an invisible chief, who corresponds much more frequently with the agent or treasurer of his corps, than with the officer and the soldier, and troops which are always commanded by their own colonel, who sees in them his companions in arms; and becomes attached to them; who, in a word, sharing their labours, their dangers, and their sufferings, must be in the habit of daily conducting to their happiness, and familiarizing them to those exercises, in the success of which depends his own reputation.

CHAPTER III.

On the Troops.

A SPECIAL regulation establishes the precedence of troops of the different arms, whether in order of battle, in duties of honour, or those of parade. The mounted forces, as may be seen by the following table, are always placed before those on foot; this is contrary to sound military doctrines, which consider, with reason, artillery and infantry as the most important arms.

Order of Precedence.

- | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Life and Dragoon-guards. | 5. Foot-guards. |
| 2. Horse-artillery. | 6. Veteran Battalions. |
| 3. Cavalry. | 7. Infantry of the Line. |
| 4. Foot-artillery and Sappers. | 8. Militia and Volunteers. |

Royal Guards.—The guard of the sovereign should never form a distinct body from the rest of the army. The honour of watching over the preservation of the life of the monarch and his family, should be the recompense of valour in war, and of high order and discipline in peace. This noble reward, held out to courage and military virtue, without distinction, would inspire officers and soldiers with generous and well-timed emulation. They would become rivals in heroism before the enemy, and in moderation and peaceful demeanour among their fellow-citizens. The armed force would display itself at the foot of the throne, not to inspire terror by the aspect of sabres and bayonets; but to convince the sovereign that he is the chief of a national army, and to prove to his subjects that the supreme magistrate will only confide his safety to those of the military who are most devoted to their country, and most submissive to its laws. Such might be, such ought to be, above all, the guard of a constitutional king, like the sovereign of Great Britain.

George III., who appears to have been sensible of this truth, and who was, besides, an enemy to all ridiculous pomp, kept his military household at a distance from his person during the greater part of his reign. Living in a simplicity worthy of the

olden time, in his retired castle at Windsor, he had no other guard than a mere regiment of militia, to whose colonel and band he was partial. But the spectacle of the patriarchal manners of a king, who possessed all the private, and many of the public virtues, formed round his person a more powerful rampart than the glittering cuirasses of privileged guards.

Cavalry Guards.—The cavalry guards are composed of the life-guards and the horse-guards. It is impossible to explain the origin and changes of the former corps, with more fidelity and exactitude, than in the words of the historian of the English army. (*Grose*, vol. ii. p. 203.)

“Immediately after the restoration, Charles II. raised a regiment of body-guards, the simple troopers of which were gentlemen, who had devoted themselves to the profession of arms, and had followed the fortunes of his father during the civil war. As nearly all of them belonged to considerable families, they obtained privileges similar to those of the *garde-de-corps* of France, whose organization served as a model for theirs. These privileges continued long after the regiment had ceased to be composed of the same class of men. This, of course, rendered them a body of high pretensions, and, as often happens in similar cases, of little use, being calculated for show or parade, rather than for actual service.”

These disadvantages, and the excessive charge resulting from the primitive organization of the body-guards, being evident, the privates were disbanded towards the close of 1788. George III. preserved only the skeleton of officers.

A new corps, almost entirely composed of recruits, was then organized, and placed very nearly on the same footing as the rest of the cavalry. It received the appellation of life-guards; and in thus losing its old title of body-guards, it had no longer the shadow of a pretext for claiming the same absurd privileges. It is, at this day, one of the finest corps in the army.

The corps which immediately follows the life-guards, is the regiment styled the horse-guards; it is similarly composed as the life-guards, having eight troops of forty-three men each, and officered in the same manner, with the exception of having three lieutenant-colonels instead of one.

Infantry Guards.—There are three regiments of foot-guards. The first is a regiment of grenadiers, composed of three battalions, thirty-two companies, and two thousand five hundred and sixty rank and file. The two other regiments, composed of the common description of infantry, reckon each two battalions, twenty companies, and sixteen hundred men; so that the infantry guards amount, altogether, to five thousand seven hundred and sixty rank and file. Each regiment

is commanded by a colonel and lieutenant-colonel, with a surgeon, major, and solicitor; each battalion by a major, with a surgeon, and his assistants; lastly, each company by a captain, two lieutenants, and an ensign. We shall briefly trace the history of the royal-guard of England.

Charles II., on being recalled to the throne, directed his attention to the means of disbanding the army as soon as he landed at Dover, in May 1760. He was seconded in his views by the parliament, who wished to relieve the nation from the burthen of a heavy military establishment, and who saw in the troops the same corps which, under Cromwell, had expelled the two houses of parliament, shamelessly violated every principle of liberty, and persevered in opposing obstacles to the establishment of the civil laws. The army, *en masse*, was disbanded, except some corps of slender strength, but of tried fidelity, with whom the monarch surrounded his person; these he shortly augmented to five thousand men. Thus, at this period, there was no other army than the guards of the sovereign. The parliament saw with alarm all the military force placed, without counterpoise, in the hands of a prince who dared promise to Louis XIV. the subversion of the representative government. The commons petitioned Charles to disband the forces, of which he had formed his guard, in order to lessen the excessive expences of his household to a degree better proportioned to the condition of the public finances; but this request was refused. The Commons passed a bill for the exercising of the national militia in the different counties, during six weeks in every year: the king refused to assent to the bill. It was then that the House of Commons, awakened to the magnitude of the danger which threatened the public liberties, pronounced that celebrated resolution which afterwards became, at the revolution of 1688, the basis of the military law:—"That a standing army maintained about the throne, without the consent of parliament, is not only in itself illegal, but dangerous to the liberty of the citizen."

The soldiers of the guards have preserved their high rates of pay, and the prerogatives granted to them by Charles the Second, because the revolution of 1688 was effected without any effort on the part of these troops, who were the hopes of tyranny, against the forces of William. Carried away with the torrent of public opinion, they recognized the new dynasty without striking a single blow.

In England, there is no corps of engineers and artillery of the guards, because the whole regiments of artillery and engineers are royal corps. There is neither train nor park of artillery, because every piece of ordnance in the army, as well as the arm

of every good citizen, becomes, in cases of need, the true guard of the sovereign. The only corps of artillery in London, is that of the volunteers, who take arms whenever the public tranquillity is endangered.

Lastly: there is no foreign corps in the royal guards; the only one which ever formed part of this force, was a regiment of Dutch guards, brought over by William in 1688. But the natural pride of the British; their jealousy of whatever could threaten danger to liberties purchased by so many misfortunes and sacrifices; besides, the simple idea of the propriety of employing Britons in all offices, rather than lavishing the treasures, dignities, and rewards of the state upon mercenaries drawn from other countries; all these causes made it a duty in parliament to preserve their inflexibility upon the subject of foreigners. They, therefore, declared, first, that all the land-forces in pay, in England, above seven thousand men, and these to be taken from the natives of his majesty's subjects, should be forthwith paid and disbanded; secondly, that all the forces serving in Ireland, exceeding two thousand men, and these of the native subjects of the king, should, in like manner, without delay, be paid and disbanded.

The king, after making a shew of an intention to abdicate, in order to preserve his Dutchmen, was obliged to assent to a bill, which was the legitimate consequence of the Bill of Rights. —He at once disbanded all the foreigners of the different corps, which he had brought over from Holland; but he requested, that he might at least retain those who formed part of the royal guard. He sent a message to the Commons to announce, "that preparations had been made for transporting back the guards who had accompanied him into England, and that he would send them away immediately, unless the House, out of regard for him, would find an expedient for retaining these troops; *which act he should receive with extreme satisfaction.*" But the Commons refused to do so; consequently, there no longer remained any foreigners in the royal guard. A happy experience proved to William, that the stability of his throne depended not in the slightest degree upon the support of mercenaries.

The Cavalry.—The cavalry forms a considerable part of the English army; during the late war it equalled in number one sixth of the infantry.—By adding to this body the volunteer cavalry of the three kingdoms, the total exceeded eighty thousand men.—And, at the same time, agriculture, far from suffering, made unexpected advances. Great Britain is, of all countries in Europe, the richest in horses fitted for every species of service. Although France has a territory three times more extensive than the whole of England and Scotland together, the

number of our horses does not exceed, by above one-ninth, those of Great Britain; and when we add Ireland also, the number of horses exceeds that of all France.

The following is the comparative table of the numbers of men and horses in Great Britain, in 1804; and of those in France, at a much later period:

	Great Britain.	France.
Human Population	11,000,000	29,000,000
Horses - - - -	1,790,000 *	2,122,617 †.

From this statement it appears, that, for their wants and pleasures, one hundred individuals have, in Great Britain, sixteen horses, and in France only seven: what an immense disproportion!—But the difference is not merely in numerical inferiority; among the French the breed of horses, calculated for war, has greatly degenerated, while in England it is daily improving.

It is not two centuries ago, since France possessed the finest horses in Europe. Our cavaliers, in returning from the crusades, brought with them Arabian coursers, and propagated the breed with the utmost care; hence arose a source of lucrative commerce. But when Cardinal Richelieu compelled the powerful nobility to quit their feudal residences, to crouch at the feet of a master, where they were no longer able to display their pomp and power by numerous trains of gentlemen, (the greater part of whom were mounted and armed at their expence,) nor to shew themselves at the head of their retainers in all the pride of the old chivalry, they neglected the studs which had furnished the chargers for the days of battle or festivity.—The breed in consequence soon degenerated, and this branch of industry passed into the hands of the English. They have succeeded in breeding excellent horses, not only for the purposes of luxury and racing, but for labour and war.

The superior qualities of the English horse, preserved by the care of the trooper, who cherished the companion of his fatigues almost as fondly as the Mameluke or the Arab; these qualities, I repeat, are the fruits of an attention which has only been recently paid to the improvement of the breed. This circumstance affords us a very striking example, which should excite the emulation of every friend to the public weal, and the national glory.—Since 1815, our studs in France have degenerated in a most lamentable degree.

The English trooper, so skilful in riding, and managing his horse, is far from being equally expert in the use of his arms: in this respect he is inferior to the French dragoon.

The officers of the British cavalry are generally reproached

* Edinburgh Encyclopædia.

† Chaptal—Industrie Française.

with bestowing too little attention upon the details of their service, and the duties of their situation. Good general-officers of this arm are yet fewer, in proportion, than the inferior officers. To these various causes must be attributed the little efficiency of the British cavalry, in a multitude of engagements, where the infantry acquitted itself with glory.

Some very honourable exceptions might, however, be cited, in favour of regiments, whose commanders obliged their officers scrupulously to fulfil all the duties of their service. These corps have proved that the English cavalry has all the requisites to render it one of the best in Europe.*

Infantry.—The regiments of infantry have only one battalion as a constant nucleus. When additional battalions are created, they are employed separately, and each commanded by its lieutenant-colonel. As to the colonel of the regiment, he is usually a general-officer, who does not serve with his corps. In the British army, therefore, the battalion is properly the principle of unity.—Two, three, or four battalions, united under the orders of a major-general, form a brigade; two brigades form a division, under the command of a lieutenant-general.

Each battalion is composed of ten companies; eight of the centre, termed battalion companies, and two which correspond with the grenadiers and chasseurs of French regiments.—It is evident that the battalion, which is augmented in time of war to eleven or twelve hundred men, is organized so that it may, on the field-of-battle, sub-divide itself into two distinct corps, each directed by a major, and commanded in chief by the lieutenant-colonel, like a regiment of two battalions.

But the institution of colour-sergeants merits, above all, our fixed attention;—their creation is recent, bearing date only in 1813;—it appears to be calculated to excite the most useful emulation among the non-commissioned officers; it became the more necessary in the British army, because the non-commissioned officers in that service have less chance than elsewhere of attaining commissions, and receive no decoration of any military order as a reward for splendid actions. The general order of the commander-in-chief, which announced to the army the institution of colour-sergeants, deserves to be known.—We shall here give an abridgment of it:—

“In consideration of the distinguished services of the non-

* I wish to offer, as a pattern, the example of a worthy friend of mine, whose courage is enhanced by his humanity, did he not compel me to withhold his name; I would cite the instance of that generous colonel, who in one of Wellington's retreats, (that of 1812,) forming the last of the rear-guard, dismounted his regiment, in order to transport, on their horses, the sick and wounded, whom the army had abandoned on their route.

commissioned officers of the army, and with a view to extend to the infantry the encouragement and advantages enjoyed by the non-commissioned officers of cavalry, the Prince-Regent, in the name of His Majesty, directs that, in all regiments of infantry, whose services are not limited, the pay of the serjeant-major shall be increased to three shillings per day, and that of one serjeant per company, to two shillings and four pence.—These serjeants are to be distinguished by a badge of honour, of which they may, nevertheless, be deprived at the discretion of the colonel or officer commanding the regiment, or by sentence of a court-martial.

“These privileged serjeants are to be termed *colour-serjeants*; they will bear above their chevron, the honorary distinction of a regimental colour, supported by two sabres crossed. When under arms, they will constantly take post round the regimental colours; in other respects, they are to fulfil all the duties of other serjeants.

“The commander-in-chief recommends to colonels the utmost circumspection in the choice of colour-serjeants.—He trusts, that this honourable title will constantly be given to men of tried valour; distinguished by their attention in fulfilling the duties of their station, and maintaining discipline in their respective companies.

“The commander-in-chief addresses himself to the non-commissioned officers themselves—he appreciates their meritorious services; he is persuaded that, under the direction of their officers, they have, by their individual and collective efforts, largely contributed to raise the character of the British army to that degree of eminence which it has at present reached.—The commander-in-chief has real satisfaction in seeing such services graciously recognised and rewarded.

“It is reasonable to hope that, the reward thus presented to merit, will serve as an incentive to every soldier—it is within the reach of all who have hands and hearts to serve their king and country. It is offered to the young as well as the old; it is the price of honesty, sobriety, fidelity, and personal bravery. The commander-in-chief trusts, that this reward will excite, more than by any other means, the non-commissioned officers of the British army to persevere in conduct which has procured for them this honourable mark of the munificence of their country, and of their sovereign.”

Foreign Troops.—We have already noticed the determination with which the parliament prevents the sovereign from maintaining foreign mercenaries in arms, during the time of peace. Nevertheless, during war, they sometimes permit the monarch to receive foreigners under the British standard, limiting, however, the duration of such a concession.

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In 1812, the ministry incorporated, into the tenth light dragoons, a certain number of Germans, who had been taken prisoners from the French service. The parliament instantly took the alarm, and the warmest discussion arose upon this employment of foreigners in the national ranks. "To mingle foreigners in the same regiment with Englishmen," exclaimed General Tarleton, haughtily, "is to blend the baser metal with pure gold and silver. Let the government retain in their pay as many foreigners as they please, but let it leave them the title of mercenaries."—"It was the pride of Lord Chatham," said a second orator, "that having found the army filled with foreigners, and having expelled them all, the result proved that he had thus powerfully raised the hopes and the honour of his country."

The ministry, unable to resist such attacks, proposed that there should be laid before the house, a return of all foreign officers and soldiers incorporated in British regiments. This return shewed, that among two hundred thousand British soldiers, there were only *thirty-one officers, and three hundred and ninety-three private soldiers*, who were foreigners: the latter being, for the most part, men of colour, belonging to bands. I dwell upon this fact, because it is believed, on the continent, that the national troops of Great Britain are in a great part recruited by foreign mercenaries.

The English government, with more reason, prefers purchasing complete corps of foreigners, at a price fixed according to circumstances. Thus, the troops of Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel, Darmstadt, &c. were hired out to England during nearly all the wars of the French Republic. In forming these military treaties, the King of Great Britain never forgot the interests of his Hanoverian auxiliaries.

In the last war, General Mortier having compelled the Hanoverian army to lay down their arms, upon condition that they might retire into England, an act of parliament authorized the residence and service of these troops in the British dominions. They there formed a complete corps of themselves, under the name of "the King's German Legion." This legion, sixteen thousand strong, was composed of cavalry, infantry, and artillery.

Not contented with taking into pay, during the war, the troops of other powers, the English ministry raised corps of foreigners in those countries of which they held temporary possession, and in the colonies. By these means they formed, in the course of a few years, Sicilian and Greek regiments, Maltese, military artificers, &c.; lastly, they used every method, in Great Britain itself, to enrol prisoners of war.

Great Britain has never placed much reliance upon foreign auxiliaries. Experience has convinced her that, with few exceptions, these troops are still, in our days, of the same character as

the bands who ravaged Italy instead of protecting her, and of whom Machiavel has given us a picture at once masterly, frightful, and exact, as if it had come from the pen of Tacitus. We shall extract the following statements from the "Narrative of Poole," and "Macdiarmid's Inquiry into the System of National Defence of Great Britain."

"In 1794 and 1795, the corps of Rolle, Dillon, &c. were formed of German deserters and French emigrants. The Austrians frequently sent detachments of cavalry to the English camp, in order to recover their deserters. By this means, and still more by *re-desertion*, five regiments, raised at great expence throughout Germany, melted down into a single battalion. This remaining wreck was conducted with great care as far as the Lake of Constance, where the Austrians, in one of their customary researches, carried off forty-five men from the grenadier company alone: they still, in contempt, left behind several soldiers too well disguised, or too unfit for the service to be reclaimed.

"The usual precautions against desertion proving insufficient, the serjeants had orders every night to take away the shoes of the recruits, as well as the most indispensable part of their clothing; this was also without effect. As soon as victory declared itself for the cause of the French Republic, the French soldiers, who had been enticed under the emigrant colours, repassed the Rhine, and returned in crowds to their native country. Several corps, having scarcely as many soldiers as officers, the commanders and their subalterns all deserted together, shortly after they had received the price of their engagements. At length, the desertion of these auxiliaries was so great on every occasion, that the privates, and even their officers, (when they were sent to the colonies) went over to the Maroon negroes, rather than remain in the British service."

Colonial Forces.—I have already said, that the English government, in order to guard their national troops from the ravages of unhealthy climates, sent as many foreign corps to the colonies as it was possible to obtain for such service. But European mercenaries were not sufficient for the ever-increasing wants of immense possessions. The most numerous foreign corps, the German legion, and some others besides, served under the express stipulation that they were not to quit Europe, a condition which very much limited a resource that the British government would soon have exhausted. They were, therefore, reduced to the necessity of adopting other expedients; and they had recourse to the same plan of recruiting their American forces, as the colonists had followed for three centuries, to supply their plantations with labourers. It was resolved to raise several

corps of blacks in America, and on the coast of Africa. It appears, that in 1805, before the abolition of the slave-trade, the government concluded a bargain with some merchants for the purchase of five thousand African negroes, between the ages of sixteen and thirty. Before this, there were already raised six West-India regiments, amounting to rather more than five thousand men. In the estimates laid before the House of Commons, these corps are considered as national troops, placed after the regiments of the line, and paid on the same footing.

When the slave-trade was solemnly abolished by the British parliament, it became necessary to resort to other measures than a direct purchase of men, for the recruitment of the black regiments. A major for the recruiting service was, accordingly, dispatched to the settlement of Sierra Leone, on the African coast, with money, clothing, &c. for the Africans whom he might enlist, and presents to the African chiefs of the surrounding country. These presents, to obtain permission to recruit *gratis*, have some resemblance to the bargains which are concluded by Europeans with the haughty Bashaws of Asia, who are too proud to sell any thing to Christian princes; but *give* them the objects desired, for which an equivalent present is *given* in return.

The Militia.—The militia is the only armed force which is truly national in England. Its origin is traced to the reign of the great Alfred, by whom it was made subservient to the delivery of the country from the Danish yoke. It is, in fact, a force essentially defensive; and should be adopted by every people, who are enemies to conquest, and jealous of their liberties.

The successors of Alfred had neither his genius, his courage, nor his activity. In their hands, the Saxon government rapidly declined, institutions lost their vigour, and the state was ruined. A conqueror, skilful, profound, and dissembling, full of talent and valour, undertook the usurpation of the throne of England. He succeeded, and, in order to found his empire more securely, changed at one blow the system of civil and military laws. He established the feudal customs in all the purity of the monarchies, founded by the Goths, the Huns, and the Vandals. The native families being once stripped of their patrimony, their lands were allotted in great fiefs to the barons, the bishops, and abbots of the conqueror, and parcelled out by these chieftains to their officers and soldiers; annexing to their rental charge the obligation, *in perpetuo*, of military service on the summons of their feudal proprietors.

Notwithstanding the progress of knowledge, the perfection of industry, and the division of property which thence arose, the military system of feudal tenure was not wholly abolished in England until the time of Charles the Second. This was

almost the only benefit of a bad reign. From that period, a new organization of militia was requisite in place of the feudal array. Proprietors were divided into separate classes; the most wealthy were required to furnish a horseman, armed and equipped; and those of less substance, an armed foot-soldier.

Charles was careful to procure from the parliament a guarantee of the most absolute power over the national militia. The nation had just escaped from despotism, the excesses of which had been caused by the usurpation of military power from the crown by parliament, and afterwards from the parliament by the army; it was, therefore, thought that too great an authority could never be conceded to the sovereign, and his subjects rushed into the contrary extreme from that which they had just escaped. Such is the course of revolutions!

The happy period of 1688, which set bounds to the power of the prince over the formation of a regular army, fixed no limits to his authority over the militia; because parliament had no fear of this force being rendered an instrument of despotism. Owing to the charges which, under the law of Charles II., pressed heavy upon the wealthy and middle classes, and to the little probability which offered, for a long time, of any descent of an enemy upon England, the institution of the militia fell more and more into neglect.

The dread of an invasion in 1756 caused serious attention to be bestowed upon this important branch of the public force. It was improved by degrees under the reigns of George II. and III. Under the first of these princes, the force of the militia was fixed at thirty-seven thousand seven hundred and forty men; and it has since been considerably increased. The duration of the service of a militia-man, which was originally three years, was increased to five by the act of the 26th of George III. Formerly, also, the militia of Great Britain and Ireland could not, under any pretext, be sent out of their respective kingdoms; but at the epoch of the rebellion of 1799, an act of parliament suspended a restriction so hurtful to the defence of both countries, in favour of such of the English militia as should volunteer to pass over into Ireland; and, finally, in 1811, this sort of barrier, which limited the services of the militia to particular parts of the three kingdoms, was abolished.

Since the year 1803, the militia, who were formerly exercised only twenty-one days, have been made liable to twenty-eight days of training in the year.—In each county, the lord-lieutenant and his deputies, in general assembly, determine the time and place of embodying the militia, subject to the approbation of the government. Their orders are then transmitted to the assemblies of sub-division, and by the latter to the municipal

magistrates, who give immediate notice to the militia-men of their respective parishes.

In cases of actual invasion, or danger of invasion, in all circumstances of rebellion and insurrection, the sovereign can order the incorporation, without delay, of a whole or a portion of the corps of militia, to send them to any part of Great Britain. If the parliament is sitting, the king must previously communicate to both houses the causes of this measure: if it occur during a prorogation, the resolution of embodying the militia must be made in the responsible council of ministers, and notified by a proclamation. *In this latter case the king must assemble the parliament within fourteen days, at the utmost, from the date of the day of embodying.*

The sovereign has not only the power of summoning the whole of the militia to arms in case of rebellion or invasion; he can also augment their force by one half, and levy what is termed, *the supplementary militia*. But the sovereign must then also direct the meeting of parliament within, at most, fourteen days after the new call to arms.

Fencibles and Volunteers.—William the Conqueror, who, with his Normans, could only govern the Britons by disarming them, and exerting the strong curb of the feudal system to restrain their freedom, destroyed the fine establishment of Alfred for a national militia. The successors of William, whenever they summoned the inhabitants to defend their government, used no other preliminary formalities than the simple expression of their pleasure. On occasions of internal rebellion, or foreign invasion, if the monarch judged it requisite to assemble a larger force than the feudal array, he gave orders to the sheriffs of counties to mount on horseback, and ride day and night, through their respective districts, and to proclaim every where on their route, a levy of all men from the age of sixteen to sixty, in a condition to bear arms. It was enjoined to these conscripts, named *defensibles*, to repair armed to the army of the king with the least delay; and that *under pain of loss of life, of limb, and every thing else which it was possible to lose.**

Thus, under the admirable reign of feudalism, a simple writ of the sovereign was sufficient to direct a *levy en masse* of all serfs from sixteen to sixty years of age! This despotic power of the Anglo-Norman monarchs fell by slow degrees before the legislative authority of the parliament; and the corps of fencibles, whose name recalls that of slaves, conducted by force to war, are, at present, troops levied by voluntary engagement, at the charge of some wealthy individual, for the purpose of aiding the public

* Grose's History of the British Army, Vol. 1. p. 66.

defence in case of rebellion or invasion. These corps terminate their service, by right, on the return of peace.

The first corps of this nature was the Argyle county regiment, levied in 1759, to serve specially in that county only. Other regiments were raised in the same manner, by voluntary enrolment, in 1778 and 1779, at an epoch when the war with the American colonies assumed an aspect altogether unfavourable to Great Britain, and caused her to fear an invasion by France.

In the war with the French republic, twelve regiments of fencibles were levied, whose services might be extended to, and even beyond, the three kingdoms. They were of great utility in the Irish rebellion previous to the union. In the same war twenty-four regiments of cavalry and seventeen of infantry, enrolled voluntarily for defensive service only, offered to bear arms in any part of the British empire.

During the war with the French empire, companies of volunteers were formed, specially destined to the guard and service of the batteries on the coast. These companies, which received the name of *sea-fencibles*, were levied in the maritime counties. From the places of their abode, they were at hand on the spots where their services might be required immediately on the attempt of an enemy to effect a landing.

Volunteers.—In times of public danger in Great Britain, numerous bodies of the citizens take arms, and organize themselves into corps of volunteers. When they take the field, or are charged with any post of defence, they immediately pass under the orders of the commander-in-chief. In ordinary cases, however, they are under the authority of the secretary-of-state for the home-department; their charges and expence enter into the department of the secretary-of-war; their arming is entrusted to the board of ordnance.

The lord-lieutenant of each county commands the volunteers, as well as the militia. It is through him that communications pass between these troops and the different branches of the ministry. He names the officers, subject to the approbation of the king. The levy and formation of troops or companies, battalions, and regiments, are likewise under his direction, and that of his deputies.

Yeomanry-Cavalry.—The volunteer cavalry, composed of the wealthy country gentlemen, and principal farmers, who are, in general, electors of the county members, and consequently have the rank of yeomen, is known under the name of the yeomanry-cavalry. Organized at the period of the war with the French republic, this force has never been broken up, and continues during the peace, in readiness to march at the first summons. It renders services equally numerous and varied. In

time of war it fulfils all the military functions of our *gens-d'armes*, the escort of prisoners, deserters, &c.; it has not however the duties of the civil and criminal police, which our *gens d'armes* execute with the sabre. A constable, with a small staff in his hand, is, in England, sufficient to perform this part of the judicial service. The yeomanry-cavalry, which might, in the event of invasion, render incalculable service, is also singularly well adapted for the maintenance of the public peace. It is, above all, useful in the manufacturing provinces, where great and unexpected revolutions of commerce, by suddenly creating a frightful extent of misery, urge the wretched workmen, who are deprived of all means of existence, to have recourse to arms, in order to obtain what their industry and supplications cannot procure—sufficient wages to support their families.

Volunteer Infantry.—The volunteer infantry form regiments, battalions, and companies to serve as troops of the line, and as light troops. In some cases they are also organized as artillery. They assemble for exercise twenty-six days in the year; during which period they are paid like the regular forces. They clothe themselves at their own charge, but during the late war, some districts assessed themselves to provide uniforms for the poorer classes of volunteers. The arms and ammunition were supplied by the ordnance department.

In 1803, the first consul of France assembled, on the heights of Boulogne, the veterans of the republic—the conquerors of all the continental powers. At sight of the danger, the population of Great Britain rose *en masse*. On the 18th of May, war was declared; and, on the 11th of June, an act of parliament directed the lords-lieutenants of counties to prepare a general list of males, in condition for service, from 15 to 60 years of age, inviting those who were not already in the militia, to arm for the defence of their country.

In a few months, all the counties, towns, and great corporations, even the universities, formed, armed, clothed, and disciplined regiments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The young emulated those of maturer years, and the youth of the richer classes rivalled the sons of the less opulent, in ranging themselves, like them, in the military ranks. Thus, on the 9th of December, when the French flotilla had scarcely begun to assemble at Boulogne, England, exclusive of her regular troops, had accepted the services of 592,629 men!

It was the profound policy of the British government to favour, by every possible method, the combined systems of militia and volunteer organization. These levies summoned all classes of citizens under the banners of their country; excited military ardour, and exalted even to enthusiasm the eagerness to resist

an enemy, who became the less dangerous to England, in proportion as she formed a more serious and just calculation of the preparations and efforts which would be requisite for the repulse of the assailant.

CHAPTER IV.

On the War and Peace Establishments.

IN time of war the greater part of the regiments of infantry are augmented to two battalions, the second of which remains in Great Britain, and is charged with the recruitment and training of the whole. By these means, the army on active service is composed of the flower of all the corps, and the young soldiers are not exposed to all the fatigues of war, before they have served some period of apprenticeship to the rough trade of arms.

To judge of the military forces of Great Britain, it will be necessary to consider them under two points of view—the defensive and offensive systems. The most striking exemplification which can be desired is afforded by the late war.

In the spring of 1803, the British government resolved upon a renewal of hostilities against the French republic; the first consideration was to prepare the means of defence, and one month before the declaration of war, the national militia was incorporated under the following heads:

	<i>Regiments.</i>		<i>Battalions.</i>		<i>Men.</i>
England	-	56	-	76	51,448
Scotland	-	15	-	15	9,540
Ireland	-	38	-	38	22,857

Total Militia of the three kingdoms - - - 83,840

To add to this defensive force, an army of reserve was raised, like the militia, by means of ballot, upon condition of serving only in the three kingdoms, and the islands adjacent. The command of the corps of this army was bestowed upon officers from half-pay, and old fencible officers. On the 9th of December, 1803, the army of reserve of the three kingdoms consisted of 34,162 men.

At the same epoch, the total of the volunteer force of the three kingdoms amounted to 474,627 men, making a grand total of the force purely defensive, amounting to - - - 592,629 men.

The Regular Army (rank and file) consisted of	-	-	150,000
Navy, (sailors and marines)	-	-	100,094
Army of the East Indies, upwards of	-	-	160,000

General Total of the British Forces in December, 1803 1,002,723

From this period, until the year 1814, the increase of the regular forces was constant and progressive. At the latter epoch, the regular army, with the militia, amounted to 324,971, and

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exclusive of the militia to 261,215. The foreign corps in British pay, in 1814, reached a total of 52,057. The force of the militia had rather diminished from their volunteering into the line.

It is necessary to observe, that, from the year 1808, the militia became a regular and permanent description of troops, differing in no point of organization and discipline from infantry of the line, but reserved expressly for the defence of Great Britain, and thus affording the power of employing a portion of the regular army, to the same amount as their numbers, on foreign service.

The forces of which we have given an enumeration do not include the troops of the East-India Company, in themselves composing a great army. According to a statement submitted to the House of Commons in March, 1819, the total number of the East-India Company's troops amounted to 190,904 men.

On the Levying and Recruiting of Troops.—In England, no citizen, whatever be his age or rank, can be obliged to enrol himself under arms, except for the defence of the territory; he cannot be made to serve in the army which is destined for offensive war. This distinction, which seems the dictate of humanity, is also worthy of a free people. It will be seen how it has operated in rendering the government frugal of British blood. But the law does still more; it offers to misfortune and improvidence a resource against every enrolment which has been contracted in a moment of drunkenness or despair. The mutiny act, which appoints and specifies the annual force of the army, provides that, within four days after a voluntary enlistment, the recruit shall be conducted before a justice of the peace, or other civil magistrate, who is to read to him the articles against desertion and rebellion, and require of him the oath of allegiance. If the soldier wishes to revoke his engagement, he may at that moment do so, on paying twenty shillings for the expences of his enlistment.

The recruiting service is attended with very considerable charge to the state.—The bounty for enlistment increases with the difficulty of the period; in 1806, the total expence of the enlistment of a trooper was as high as thirteen guineas; that of a foot-soldier, destined for general service, sixteen guineas and five shillings; and that of youths under sixteen years of age, ten guineas and five shillings.

Towards the close of 1804, when England most apprehended an invasion, the government, in the hope of completing the second battalions of regiments, authorized the commanders of corps to enlist ten boys under sixteen years of age for each company, making one hundred each battalion. These boys were instructed first in marching, and afterwards in the use of the firelock. They did not commence the performance of military

duties until their corporeal strength admitted of their doing so. This care is worthy of praise, but the primitive measure is not the more justifiable on that account. When the parents or guardians of a youth under sixteen years of age induce him to enlist for life, *they receive a reward of two guineas!* Such a proceeding is the height of immorality: it tends to establish a military traffic on the shores of Europe, upon the same principles which encouraged and gave vigour to the odious slave-trade, carried on with the people of the most barbarous countries of Africa.

On the renewal of hostilities in 1803, Great Britain found herself placed under extraordinary circumstances, which obliged her to alter a great part of her military institutions; and in the number, more particularly, was the recruiting of the army. This operation was always tardy and difficult, notwithstanding every encouragement; and the putting in force every art of management; though even the hulks were drained, and the prisons emptied, more than once, to supply the want of soldiers.

The difference of character in the inhabitants of the three kingdoms is strongly evinced in the returns of the volunteering from the militia. The Scotchman, prudent, and master over himself, rarely enlists without limiting the duration of his service; the Englishman is, in general, less guarded in this respect; and the Irishman has so little thought of the future, that it is extremely rare to find an individual of that nation who does not engage for life.

Losses of the Army.—In the eye of the philosopher, one of the greatest advantages of the English laws is, that they afford the government every possible facility for raising an army of defence, while they oppose obstacle upon obstacle to their levying, or promptly recruiting, numerous offensive corps. The ministry must become sparing of blood, which can only with so much difficulty be replaced; they are obliged to deny their ambition the indulgence of those hazardous expeditions which, being undertaken with immense forces, intoxicate and corrupt by their success, in the same proportion that their failure occasions exhaustion and despair.

As the results which we are about to lay before the reader are very different from the ideas generally received upon the same subject on the continent, it will be requisite to be particular in verifying them.

Every year, during war, the adjutant-general of the British forces lays before the House of Commons a numerical return of the losses of the army, distinguishing the national forces from the foreign and colonial troops, and stating the number of deaths, discharges, reductions, and desertions. We shall confine ourselves to the results of these documents for the different years of the war with the French empire.

State of the Losses of the British Army during the Twelve Years of War with the French Empire.

Years	British Corps.			Foreign & Colonial Corps.			General Total
	Deaths.	Discharges	Desertions	Deaths	Discharges	Desertions	
1803	4,591	4,627	4,178	617	1,831	226	16,070
1804	4,861	3,634	4,852	1,258	964	616	16,185
1805	5,888	3,415	6,497	945	914	584	18,243
1806	5,581	3,809	4,466	914	879	1,282	16,931
1807	6,379	3,170	5,021	1,553	708	707	17,538
1808	7,993	4,131	5,059	1,292	859	1,552	20,886
1809	14,476	2,968	4,186	1,867	355	715	24,567
1810	11,660	3,944	3,994	2,037	683	735	22,953
1811	11,670	3,289	4,060	1,778	697	966	22,460
1812	13,406	2,554	4,353	2,436	1,184	1,565	25,498
1813	16,012	3,621	5,822				
1814	12,502	3,429	8,857				

Taking into account the British forces only, from the commencement of 1804 to the commencement of 1814, that is, during those years of the last war which were wholly passed in warfare, we shall collect from the above table, that the total of discharges and losses amounted to 179,671 men. Let us now proceed to rate the force of the levies in the same lapse of time.

On the 1st of Jan. 1814, the effective force of British }
corps was } 187,926 men.

On the 1st of Jan. 1804, it amounted to } 119,441

Augmentation of the effective force of British regular }
corps between 1804 and 1814 } 68,485

It then follows that the corps of British cavalry and infantry of the line, in order to replace their losses, and present an increase of 68,485 men, must have at least received 248,156 recruits.

The following proportions may, therefore, be given as the average contingencies of the war, one year with another, against the French empire :

Number of deaths, 9,682.—Discharges, 3,453.—Desertions, 4833; forming a total annual loss of 17,968 men.

These facts merit the most serious reflection. Strange! that at the epoch when the French army required for its recruitment, one year with another, nearly 150,000 men per annum, the English army required but 23,000 men annually; and that this comparatively small number sufficed, not only to cover all losses, but to increase the effective strength of the forces by about 7000 men yearly!

We shall now have no difficulty in judging whether we can possibly consider an empire, which was protected by a million of armed warriors, when it was menaced with invasion, as having too few men for its defence; and whether or not the moderate rates of recruiting enable the government to maintain for

a long period the forces which were employed on the continent, and husbanded with so much prudence and foresight. But let us see what influence the destruction of warfare actually had upon the British population. From the commencement of the eighteenth century to its conclusion, Great Britain passed through nearly fifty years of wars in all parts of the globe; and yet its population, so far from diminishing in numbers, increased in that lapse of time almost eighty per cent.

During the ten first years of the nineteenth century, a war more extended, more furious, more sanguinary, than any which had preceded it, raged with an intermission of only two years; and, notwithstanding, the population rose in numbers at a rate double that of the average increase of the preceding century. To these facts should be added the remarkable circumstance, that after the peace of 1815, when the British government seriously applied itself to the reduction of the forces for a peace establishment, the disbanding of the troops was one of the causes of the sudden misery into which the poorer part of the population were plunged at that epoch: all situations which could afford a livelihood were filled, and the disbanded soldiery were thus thrown upon that portion of the people which subsists only by charitable contributions, and yet the reductions were made very gradually.

In concluding this part of the subject, it may be safely asserted, that whatever be the losses of the British armies, no European power will ever triumph over England by trusting to the exhaustion of her population in warfare.

On the Peace Establishment.—The passage from a state of war to that of peace is always a critical moment for the public prosperity, and the liberty of nations; during war, a thousand plausible pretexts, are afforded by circumstances for suspending the civil laws, and violating the safe-guards of the citizen. It is at first, as if with regret, that authority possesses itself of a temporary increase of power and of momentary attributes, which, at the time, there is a secret determination of preserving as long as possible. Prodigal in assurances for times, which are only seen in prospect, and holding out flattering pictures of general happiness and liberty, at an approaching epoch, it is the endeavour of the executive to accustom the people to forego, for a time, the advantages and enjoyments of actual freedom. At length, however, the decisive hour of peace must arrive, and it is then that the destiny of nations produces either a return of prosperity, or rivets them in oppression and distress, according as the public will is proclaimed, or not, by a legislative power; according as their government is constitutional or arbitrary. These truths have received a memorable exemplification since the peace of 1815, a period of merited disasters for the nations of Europe,

because it was one in which they combined in availing themselves of the misfortunes of a single state, for purposes of exaction.

When, in 1813 and 1815, the allies penetrated into the French territories, and declared that they were about to exert a great and last effort, in the hope of restoring peace to the world, and of being enabled to disband the greater portion of their enormous forces, the majority of their governments were already preparing for the world the measures of their bad faith; for, with the exception of Great Britain and Sweden, they have, since all, retained the most formidable armaments during a general pacification. Russia keeps on foot 800,000 men, and concentrates a force on her western frontier as a nursery for future invasions. Since the mysterious league of the Holy Alliance, the conscription *en masse* has been established in Poland, by the creators of that symbol of eternal peace. Prussia maintains 200,000 men of regular troops; Austria a still greater number; and the larger portion of the petty potentates of the Germanic confederation, trembling at the same time before their holy allies and their own subjects, imagine that they can best consolidate their thrones by ramparts of bayonets, and, above all, by arbitrary tribunals. Political espionage and religious inquisition, are there to be ennobled by the majesty of military executions. Such are the fruits of peace in countries groaning under the sceptre of despotism.

Let us now examine the military reductions which have taken place in Great Britain since the year 1815.

Since 1816, the expence of foreign corps in British pay has been lessened by three-fifths; that of the regular militia by three-fourths, and that of the army of the line by two-fifths. In 1817, the whole of the regular militia, and foreign corps, without exception, were disbanded. With regard to the troops of the line, they were reduced as follows:

The Cavalry, from 29,663 men	to	-	-	17,062
The Infantry, from 203,440	to	-	-	105,890
In 1818, there were only under arms,				
Cavalry	-	-	-	14,116
Infantry	-	-	-	104,116

And, in 1819, the military force, reduced to its minimum, was still less than in the former year.

The peace establishment of Great Britain, as regulated by the estimates of 1819, is composed as follows; exclusive of the troops serving in India.

Infantry—Soldiers, officers, and non-commissioned officers	69,848
Cavalry Do. Do.	10,640
Ordnance Do. Do.	7,935
	<hr/> 88,423

By this system of reduction, the charge for pay and maintenance of the troops was reduced from £13,435,392 to £6,582,803.

Before the subject of the peace establishment of Great Britain is concluded, it may be interesting to offer a statement which will be conclusive in clearing up an historical doubt, arising from the angry passions of a moment. The statement to which I allude is the following; showing the numbers of the British forces at the close of the war of 1814, on the 25th June, and again on the 25th of December of the same year.

	Cavalry	Ordnance	Infantry	Militia	Gen. Total.
25th June, 1814	31,055	27,107	203,052	63,756	324,970
25th Dec. 1814	23,674	21,337	175,783	20,372	241,166

I now ask, if it be reasonable to presume that, if the English meditated a renewal, in the spring of 1815, of the contest which threatened ruin to the proud edifice of the holy coalition, they would, between June and December, 1814, have disbanded more than eighty thousand men, who had been inured to warfare by ten years of continued servitude, during a struggle so fruitful in great events.

There are still additional facts to give increased force to these observations.—Between the Christmas of 1814, and the spring of the next year, eight regiments of militia were disbanded, although this description of force had already been diminished by forty-three thousand men. All that could be done in “the hundred days,” was to levy hastily, and at great expence, twenty-five thousand nine hundred and seven militia, and nine thousand one hundred and forty-eight soldiers of the line.

On Half-Pay, Retired Allowances, and Invalids.—It is not sufficient to be acquainted only with the extent of reductions operated in the British army by the return of peace; it is necessary also to follow the soldier up to the moment when the country has no longer any occasion for his services, and to inquire what support she bestows upon him. The British government will be found to make greater sacrifices than any other in Europe, in favour of the officers and soldiery who have fought under its banners.

In the rank of the noblest of rewards must be placed the pensions granted to the widows and children of officers who have died in the service of their country. The army is indebted to Queen Anne for this benefit; and, accordingly, the support granted to orphans and widows of officers is styled, “Queen Anne’s Bounty.” It is pleasing to find national generosity consecrating the memory of the hand which first dispensed it.

When an officer is killed on the field-of-battle, a whole year’s pay devolves to his widow, a third besides to each of the or-

phans whom he may leave behind, as well as for a posthumous child. The officer who dies in the six months which follow a dangerous wound, is considered as having been killed in action.

There are widows and orphans of officers who, though not within the precise letter of the advantages warranted by law, are no less worthy by their misfortunes of inspiring the government with generous sympathy. Every year, therefore, a list of such cases, prepared by the secretary of war, is submitted to parliament, under the appellation of "*The Compassionate List*," for which the commons never fail granting the necessary supplies. Non-commissioned officers and soldiers, discharged from the service, have a right to invalid or veteran pensions. Those of Great Britain receive this reward from the hospital of Chelsea: those of Ireland from that of Kilmainham. It will be sufficient to explain the most important of these two establishments.

The spacious edifice of Chelsea, erected in a village which now forms one of the suburbs of London, was commenced by order of James I., and destined for a far different object than that to which it was subsequently devoted. That monarch, famous for his acquirements in scholastic learning, and his fondness for the subtleties of theological controversy, was desirous of establishing near his throne a centre of disputation upon doctrine and faith; and, with this view, meditated the foundation of a college of fifteen protestant doctors, with canonries, prebendaries, and whatever else could exempt them from the vulgar cares of humanity. The special object intended for these theologians of the reformed church was, the intrepid maintenance of all points upon which the religious establishment of England differed from that of Rome. This anti-sorbonne of King James received the property of the domain of Chelsea, with the right of using the river Lea, to supply London with water.

The seat of the English college, notwithstanding all the zeal of the royal theologian, rose but slowly during the reign of that prince; the building was suspended in the troublous times of his son, and the institution declined altogether under the republic. When Charles II. was restored to his throne, his ambition of rivalling Louis XIV. led him to choose Chelsea for a hospital of invalids; the works were then resumed, and at length finished by Sir Christopher Wren, the celebrated architect, under the reign of William and Mary.

Chelsea Hospital is reproached for an excessive expenditure, both in the support of its vast buildings, the emoluments of the governor, and a multitude of persons in its service, in every station, and of all ranks. Enormous sums are thus ostentatiously dissipated for the maintenance of the very small portion of invalids actually resident in the hospital. The great number of

old soldiers, whose pensions are paid at their several places of residence in the different counties, are not under the eyes of the inhabitants of the capital to exhibit, by their extraordinary dress, the munificence of the government.

On the Military Hospitals.—During the war there were general hospitals, as well as regimental ones, for each corps. In 1794, shortly after the formation of the medical board, a plan was conceived for establishing, with the army of the Duke of York serving in Flanders, a general hospital, directed by physicians to be chosen from the civil profession. All the wounded who needed a protracted cure were required to be passed from the regimental hospitals to this general one. The innovation was unfortunate; the mortality increased in very considerable proportion, and the expense of the medical service rose in the same ratio.

By a regulation of 1798, the surgeon was created director of the hospital of the regiment to which he belonged; the stoppage of pay from the sick received into such hospital was fixed at ninepence per day for each man (which sum was afterwards raised to ten-pence); and the disposal of this stoppage was entrusted to the surgeon for procuring reasonable comforts and indulgences for the sick. The surgeon was required to keep a regular account of his expences, which was to be examined and signed weekly by the commanding-officer and paymaster of the corps: the surgeon was further directed to render an account, every six months, to the inspector of hospitals, of medicines expended, and remaining on hand.

General Hospitals.—The creation of general hospitals presents three different epochs, the first being that of the commencement of the French republic; the second, the period of the expedition to Holland; and the third, that of the war against the French empire.

In 1819, I visited the medical establishment at Chatham, to which the dépôt, lately existing at the Isle of Wight, had been removed; this dépôt is placed in Fort Pitt; and to it all soldiers about to be discharged are sent, before their final release from the service. If their infirmities are not declared incurable they are retained at the hospital, and treated with the most enlightened care; for the British government never discard a non-commissioned officer or soldier under the affliction of any disease for which human art can afford relief or remedy. This conduct is worthy of every eulogium, and reflects shame upon those governments who disband the corps of their armies in the aggregate, without bestowing any care or a thought upon the means of restoring health or strength to those who have sacrificed one, or both, in the service of an ungrateful country.

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The dépôt hospital at Chatham will contain about five hundred men; and since the peace, above six thousand have, on an average, been annually received into the establishment. The wards are kept in a state of the greatest cleanliness, and, in passing through the spacious and well-ordered rooms, we breathe the purest air, and are not at all annoyed by any unpleasant odour. It should be observed, that the air of Fort Pitt, which is excellent for persons of a vigorous constitution, appears to be too piercing for invalids.

Dr. Forbes, the present director of the hospital, had, since he took charge of it, formed a cabinet of anatomy, &c., which although it had only been two years in existence, already contained many objects of great interest for professional men. All the preparations for injections, and other materials belonging to this cabinet, had been made by the surgeons attached to the establishment.

The military hospital for Lunatics is situated very near the general hospital, in Fort Clarence, under the separate charge of a medical officer. The extensive casements of this fort are fitted up for the patients, and heated by steam to a proper temperature during the winter.

The ordnance department has its own medical establishment, independent of that of the army, and directed by an inspector-general.—Woolwich is the medical dépôt for the troops of the ordnance, and the place of examination for the discharged soldiery of that force. I visited a regimental hospital of the ordnance at Chatham, which was remarkable for its excellent arrangements.

Apothecary-General.—It will scarcely be credited, yet it is nevertheless true, that by a warrant of George II. (dated 1747,) an apothecary was created perpetual furnisher, with remainder to his heirs, of all the medicines necessary for the general service of the land-forces of Great Britain! The consequence of such a monopoly is, that the government pays at a higher rate for bad medicines than that at which they might procure others of superior quality by a fair competition. From 1795 to 1806, inclusive, the supply of these articles cost the sum of £809,089; and no previous examination of the quantity or quality of the drugs was ever made!—For want of this preliminary examination, the medicines sent out to corps, serving in climates essentially different, were not at all assorted with a view to the particular disorders to which the soldier might be chiefly liable in each country. The most indispensable articles were often thus supplied in very small quantities; while others, which were perfectly useless, came out in superabundance.

However, since the period of the military inquiry, to whose

exertions it is owing that so much prodigality and malversation were exposed, the regularity of the service, and the accounts of the medical department, have been very considerably improved. —That department is at present under the direction of Dr. M'Gregor, an old medical officer, who went through most of the campaigns of the two last wars, and has acquired high reputation for his services.

CHAPTER V.

General Character.—Religious Feelings and Practices of the Army.—Honorary Rewards.—Corporal and other Punishments.—Interior Discipline of Corps; Effects of this Discipline upon the Relations between the Soldier and the Citizen.

MEN usually judge of the valour of troops by the events of war. A victorious army always appears heroic, whilst one less fortunate seems, by its discomfiture, to evince its cowardice. Thus, when the English troops gained the victory of Blenheim, they ranked with the most valiant of Europe; while, on the other hand, after the defeat at Fontenoy, the capitulation of the armies of Burgoyne and Cornwallis, who were compelled to surrender by Gates, Washington, Lafayette, and Rochambeau, and more especially, after the reiterated defeats in France, Belgium, and Holland, the whole world regarded the English soldier as incapable of facing the warriors of the martial nations of Europe. Our government immediately availed itself of this gross prejudice to inspire our armies with a sovereign contempt for the English forces. To doubt the defeat of an army, sent by the British ministry to any part of the continent to contend against our troops, would have been imputed to disaffection.

In the mean time, the expedition took place; and a French general, whose incapacity rendered him an unfit successor of the two great captains who had preceded him, imprudently attacked the troops he despised, and Egypt was lost.

The British soldier has less natural spirit and penetration than the French; but the steadiness of his disposition renders his actions more deliberate. Less diverted by the view of external objects, by the recollections of the past, and by the hopes or terrors of the future, he preserves an unshaken presence of mind. He atones for his inferiority of intelligence by prompt attention to command. Incapable of judging of the great movements which are executed, much less of those in agitation, he does not even think of dangers that are to come. He rushes to instant death without bestowing a thought on the future; and this

is the reason why the moral energies of the British army are indestructible by ill-fortune. That want of foresight which seems to characterize the English soldier, that oblivion of past misfortunes, that carelessness about those before him—these qualities, so valuable in well-directed troops, are counterbalanced by defects of a destructive tendency. A brutal desire of temporary enjoyment leads the British soldier into excesses of debauchery and inebriety. When he arrives at places where wines or strong liquors are to be procured, nothing can restrain him; neither the noble desire of marching to victory, and of completing it by pursuit; nor, in case of retreat, the fear of being surprised by an advancing enemy. He will drink to his immediate destruction, if nature do not paralyze his insatiable thirst by suspending all his faculties.

In England, where religious ideas have a very great controul over the avowed acts of public authority, all means are used to subject the army to the same influence. Like the Roman, the English soldier, on ranging himself under the standard, takes an oath to the prince, but which he is far from adhering to with the same tenacity; and he not unfrequently deserts, often even to the enemy.

Lord Wellington says, in the accustomed style of the orders of the day: "The commander of the forces regrets to have observed the number of soldiers who have of late endeavoured to desert to the enemy. He hopes that this caution will prevent the repetition of a crime, which has become but too common, and which, until latterly, was unknown to the British army." Dated, *Lexaca, 14th October, 1813.*"

Thus, at the moment of our greatest disasters, and when our armies were annihilated a second time in the plains of Leipsic, the desertion of the English troops increased to such a degree as to alarm, or at least distress, their general. The military oath has not always been administered in the same form; it was, originally, framed by the Stuarts, as a species of religious engagement, by which the ends of despotism might best be served. It is still remarkable for its imperative and servile tone.

"I, N. enrolled to serve in the troops of his majesty, or in those of the East-India company, according to the pleasure of his majesty, swear, that I will bear to our sovereign lord, king George, faithful and true allegiance; that I will defend him, as I am in duty bound, in his person, in his crown, and in his dignity, against all his enemies; and that, as long as I remain in the service of his majesty, I will duly obey the orders of his majesty, as well as the orders of the generals and officers placed over me by his majesty," &c.

We will now shew by what means the government has en-

deavoured to encourage religious sentiments among the regiments. Formerly it was usual in the English army to appoint a chaplain to every regiment of infantry or cavalry in the regular troops, militia, or fencibles. The duty of the chaplain was to follow the corps under all circumstances, and to perform divine service *in person*. By degrees, however, the regimental chaplains obtained leave of absence, which was continually renewed, and their places ended by being considered as sinecures. Every chaplain caused the duties of his situation to be fulfilled by a deputy, with whom he stipulated at the lowest price. The poor deputy generally received from the nominal chaplain the pay of a serjeant of infantry.

As the nomination of chaplains used to belong to the colonels of regiments, who sold these situations, the government, from what was called a spirit of equity, had the folly to give 700*l.* to the colonels of cavalry, and 500*l.* to colonels of infantry, *in order to indemnify them for a loss of a branch of their commerce!*

At present, the chaplains are chosen with particular care, and by the first prelates of the kingdom. They are obliged by regulation to visit the sick, and the hospitals of their respective brigades or garrisons, at least twice a-week; to perform their sacred duties, as ordained by the English church; and, lastly, they are required to officiate on Sundays, for the benefit of the troops. Chaplains are enjoined to repeat the service of the different corps of the garrison, or of the division in succession, and care is to be taken, that a greater number of troops than the voice of the preacher can reach, be not assembled at one time to hear divine service, which must be concluded with a sermon, directed towards practical duties, and adapted to the habits and intelligence of the soldier.

Honorary Rewards.—The British parliament, in passing its votes of thanks, employs with dignity the same means as those of antiquity, to recompense the valour of the soldiers, officers, and victorious generals. Another way of perpetuating the recollection of services rendered to the state, is to permit the individual to wear some exterior token, which should daily call forth the respect and gratitude of his fellow-citizens.

In the institution of the several orders of chivalry, modern European governments seem to have had this object in view. Like the ring of the Roman knights, these orders were first exclusively reserved for privileged ranks. Soon after, such a badge served, like the cap of the freedman, to mark the elevation of the vassal and the peasant to that class of men truly free,—to the order of nobility. When knights ceased to form a chosen body in armies, the distinctions of the orders degenerated into vain baubles; and troops long remained without rewards capable of

stimulating them to great actions. The modern orders of knight-hood, among some nations, approximate, in a degree, to those true principles which should be our guide in the distribution of military rewards: but, with an absurdity worthy of barbarous states, potentates have attached the greatest honours to those distinctions, to obtain which, the only qualification requisite is a long series of privileged ancestry. The order founded on merit holds, almost universally, a secondary place to that which is reserved for high birth, and, therefore, peers have blushed to receive the decoration of the order of St. Michael. Hence, also, the legion-of-honour has yielded to the order of the Holy Ghost; and constitutional France affords the singular spectacle of an order holding, according to the ideas of the court, the first place in the scale of honorary rewards, which, from its nature, cannot be bestowed upon any one of the marshals, whose exploits, during thirty years, raised France to the pinnacle of glory.

The orders of the Garter, the Thistle, and St. Patrick, are to England, Scotland, and Ireland, what the order of the Holy Ghost is to France: but, in an empire where personal merit may, almost without effort, elevate to the highest dignities, men eminent by their services are first created peers; and even, though they cannot exhibit a long line of boasted ancestry, are afterwards chosen knights of the privileged orders. The three orders above-mentioned are not sufficiently numerous; and they contain too few military names on the list of their members, to justify their being regarded as a part of the rewards capable of having a moral influence on the conduct of the army; but the order of the Bath, as at present constituted, may be considered in a different light.

Previous to 1815, the number of distinctions awarded to officers for meritorious actions was very small; and none had been allotted to soldiers. The government availed itself of the extraordinary successes during the campaign of "the hundred days," to give somewhat the appearance of a new institution to the ancient order of the Bath. This order, claiming an origin as remote as the year 1399, is, like the legion-of-honour, at once civil and military. It is composed of three classes only, grand-crosses, commanders, and companions. Since the year 1816, this order has consisted of 68 military knights grand-crosses, and 12 civil; 196 knights-commanders, and 520 companions.

In a political point of view, warriors undistinguished by signs, titles, or general appellations, do not form a privileged body in the state; and, consequently, are not likely to imbibe the spirit of an aristocracy, the more dangerous from the popularity and influence which it would acquire by the reputation of valour and military genius.

The soldiers and under-officers of the English army are excluded from participation in the honours of the military orders. The only mark of distinction, which the serjeants can obtain, is the badge of the colours placed on the right arm; but, by a measure which deprives the honour of its value, this distinguished badge, acquired by services, can be taken away from the under-officer simply at the decision and arbitrary will of the commanding-officer of the corps.

All the English soldiers, who were present at the battle of Waterloo, wear a silver medal, suspended by a red ribband. This is in imitation of the distinctions awarded by the Spaniards and Germans, and appears to be the copy of an original which, in itself, is not happily conceived. Nothing is more just, or better adapted to keep alive in the army that sentiment of honour and love of true glory, which make men undergo all privations, endure every ill, and brave every peril, than that a mark of distinction, commemorative of a noble deed, a feat in arms, or a trait of extraordinary devotion, should be bestowed upon the soldier and under-officer who distinguish themselves in the field-of-battle. But to grant to fifty, sixty, or a hundred thousand men the same distinction, for having been together on the same day, and on the same field-of-battle, where certain corps alone have decided the event of the action by their valour and exertions; whilst others, on the contrary, have rendered it doubtful by their ignorance or inactivity;—to recompense equally, in every corps, the hero, whose ardour has animated his companions, and the poltroon who, trembling with impatience to shun the danger, has only been prevented from quitting his ranks by the fear of immediate punishment, is the height of folly.

Military Punishments.—The punishments of the English soldier have always displayed a peculiar character of ferocity. The criminal suffered capital punishment by decapitation, by hanging, and sometimes even by drowning, according to the nature of the offence, and the rank of the condemned.

In 1189, when the crusaders of England set out for the Holy Land, Richard the First decreed, that any crusader who, during the passage, killed a man on-board a ship, should be tied to the dead body and thrown into the sea; that any one killing another on shore, should be interred alive with the dead body of the man slain; and that every crusader wounding another should lose his hand. Every thief was shaved, and his head covered with long feathers, and upon these was poured boiling pitch, from which they could not be torn without severing the skin from the head. In this state he remained exposed to the view of the army, and was afterwards landed on the first shore at which the fleet touched, &c.

In general, when crimes were committed by a body of troops, too numerous to admit of all the delinquents being punished, they were decimated. Upon such occasions, it was usual to assemble the army in order of battle, and to lead forth the first, the eleventh, the twenty-first, and every tenth man in succession, to immediate punishment. This left nothing to chance, but was simply condemning men of certain files to an arbitrary death, to expiate the misbehaviour of a whole body. At other times recourse was had to the award of chance. The soldiers, whom it was intended to decimate, threw the dice that determined their fate upon a drum-head. Each threw in his turn; the numbers thrown were, with the names of the throwers, inserted in a list by the provost-marshal. The lowest numbers pointed out the men who were to be conducted to execution. It will hardly be credited, that at the period of the revolution, occasioned by the accession of William III. to the throne of England, this mode was still practised in Ireland!

At present, the only capital punishments to which the English soldiers are liable, are those of shooting and hanging. Care is taken, after every execution, to make the troops defile before the body, and, above all, the recruits, who are obliged to pass, one by one, close to the corpse.

Mutilation was a punishment formerly much resorted to; and, for this reason, the mutiny-act carefully specifies the courts-martial, whose authority may or may not extend to loss of life or limb. In certain cases the hand, and in others the ears, of the condemned, were cut off. By the frequency of these barbarous punishments, not only for military but for political offences, the Stuarts* much increased the hatred of the people for their dynasty. Mutilation is now abolished, death being the only punishment awarded for heinous crimes; and corporal punishment, more or less severe, for minor offences. The soldier who deserts, rebels, &c. is shot to death; the spy is hanged; the remaining punishments consist in the drill, confinement, cat-o'-nine-tails, and branding. The cavalry and artillery formerly made use of the punishment of the picket; the delinquent was fastened by the wrist to a place sufficiently high to allow of one of his feet resting naked on the point of the picket, thrust into the ground. Thus, the prisoner had only the choice of the torture occasioned by the forced distension of the muscles of the arm, or that produced by the pressure of the whole of the body

* The refinement of barbarity was carried so far, as to make the prisoner lose one of his ears in one public place, and the other ear at a second; affording the double advantage of prolonging the punishment, and of parading the unfortunate through the city, covered with blood, and followed by an immense concourse of people.

upon a point which bore against the nerves of an extremely sensitive part. This punishment, which seems to have been taken from the tortures of the inquisition in Spain, having maimed a number of soldiers, was finally abandoned, and that also of the gauntlet is now no longer used.

Care has been taken to retain the punishment of the lash : when a soldier is condemned to the lash, three serjeant's halberds are thrust into the ground, and their steel points fastened together with a cord, which serves, at the same time, to bind the prisoner's wrists above his head. The three halberds thus placed, resemble the three edges of a triangular pyramid uniting at the vertex, and are generally known in England by the name of *the triangles*. Across two of the halberds already fixed, a fourth is fastened horizontally, as high as the prisoner's waist, against which he leans, his feet being attached to the two halberds just mentioned.

The prisoner, being stripped, is, in this constrained position, beaten on the back and shoulders, or on the back, according to the nature of his offence, with a whip of nine tails, each tail having nine knots. For this reason it has acquired the name of *cat-o'-nine-tails*. Under the direction of the drum-major, the drummers of the regiment successively inflict five-and-twenty lashes ; and the adjutant is always present to enforce the exact and vigorous execution of the prescribed number of lashes. Lastly, the surgeon, or his assistant, must be present during the infliction of the punishment, in order that the prisoner may not be flogged so as to endanger his life. When it is found necessary to discontinue the punishment, before the prisoner has received the assigned number of lashes, he is taken down and conveyed to the hospital, where he remains until he is sufficiently recovered to undergo the remainder !

Who would believe that so dreadful a punishment could be inflicted for the slightest military offences, and often even to suppress by terror the just demands of the soldier ? When a corps is on its march, and an immediate punishment to be inflicted of this nature, the troops are halted, the officers are assembled round a drum, which forms the desk of this itinerant tribunal. The simple negative or affirmative of this court acquits or condemns the prisoner arraigned ; in the latter case the sentence is carried into effect without delay, and afterwards the corps continues its march. This species of judicature is called *drum-head trial*.

The walls of the British House of Parliament have often echoed with the generous voice of opposition against the barbarity of corporal punishment. Sir Francis Burdett has long distinguished himself among the orators who have defended a cause.

so dear to humanity; but his efforts have not hitherto been attended with success.

Interior Discipline of Corps;—Effects of this Discipline upon the Relations between the Soldier and the Citizen.

Perhaps there is no army in Europe in which the distinction of rank is so strongly marked as among the British troops. The distance which separates the soldier from the simple corporal is immense; that which divides the corporal from the serjeant is still greater; and, finally, the officers appear to form a class of beings of a different nature from that of the under-officers, with whom the former never admit of the slightest familiarity. One of the least apparent, but, nevertheless, greatest improvements in the organization of the English army, is the difference in the pay of the under-officers and soldiers.

In France, a soldier scarcely ever salutes any officers but those of his own regiment. Sometimes, however, a soldier of the line bestows a sort of half-salute on officers of the artillery or engineers; but a trooper, a sapper, or an artilleryman, would think it derogatory to the dignity of his branch of the profession to salute any officer of any other corps but his own. If a French trooper should not be distinguished by his uniform, he would be recognized among a thousand by the air of disdain which he affects at the sight of a foot-soldier. Certainly, this want of mutual respect does not necessarily produce insubordination, but it is a sure indication of an imperfect spirit of discipline. This subject is not unworthy of consideration by our most distinguished officers. It would be wrong to imagine that, in the English army, obedience and respect are only imposed by terror, and merely shown by marks of deference exacted by authority. If there are chiefs of corps and other officers who conduct themselves with harshness, haughtiness, and cruelty, and regard the soldier as an intelligent machine, or brute, destined simply to be the instrument of their ambition, the toy of their vanity, and the sport of their passions; there are, on the other hand, commanders who do honour to the human character, by the goodness of their hearts, and the generosity of their conduct towards the troops under their authority.

An English lieutenant-colonel, (whose name I regret not having it in my power to engrave on the memory of all admirers of military virtue,) who commanded a regiment in the West-Indies, lately afforded one of the finest examples of generosity of character that history has on record. The yellow-fever made such ravages in the colony where he was stationed, that it was found necessary, all the hospital attendants having perished, to replace them by soldiers. But the half of those destined for this peri-

lous office were immediately seized with the malady, and the rest refused to continue the performance of duties which only seemed to insure them an inevitable death. "It devolves then upon me," said the lieutenant-colonel, "to take care of my own soldiers, since their brothers in arms refuse to fulfil this duty." This generous officer devoted himself to employments, mean and disgusting in themselves, but ennobled by his motives, and hallowed by the object which he had in view. This hero of humanity, who deserved to live, to receive the tribute of public admiration, unfortunately fell a victim to the disease, the virulent effects of which, among the soldiers, he succeeded in arresting. The English parliament ought to erect a national monument to perpetuate the remembrance of this noble deed.

The relation between the soldier, the British army, and the citizen, deserves to be named as a model for all nations, who cherish both law and liberty. The British government has discovered the secret of constituting an army, formidable alone to foreign nations, and which considers obedience to the civil authority of the country as a part of its glory.

I admire the answer of an English soldier, in the midst of an assembled populace, whom he had joined in demanding from the government a measure ardently desired.—"Well, friend, (said one of the crowd) you will not take up arms against us, surely? and we may regard you as one of us."—"At present, (answered he) I am a citizen, and reclaim my rights as such; but, under arms, I shall be a soldier, and shall execute the orders I receive to compel you, if it be necessary, to obey the law." This is the spirit which animates the British army.

These noble sentiments are imprinted on the countenance of the British soldier. He has not that menacing and ferocious aspect which, on the European continent, is too often taken for martial appearance. He does not insolently scrutinize all who pass, both men and women, with an arrogance that seems to say, "I am the personification of power, and the object of terror," &c.

In England, such an air does not excite admiration; and the imitation of a braggart never becomes so frequent as to give rise to the caricature of a *Calicot*, which would only be laughable, did it not originate in a deplorable state of society. With very opposite feelings to those prevalent on the banks of the Thames, the clerks of counting-houses and offices in France equip themselves in high-heels, spurs, and mustachios, to ape the martial figure for an hour; but a military man rather endeavours, on leaving the camp for the city, to lay aside his professional character. Whenever an English officer arrives in the capital, far from appearing to be in the service, he throws aside his arms, uniform, and decorations; his dress then differs no more from

that of a common citizen, than the plain coat of a member of parliament, or a prince of the blood.

The English soldier is obliged to be constantly in uniform; but, whilst on the home-service, and particularly in time of peace, he is not armed unless on duty. Even in this last case, if in consequence of a dispute with the citizens, the soldier abuses the means of aggression which he possesses, by striking any of them, a cry of indignation is raised on all sides, and the vengeance of the law falls upon the offender with unmitigated rigour. We must add, however, that in every case of this nature, the soldier is tried *by the civil courts*.

In England, the corporal and private soldier of the infantry do not carry the sabre, because the musket, with the bayonet, is much more formidable both for attack and defence. The officer and serjeant are alone permitted to wear the sword; they are never armed but when on duty, or on the parade. The serjeant has generally so strong a sense of propriety, that there is hardly an instance on record of his perverting the use of his arms to spill the blood of defenceless citizens. Even when the English troops are under arms, nothing changes their regard, indeed, I may almost say respect, for the humblest of the citizens; and I have seen companies marching in file on the foot-path, move towards the middle of the street, to give place to the inhabitants coming in an opposite direction. Sentinels are never seen performing in England, as on the Continent, the duties of a police worthy of Algiers or Tunis, by announcing with the butt-end of their muskets, and sometimes even with a thrust of the bayonet, that *no body can pass there, or no one must stand here*. Even when in the extreme cases of rebellion, or breach of the public peace, an armed force is required to assist the civil power, the troops still respect the citizens, at a moment when the latter cease to respect themselves.

CHAPTER VI.

Royal Military Asylum.—College.—Royal Academy for the Artillery and Engineers.—Fortifications of Dover, Chatham, and Portsmouth.

THE Royal Military Asylum was founded in 1801: It is a school destined for the reception of the orphan and other children of non-commissioned officers and soldiers; and is situated at Chelsea, near the hospital for invalids, in extensive grounds. The school was opened in 1803, with the original intention of receiving only seven hundred boys and three hundred girls; but these numbers have since been increased. When I visited the establishment, (in August 1819) there were eight hundred and

fifty boys and four hundred girls, besides four hundred boys educating at an additional branch of the institution, at Southampton.

The building is composed of a large central edifice, and of two wings connected with it by colonnades. In front of the main edifice is a portico of considerable size, with four Doric columns of grand dimensions, and of fine white Portland stone. The portico is surmounted by a triangular pediment, on the centre of which are sculptured the arms of Great Britain, with this inscription:—

ROYAL MILITARY ASYLUM,
FOR THE CHILDREN OF SOLDIERS OF THE REGULAR ARMY.

The large portico is the sole ornament of architecture which decorates the Military Asylum, and, perhaps, even that is too much. With no greater cost than for its erection, a much more considerable depth might have been given to the colonnades, where the children take their recreation in summer, during excessive heats, and in other seasons, when either rain or extreme cold renders the open air insupportable.

All the rooms are in an admirable state of cleanliness: but this, indeed, is what might be repeated of every establishment in Great Britain. But regard to cleanliness is not confined to the mere building; there is still greater attention bestowed upon the personal cleanliness of the children. There are two of them in each bed, and the bedsteads are of iron instead of wood; over the heads of these beds are shelves, on which the children deposit their clothes. At all seasons of the year, they are compelled to bathe twice a-week for cleanliness, but never suffered to remain in the water long enough to weaken them, or injure the development of their physical strength. Two baths, one for the boys, and another for the girls, are placed behind the colonnades, which unite the right and left wings to the central building. Independently of a large stone reservoir, where there is water for the children up to their necks, there are four fountains, each of which supplies water by fourteen cocks. Two stop-cocks, one of which gives access to cold, and the other to warm water, afford the power of proportioning the water which flows from the fountains to the temperature of the atmosphere. To these fountains the children repair three times a-day to wash their hands; before breakfast, dinner, and supper.

Each wing of the central edifice faces a very large court, reserved for the exercises and games of the children; for the same attention is paid to their amusements as to their instruction and labours. In the large court, reserved for the boys, they are taught to march in step, both in line and in files, and even to perform complicated movements, which they execute with much

precision : but arms are never put into their hands. Over the colonnade which faces the central building, there are two workshops, where the children are employed alternately on the days when they are not at study. In the one shop, they are taught the business of tailoring, and, in the other, that of shoe-making. In this manner they learn to make and mend their own clothing and shoes, and the wants of the establishment in these lines are supplied by their industry. A circumstance which had a very singular effect, was to observe, in the central building, among the girls learning to read and write, little boys of five and six years of age, receiving instruction in knitting stockings.

Infants are received into the school before they have completed their fourth year; the establishment even charges itself with orphans at the breast, who are sent to nurse at the Isle of Wight, from whence they return at the expiration of three years.

On their leaving the Military Asylum, the children are free to choose a calling in civil life; but the greater part of the boys prefer the profession of arms, and, it is worthy of remark, that even those who are apprenticed to some civil trade, usually return to a military life, in the habits of which they have been practiced in infancy. Napoleon perfectly understood this influence of early association, when he transformed our peaceful seminaries of knowledge into barracks for military apprenticeship. It will probably require full half a century before the fatal effects of such a measure have ceased to operate upon the manners of the French nation.

The uniform is scarlet, like that of the army, with blue stockings and breeches. The expenditure is regulated with economy and wisdom. The pay of officers, the clothing, board, and salary of masters and servants; the clothing and maintenance of one thousand two hundred and fifty children at Chelsea, and of one hundred at the Isle of Wight, including all contingent charges, amounted, in the year 1819, to £28,161, making an average cost per child of less than twenty guineas. At Southampton, the expence per child was about the same, and the total estimated charge for all branches of the asylum for the year, was 36,482*l.* 17*s.* 7*d.*

It is surprising, that instead of sufficiently enlarging the fine establishment at Chelsea, the government should have preferred forming a second receptacle at Southampton, beyond the inspection of the superior authorities, and producing the additional expence of a second staff, and corps of instruction. The original expence of the building of the asylum at Chelsea, including the purchase of the ground, &c. exceeded £100,000.

Royal Military College.—In 1799, the necessity of forming

regimental officers, and more particularly those of the staff, with a perfect knowledge of the theory of the art of war, caused the foundation of the institution known under the title of the Royal Military College. It is under the immediate command of a governor and lieutenant-governor. All the military officers of the establishment are appointed by royal commission, and subject to the articles of war, and regulations of the army.

The junior department of the college, analogous to our French school of Saint Cyr, is devoted to the education of youth destined for the army. When distinguished by merit and assiduity at their studies, these young men are sometimes permitted to continue at the college after their appointment to regiments, for a further prosecution of their studies.

Sandhurst, where the Military College is situated, is about thirty miles from London, on the western road; on the way thither, from the metropolis, we crossed the plain where King John was constrained to grant the Magna Charta to his subjects, whom his tyranny and bad faith had driven to revolt. We afterwards gradually ascended an irregular hilly tract of country, from whence the eye wanders in every direction over vast plains of heath of frightful sterility. It is not until the traveller approaches the vicinity of the college, that he can perceive here and there an occasional plantation of young firs, the principal extent of which is either on the property of the Duke of Gloucester, or of the college. This uncultivated appearance of the country enhances the magnificence of the buildings of the Military College.

There are no large amphitheatres for general lessons in the Military College, as in our first-rate academies; these are supplied here by halls of study, with a semi-circle table in each, sufficient for about five-and-twenty pupils to sit on the side opposite to the master, and facing the small desk at which he is placed. For mathematical instructions, large slates, or black boards, are suspended, and on these the pupil traces the figure from which he demonstrates his proposition.

The dormitories are situated on the first floor of the central building, and in the wings; every room contains five beds, occupied by the same number of cadets, an under-officer presiding in each chamber, who is responsible for the good order and regularity of his charge. The dress of the youths is neat and handsome. The uniform is composed of a scarlet coat with blue facings, as in all royal corps; with loose pantaloons, of the colour of the facings. The students are instructed in all the military exercises. They have a band, the individuals of which are practised on the bugle, as well as the usual martial instruments; these musicians are boys selected from the Military

Asylum, and, of course, form a class distinct from, and inferior to, the gentlemen cadets.

Although the elements only of mathematics are taught at the Institution, the Military College has had the distinction of numbering among its professors, in the few years of its existence, two of the most eminent mathematicians of Great Britain—*Ivory and Wallace*.

The object of the senior department of the College is to instruct officers already in the service, in the scientific parts of the art of war, that they afterwards may be enabled to discharge, with the greatest possible advantage, the functions of commanding officers of corps, or of situations on the staff of the quartermaster and adjutant-general, whenever promotion, or the circumstances of warfare, may summon them to such employments.

To be received as a student in this department, an officer must be twenty-one years of age; he must have served three years abroad with his regiment, or four on home duty, and be able to produce certificates from his commanders, not only of good character and conduct, but of his practical knowledge of the discipline of the service to which he belongs. The pupils make an annual contribution to the funds of the college, which is, at present, fixed at thirty guineas per annum. During their residence at the Institution, they wear the uniform of their respective regiments, and continue subject to military discipline and law.

Royal Academy for the Artillery and Engineers.—The academy at Woolwich, like the Military College, is divided into two schools, the first appropriated to pupils of the youngest age; the second to those more advanced. The latter is, properly speaking, the only part of the Institution which can be considered as a special professional school.

The pupils for the academy are chosen among the sons of the nobility, gentry, and corps of officers of the service; and are received between the ages of fourteen and sixteen. They are, at first, entered into the under school, and, at the end of a-year, are examined in the first elements of the mathematics. For each cadet, and during the whole time of his residence at the academy, the government pays half-a-crown per day. This sum is sufficient for the entire support of the pupil, on whose account his parents are at no expense whatever, except what is paid on entering the institution,—fourteen guineas into the chest of the academy.

The Military Academy was, formerly, wholly situated in the artillery arsenal at Woolwich; but the old accommodations being found insufficient when the establishment received augmentations, they were reserved for the elementary division, and

a large edifice erected for the upper school, which is equally remarkable for its structure and position. Built on the slope of a hill, and in the rear of an extensive esplanade, it presents one of the most beautiful points of view which the environs of London and the banks of the Thames can offer.

The Military Academy of Woolwich has, like the French Polytechnic School, although with less splendour and extent, rendered important services to the general cause of mathematics and natural philosophy. Its professors have always been distinguished by their talents and celebrated by their works. Simson was long mathematical professor there; and his successor, Hutton, with inferior powers in the treatment of questions purely theoretical, has distinguished himself in the happy application of such questions to the ballistic pendulum. Finally, Bonnycastle, Barlow, Gregory, &c. have propagated knowledge in their elementary writings, which had been previously too much neglected in England. These learned and laborious men have contributed, in our days, to revive the honour and promote the cultivation of the exact sciences which appeared, for a length of time, almost abandoned on the spot where Barrow, Wallis, Cotes, Taylor, M'Laurin, and the great Newton, had erected immortal monuments of mathematical philosophy.

Fortifications of Dover, Chatham, and Portsmouth.

The English seem to have regarded Dover as the key of defence of this part of their coast; and, accordingly, immense works have been constructed around it, both at the earliest and latest epochs of history. From Dover to the northward, the sea-coast is precipitous for a considerable distance, being formed of calcareous cliffs, which the waves regularly undermine and destroy with great rapidity. On the first of these hills, thus worn perpendicularly, is the castle of Dover, an old Roman camp, which William the Conqueror afterwards fortified with much strength. At present, it consists of a circumference of walls, flanked by ancient towers, some of which are circular and others square. It is strong only from position, and particularly secure against an attack by sea. In the perpendicular face of the hill, on which the castle is built, casements have been excavated for mortars and cannon, to command the sea, and defend the approach to the port, and the sands at the foot of the castle, which are sometimes dry at low water.

On the other side of Dover is a long hill, at the base of which the town is spread in an irregular line. A magnificent flight of winding steps, with an ascent of above thirty-three yards, leads by a postern from the midst of the town to an esplanade in front of a triple range of barracks, built half-way up the hill, and

looking out towards the sea. These barracks are of brick, in a simple regular style, and therefore have an excellent effect. Opposite to each range of barracks are isolated kitchens, built at the south side; and, in the same direction, a large guard-room, surrounded with a portico of light columns.

In advancing towards the south, there is another sweep of the hill, with a range of new barracks also facing the water. Below these, and at the very edge of the sea, on a small eminence, is a bastioned fort, which by a razing fire protects the entrance to the harbour of Dover. At the foot of this work commences a line of fortifications which follows the commanding range of the hill as far as its crest at the south. On this point, the most elevated of the whole, is a kind of citadel, with magazines, barracks, and casemates. The platform of the hill, which is broad and very long, is entirely occupied by an intrenched camp, the ditches of which are broad and scarped with brick, the walls well raised, and the whole protected by a covert-way. Within the line of fortifications, a fine road, with a slope sufficiently gentle for the easy transport of artillery, runs from the south of Dover, and follows the side of the hill, to reach the summit at the gates of the citadel and camp.

On leaving Dover for London, the traveller crosses a dry, irregular, and thinly-wooded country, presenting a number of hills and vallies, but no great natural obstacles, until he arrives at Chatham, on the banks of the Medway.

At Chatham, the park of artillery is not the sole establishment possessed by the ordnance there; that essential military point is provided with barracks, magazines, and fortifications, which, united with the dock-yard and naval arsenal, render it altogether a place of the utmost importance. Chatham is not defended by any continued line of fortifications, but by a system of isolated works affording reciprocal protection to each other. It is only a few years ago since these works were undertaken, or at least finished. The origin of the greater part is of the same date as the encampment at Boulogne of the French army, which menaced England with invasion. Had the operation been tried, and the troops once landed, they might have reached the heights of Chatham in two days' march, and have possessed themselves without much difficulty of the ordnance and marine establishments.

To protect these, when Phillip II. threatened England with invasion, and prepared his great armada for the attempt, Elizabeth, who knew the value of the position of Chatham, built the fort known by the name of Upnor Castle, on the left bank of the Medway, opposite the naval arsenal. Upnor Castle, however, was far from sufficing for the defence of the establishments at Chatham; it did not prevent Ruyter from effecting their destruction, in 1667, and carrying away the vessels moored in the

Medway. After that disgraceful epoch, the citadel of Chatham was constructed, as well as the two fronts of works which descend from the citadel to the Medway, the one above, and the other below the park of artillery and dock-yard. The space enclosed by these works contains barracks for the infantry, royal marines, artillery, and engineers, as well as a great number of magazines, belonging both to government and to individuals.

Above these edifices, and a little to the north on the platform which crowns the hill, are situated the engineer-barracks, which by the grandeur and regularity of their construction, by the majestic beauty and simplicity of the architecture, appeared to me to be a model of their kind. In front of the railing which encloses the parade of these barracks, is an esplanade of considerable extent. On inclining to the left, the stranger descends towards the front of fortifications which defend the channel of the Medway. In continuing to follow this direction to approach the town, we turn sharply, and move towards the Medway, at right angles, by descending steep and irregular passages.

The buildings belonging to the park of artillery are within the fortifications, but the park of guns itself is outside of them, extending like a glacis to the Medway. This point is at the extremity of a deep defile, through which ran the old road from London to Dover. The present road, on leaving Rochester, passes above Chatham.

On the other side of the defile stands Fort Pitt, scarped with masonry and bastioned. It is the largest of all the works which cover Chatham, the most important, and the nearest to the citadel. On the opposite quarter, the fire of Fort Pitt crosses that of Fort Clarence, an immense tower of defence placed on a hill above Rochester. The flanks of Fort Pitt are provided with carronades, in frames turning upon pivots, to sweep the different parts of the ditch. The gorge of the fort presents a front of fortification casemated with embrasures, to command the town of Chatham, and the course of the Medway, in front of the park of artillery and dock-yard. The casements are fine and perfectly well constructed; no moisture penetrates into them, and they are at present inhabited by invalids, who compose the only garrison of this fortress.

The town of *Portsmouth*, properly speaking, has little extent, and does not contain above seven thousand inhabitants; it is enclosed within fortifications: beyond the limits of the town are situated the victualling-office, the ordnance, arsenal, and the dock-yard; which three establishments are all included in the town of Portsea, extending to the northward of that of Portsmouth. It is about fifty years since the undertaking was com-

menced of enclosing Portsea also within a line of regular works, which, on their left, rest upon the vast way forming the harbour of Portsmouth: and, on the right, upon the land-front of the fortifications of the town of Portsmouth.

Portsmouth and Portsea being situated on a soil very little above the level of the sea, the ditches of the works are full of water, which, to prevent any unhealthy effect, is replenished at every tide. In front of the left of Portsmouth, a lake, formed by the sea-water, and confined by a sluice, serves to put a large mill in motion when the tide is out. This mill is situated between the victualling-office and the arsenal, and in a time of siege would supply all the wants of the garrison.

On the land-side, if we extend our observation beyond the line of works, we shall see that Portsmouth and Portsea lie at the southerly angle of a triangular peninsula, of which Portchester lake forms one boundry, the sea a second, and the bay of Lavyston the third. At the apex of this triangle, where the road to London passes, a canal unites the lake and the bay, and some fortifications by land defend this narrow passage. Beyond these defences commences a slope, at first very gradual, but afterwards rising at a short distance more boldly, until it forms the summit of a range of hills, termed Portsdown, and which extend considerably away.

The crest of this chain of hills is one of the central points marked by Lloyd as stations for corps of observation, in case England should be threatened with invasion on the side of France. It is, indeed, evident that, independently of the advantages of this position, from its situation with regard to places of probable debarkation nearer to the Thames, or in the direction of Plymouth, it would be almost impossible for an invader to attempt the siege of Portsmouth, in presence of a corps of observation encamped on the hills of Portsdown. The besieger would never dare to shut himself up in the confined Island of Portsea, where all communication, all retreat by land or sea, would be entirely cut off. It would be equally difficult and dangerous to march upon Gosport, across a swampy country, where the assailant would be exposed, on the right and left, to the attacks of a naval force in the bays of Southampton and Portchester, while he would be taken in reverse by the Portsdown-hills.

THE END.

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